From 30681d92bab8aefad314939e6f99a15ca4cae265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cyril Servant Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:47:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] feature: read force-command from client certificate --- cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go | 42 +- cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy_test.go | 83 + doc/sshproxy.txt | 7 + go.mod | 1 + go.sum | 4 + test/sshUserAuthCert | 1 + test/sshUserAuthCertForceCmd | 1 + test/sshUserAuthInvalidKey | 1 + test/sshUserAuthKey | 1 + test/sshUserAuthPassword | 1 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE | 27 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS | 22 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go | 159 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go | 99 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go | 199 ++ .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go | 16 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s | 307 +++ .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go | 398 ++++ .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go | 13 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.go | 16 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.s | 501 +++++ .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go | 27 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s | 224 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go | 42 + .../x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go | 93 + .../x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go | 31 + .../x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go | 34 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go | 9 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go | 99 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s | 93 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_asm.go | 47 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go | 312 +++ .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_loong64.s | 123 ++ .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64x.s | 187 ++ .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go | 76 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s | 503 +++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go | 97 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go | 624 ++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go | 645 ++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go | 789 +++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go | 283 +++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go | 788 +++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go | 727 +++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go | 155 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go | 34 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go | 847 ++++++++ .../ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go | 93 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go | 807 ++++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go | 1822 +++++++++++++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go | 84 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go | 893 ++++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mlkem.go | 168 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go | 357 ++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go | 955 +++++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go | 647 ++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go | 139 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go | 116 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go | 509 +++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go | 377 ++++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s | 17 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_darwin_x86_gc.s | 17 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go | 66 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go | 338 +++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go | 33 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go | 73 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go | 194 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s | 39 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_darwin_x86.go | 61 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go | 12 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go | 21 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go | 15 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.s | 26 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go | 11 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go | 22 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c | 37 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go | 25 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go | 15 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go | 39 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go | 120 ++ .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_loong64.go | 22 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go | 22 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go | 9 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go | 30 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_riscv64.go | 160 ++ .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go | 40 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go | 50 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.s | 13 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go | 15 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go | 11 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go | 173 ++ .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go | 65 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s | 11 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go | 9 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go | 9 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go | 11 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go | 12 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go | 11 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_x86.go | 11 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go | 16 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go | 32 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go | 172 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s | 57 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go | 17 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go | 162 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos.go | 10 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos_s390x.go | 25 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_big.go | 10 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_little.go | 10 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/hwcap_linux.go | 71 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go | 43 + .../x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go | 53 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go | 16 + .../x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go | 18 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go | 26 + .../x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go | 35 + .../x/sys/cpu/syscall_darwin_x86_gc.go | 98 + vendor/modules.txt | 10 + 117 files changed, 18499 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 test/sshUserAuthCert create mode 100644 test/sshUserAuthCertForceCmd create mode 100644 test/sshUserAuthInvalidKey create mode 100644 test/sshUserAuthKey create mode 100644 test/sshUserAuthPassword create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_asm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_loong64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mlkem.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_darwin_x86_gc.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_darwin_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_loong64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_riscv64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_big.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_little.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/hwcap_linux.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_darwin_x86_gc.go diff --git a/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go b/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go index e1633527..581a97d2 100644 --- a/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go +++ b/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ package main import ( + "bytes" "context" "errors" "flag" @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ import ( "github.com/moby/term" "github.com/op/go-logging" "go.etcd.io/etcd/client/v3" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" ) var ( @@ -206,6 +208,42 @@ type ConnInfo struct { SSH *SSHInfo // SSH source and destination (from SSH_CONNECTION) } +// GetOriginalCommand returns the force-command included in the client ssh +// certificate, if any. Otherwise, it returns the content of the environment +// variable SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND. No error is returned. In case of any error, +// the content of SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND will be returned. The second returned +// string is a comment for debugging purpose. +func getOriginalCommand() (string, string) { + userAuthFile := os.Getenv("SSH_USER_AUTH") + if userAuthFile != "" { + // The environment variable is present + content, err := os.ReadFile(userAuthFile) + if err == nil { + // The temporary file is read + prefix := []byte("publickey ") + key, found := bytes.CutPrefix(content, prefix) + if found { + // The file contains a publickey + pubKey, _, _, _, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(key) + if err == nil { + // The publickey is parsed + cert, ok := pubKey.(*ssh.Certificate) + if ok && cert.Permissions.CriticalOptions != nil && cert.Permissions.CriticalOptions["force-command"] != "" { + // the publickey is a certificate, and contains a + // force-command + return cert.Permissions.CriticalOptions["force-command"], " (forced) " + } + } else { + log.Warning(err) + } + } + } else { + log.Warning(err) + } + } + return os.Getenv("SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"), " " +} + func main() { os.Exit(mainExitCode()) } @@ -428,8 +466,8 @@ func mainExitCode() int { } }() - originalCmd := os.Getenv("SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND") - log.Debugf("original command = %s", originalCmd) + originalCmd, comment := getOriginalCommand() + log.Debugf("original command%s= %s", comment, originalCmd) interactiveCommand := term.IsTerminal(os.Stdout.Fd()) log.Debugf("interactiveCommand = %v", interactiveCommand) diff --git a/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy_test.go b/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy_test.go index 6f3e12a3..5990caae 100644 --- a/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy_test.go +++ b/cmd/sshproxy/sshproxy_test.go @@ -530,3 +530,86 @@ func BenchmarkSrcDst(b *testing.B) { } }) } + +var getOriginalCommandTests = []struct { + sshUserAuth string + wantCmd string + wantComment string + logs []string +}{ + { + // without SSH_USER_AUTH + "", + "", + " ", + []string{}, + }, { + // with a wrong SSH_USER_AUTH + "_non_existing_file_", + "", + " ", + []string{ + "open _non_existing_file_: no such file or directory", + }, + }, { + // SSH_USER_AUTH is not a publickey + "../../test/sshUserAuthPassword", + "", + " ", + []string{}, + }, { + // error in the publickey + "../../test/sshUserAuthInvalidKey", + "", + " ", + []string{ + "ssh: no key found", + }, + }, { + // publickey is not a certificate + "../../test/sshUserAuthKey", + "", + " ", + []string{}, + }, { + // publickey is a certificate without force-command + "../../test/sshUserAuthCert", + "", + " ", + []string{}, + }, { + // publickey is a certificate with force-command + "../../test/sshUserAuthCertForceCmd", + "test-command", + " (forced) ", + []string{}, + }, +} + +func TestGetOriginalCommand(t *testing.T) { + for _, tt := range getOriginalCommandTests { + logBackend := setTestLogBackend() + os.Setenv("SSH_USER_AUTH", tt.sshUserAuth) + originalCmd, comment := getOriginalCommand() + if originalCmd != tt.wantCmd || comment != tt.wantComment { + t.Errorf("want '%s' - '%s', got '%s' - '%s'", tt.wantCmd, tt.wantComment, originalCmd, comment) + } + logs := getTestLogs(logBackend) + if !reflect.DeepEqual(tt.logs, logs) { + t.Errorf("want %v, got %v", tt.logs, logs) + } + } + os.Unsetenv("SSH_USER_AUTH") +} + +func BenchmarkGetOriginalCommand(b *testing.B) { + for _, tt := range getOriginalCommandTests { + os.Setenv("SSH_USER_AUTH", tt.sshUserAuth) + b.Run(tt.sshUserAuth, func(b *testing.B) { + for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { + getOriginalCommand() + } + }) + } + os.Unsetenv("SSH_USER_AUTH") +} diff --git a/doc/sshproxy.txt b/doc/sshproxy.txt index e54e3981..1dcbfb09 100644 --- a/doc/sshproxy.txt +++ b/doc/sshproxy.txt @@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ DESCRIPTION 'sshproxy' is used on a gateway to proxy SSH connections. +If the SSH server sets the 'SSH_USER_AUTH' environment variable (see +'ExposeAuthInfo' in openssh's 'sshd_config'), 'sshproxy' uses it to get the +'force-command' directive of the client's signed ssh public key. If a +'force-command' is found, it is used as an argument to the 'ssh' command +forked by sshproxy. Otherwise, the 'SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND' environment variable +is used as the argument to the 'ssh' command. + OPTIONS ------- diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index f3101e21..3242f7b4 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ require ( go.etcd.io/etcd/api/v3 v3.6.5 go.etcd.io/etcd/client/v3 v3.6.5 go.uber.org/zap v1.27.0 + golang.org/x/crypto v0.43.0 google.golang.org/grpc v1.76.0 gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 ) diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index 6942755a..4abf8157 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ go.uber.org/zap v1.27.0/go.mod h1:GB2qFLM7cTU87MWRP2mPIjqfIDnGu+VIO4V/SdhGo2E= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.43.0 h1:dduJYIi3A3KOfdGOHX8AVZ/jGiyPa3IbBozJ5kNuE04= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.43.0/go.mod h1:BFbav4mRNlXJL4wNeejLpWxB7wMbc79PdRGhWKncxR0= golang.org/x/mod v0.2.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA= golang.org/x/mod v0.3.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190404232315-eb5bcb51f2a3/go.mod h1:t9HGtf8HONx5eT2rtn7q6eTqICYqUVnKs3thJo3Qplg= @@ -114,6 +116,8 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210616094352-59db8d763f22/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBc golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg= golang.org/x/sys v0.37.0 h1:fdNQudmxPjkdUTPnLn5mdQv7Zwvbvpaxqs831goi9kQ= golang.org/x/sys v0.37.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks= +golang.org/x/term v0.36.0 h1:zMPR+aF8gfksFprF/Nc/rd1wRS1EI6nDBGyWAvDzx2Q= +golang.org/x/term v0.36.0/go.mod h1:Qu394IJq6V6dCBRgwqshf3mPF85AqzYEzofzRdZkWss= golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ= golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ= golang.org/x/text v0.30.0 h1:yznKA/E9zq54KzlzBEAWn1NXSQ8DIp/NYMy88xJjl4k= diff --git a/test/sshUserAuthCert b/test/sshUserAuthCert new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6032d8d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/sshUserAuthCert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +publickey ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 diff --git a/test/sshUserAuthCertForceCmd b/test/sshUserAuthCertForceCmd new file mode 100644 index 00000000..897a7618 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/sshUserAuthCertForceCmd @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +publickey ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 diff --git a/test/sshUserAuthInvalidKey b/test/sshUserAuthInvalidKey new file mode 100644 index 00000000..68a9cf69 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/sshUserAuthInvalidKey @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +publickey invalid_data diff --git a/test/sshUserAuthKey b/test/sshUserAuthKey new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf8afcfb --- /dev/null +++ b/test/sshUserAuthKey @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +publickey ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINQMu6aptjzBfNLiyi0y2Y1s1Qfdvuj9KVTqbIAN/cLY diff --git a/test/sshUserAuthPassword b/test/sshUserAuthPassword new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3097ab1 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/sshUserAuthPassword @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +password diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a7cf70d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are +met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above +copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer +in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the +distribution. + * Neither the name of Google LLC nor the names of its +contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from +this software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..73309904 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +Additional IP Rights Grant (Patents) + +"This implementation" means the copyrightable works distributed by +Google as part of the Go project. + +Google hereby grants to You a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, +no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section) +patent license to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import, +transfer and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of this +implementation of Go, where such license applies only to those patent +claims, both currently owned or controlled by Google and acquired in +the future, licensable by Google that are necessarily infringed by this +implementation of Go. This grant does not include claims that would be +infringed only as a consequence of further modification of this +implementation. If you or your agent or exclusive licensee institute or +order or agree to the institution of patent litigation against any +entity (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging +that this implementation of Go or any code incorporated within this +implementation of Go constitutes direct or contributory patent +infringement, or inducement of patent infringement, then any patent +rights granted to you under this License for this implementation of Go +shall terminate as of the date such litigation is filed. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d80f195 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package blowfish + +// getNextWord returns the next big-endian uint32 value from the byte slice +// at the given position in a circular manner, updating the position. +func getNextWord(b []byte, pos *int) uint32 { + var w uint32 + j := *pos + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + w = w<<8 | uint32(b[j]) + j++ + if j >= len(b) { + j = 0 + } + } + *pos = j + return w +} + +// ExpandKey performs a key expansion on the given *Cipher. Specifically, it +// performs the Blowfish algorithm's key schedule which sets up the *Cipher's +// pi and substitution tables for calls to Encrypt. This is used, primarily, +// by the bcrypt package to reuse the Blowfish key schedule during its +// set up. It's unlikely that you need to use this directly. +func ExpandKey(key []byte, c *Cipher) { + j := 0 + for i := 0; i < 18; i++ { + // Using inlined getNextWord for performance. + var d uint32 + for k := 0; k < 4; k++ { + d = d<<8 | uint32(key[j]) + j++ + if j >= len(key) { + j = 0 + } + } + c.p[i] ^= d + } + + var l, r uint32 + for i := 0; i < 18; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.p[i], c.p[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s0[i], c.s0[i+1] = l, r + } + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s1[i], c.s1[i+1] = l, r + } + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s2[i], c.s2[i+1] = l, r + } + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s3[i], c.s3[i+1] = l, r + } +} + +// This is similar to ExpandKey, but folds the salt during the key +// schedule. While ExpandKey is essentially expandKeyWithSalt with an all-zero +// salt passed in, reusing ExpandKey turns out to be a place of inefficiency +// and specializing it here is useful. +func expandKeyWithSalt(key []byte, salt []byte, c *Cipher) { + j := 0 + for i := 0; i < 18; i++ { + c.p[i] ^= getNextWord(key, &j) + } + + j = 0 + var l, r uint32 + for i := 0; i < 18; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.p[i], c.p[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s0[i], c.s0[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s1[i], c.s1[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s2[i], c.s2[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s3[i], c.s3[i+1] = l, r + } +} + +func encryptBlock(l, r uint32, c *Cipher) (uint32, uint32) { + xl, xr := l, r + xl ^= c.p[0] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[1] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[2] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[3] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[4] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[5] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[6] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[7] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[8] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[9] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[10] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[11] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[12] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[13] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[14] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[15] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[16] + xr ^= c.p[17] + return xr, xl +} + +func decryptBlock(l, r uint32, c *Cipher) (uint32, uint32) { + xl, xr := l, r + xl ^= c.p[17] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[16] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[15] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[14] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[13] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[12] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[11] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[10] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[9] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[8] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[7] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[6] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[5] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[4] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[3] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[2] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[1] + xr ^= c.p[0] + return xr, xl +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08989568 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package blowfish implements Bruce Schneier's Blowfish encryption algorithm. +// +// Blowfish is a legacy cipher and its short block size makes it vulnerable to +// birthday bound attacks (see https://sweet32.info). It should only be used +// where compatibility with legacy systems, not security, is the goal. +// +// Deprecated: any new system should use AES (from crypto/aes, if necessary in +// an AEAD mode like crypto/cipher.NewGCM) or XChaCha20-Poly1305 (from +// golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305). +package blowfish + +// The code is a port of Bruce Schneier's C implementation. +// See https://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html. + +import "strconv" + +// The Blowfish block size in bytes. +const BlockSize = 8 + +// A Cipher is an instance of Blowfish encryption using a particular key. +type Cipher struct { + p [18]uint32 + s0, s1, s2, s3 [256]uint32 +} + +type KeySizeError int + +func (k KeySizeError) Error() string { + return "crypto/blowfish: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(int(k)) +} + +// NewCipher creates and returns a Cipher. +// The key argument should be the Blowfish key, from 1 to 56 bytes. +func NewCipher(key []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + var result Cipher + if k := len(key); k < 1 || k > 56 { + return nil, KeySizeError(k) + } + initCipher(&result) + ExpandKey(key, &result) + return &result, nil +} + +// NewSaltedCipher creates a returns a Cipher that folds a salt into its key +// schedule. For most purposes, NewCipher, instead of NewSaltedCipher, is +// sufficient and desirable. For bcrypt compatibility, the key can be over 56 +// bytes. +func NewSaltedCipher(key, salt []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + if len(salt) == 0 { + return NewCipher(key) + } + var result Cipher + if k := len(key); k < 1 { + return nil, KeySizeError(k) + } + initCipher(&result) + expandKeyWithSalt(key, salt, &result) + return &result, nil +} + +// BlockSize returns the Blowfish block size, 8 bytes. +// It is necessary to satisfy the Block interface in the +// package "crypto/cipher". +func (c *Cipher) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize } + +// Encrypt encrypts the 8-byte buffer src using the key k +// and stores the result in dst. +// Note that for amounts of data larger than a block, +// it is not safe to just call Encrypt on successive blocks; +// instead, use an encryption mode like CBC (see crypto/cipher/cbc.go). +func (c *Cipher) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) { + l := uint32(src[0])<<24 | uint32(src[1])<<16 | uint32(src[2])<<8 | uint32(src[3]) + r := uint32(src[4])<<24 | uint32(src[5])<<16 | uint32(src[6])<<8 | uint32(src[7]) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + dst[0], dst[1], dst[2], dst[3] = byte(l>>24), byte(l>>16), byte(l>>8), byte(l) + dst[4], dst[5], dst[6], dst[7] = byte(r>>24), byte(r>>16), byte(r>>8), byte(r) +} + +// Decrypt decrypts the 8-byte buffer src using the key k +// and stores the result in dst. +func (c *Cipher) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) { + l := uint32(src[0])<<24 | uint32(src[1])<<16 | uint32(src[2])<<8 | uint32(src[3]) + r := uint32(src[4])<<24 | uint32(src[5])<<16 | uint32(src[6])<<8 | uint32(src[7]) + l, r = decryptBlock(l, r, c) + dst[0], dst[1], dst[2], dst[3] = byte(l>>24), byte(l>>16), byte(l>>8), byte(l) + dst[4], dst[5], dst[6], dst[7] = byte(r>>24), byte(r>>16), byte(r>>8), byte(r) +} + +func initCipher(c *Cipher) { + copy(c.p[0:], p[0:]) + copy(c.s0[0:], s0[0:]) + copy(c.s1[0:], s1[0:]) + copy(c.s2[0:], s2[0:]) + copy(c.s3[0:], s3[0:]) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0407759 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// The startup permutation array and substitution boxes. +// They are the hexadecimal digits of PI; see: +// https://www.schneier.com/code/constants.txt. + +package blowfish + +var s0 = [256]uint32{ + 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7, 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, + 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99, 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16, + 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e, 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, + 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee, 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013, + 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef, 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, + 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e, 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60, + 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440, 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, + 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce, 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a, + 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e, 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, + 0x7a325381, 0x28958677, 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193, + 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032, 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, + 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88, 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239, + 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e, 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, + 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0, 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3, + 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98, 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, + 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88, 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe, + 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6, 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, + 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d, 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b, + 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7, 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, + 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba, 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463, + 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f, 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, + 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09, 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3, + 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb, 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, + 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279, 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8, + 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab, 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, + 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82, 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db, + 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573, 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, + 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0, 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b, + 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790, 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, + 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8, 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4, + 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0, 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, + 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7, 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c, + 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad, 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, + 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1, 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299, + 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9, 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, + 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477, 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf, + 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49, 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, + 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af, 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa, + 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5, 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, + 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41, 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915, + 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400, 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, + 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915, 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664, + 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a, +} + +var s1 = [256]uint32{ + 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623, 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, + 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266, 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1, + 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e, 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, + 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6, 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1, + 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e, 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, + 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1, 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737, + 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8, 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, + 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff, 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd, + 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701, 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, + 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7, 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41, + 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331, 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, + 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf, 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af, + 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e, 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, + 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87, 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c, + 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2, 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, + 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16, 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd, + 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b, 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, + 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509, 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e, + 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3, 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, + 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f, 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a, + 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4, 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, + 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960, 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66, + 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28, 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, + 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802, 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84, + 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510, 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, + 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf, 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14, + 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e, 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, + 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50, 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7, + 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8, 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, + 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281, 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99, + 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696, 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, + 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128, 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73, + 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0, 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, + 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0, 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105, + 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250, 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, + 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3, 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285, + 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00, 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, + 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061, 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb, + 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e, 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, + 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735, 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc, + 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9, 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, + 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340, 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20, + 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7, +} + +var s2 = [256]uint32{ + 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934, 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, + 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068, 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af, + 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840, 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, + 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45, 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504, + 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a, 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, + 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb, 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee, + 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6, 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, + 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42, 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b, + 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2, 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, + 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb, 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527, + 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b, 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, + 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33, 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c, + 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3, 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, + 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc, 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17, + 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564, 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, + 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b, 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115, + 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922, 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, + 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728, 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0, + 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e, 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, + 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37, 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d, + 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804, 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, + 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b, 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3, + 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb, 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, + 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d, 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c, + 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350, 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, + 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9, 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a, + 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe, 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, + 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d, 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc, + 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f, 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, + 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61, 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2, + 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9, 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, + 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2, 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c, + 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e, 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, + 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633, 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10, + 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169, 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, + 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52, 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027, + 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5, 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, + 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62, 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634, + 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76, 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, + 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24, 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc, + 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4, 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, + 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c, 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837, + 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0, +} + +var s3 = [256]uint32{ + 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b, 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, + 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe, 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b, + 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4, 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, + 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8, 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6, + 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304, 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, + 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22, 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4, + 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6, 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, + 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9, 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59, + 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593, 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, + 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51, 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28, + 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c, 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, + 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b, 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28, + 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c, 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, + 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd, 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a, + 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319, 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, + 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb, 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f, + 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991, 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, + 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32, 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680, + 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166, 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, + 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae, 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb, + 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5, 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, + 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47, 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370, + 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d, 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, + 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84, 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048, + 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8, 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, + 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd, 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9, + 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7, 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, + 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38, 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f, + 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c, 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, + 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525, 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1, + 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442, 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, + 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964, 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e, + 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8, 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, + 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d, 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f, + 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299, 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, + 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02, 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc, + 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614, 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, + 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a, 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6, + 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b, 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, + 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0, 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060, + 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e, 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, + 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9, 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f, + 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6, +} + +var p = [18]uint32{ + 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344, 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, + 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89, 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c, + 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917, 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b, +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..661ea132 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7dd2638e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 10 + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R1 + MOVD src+24(FP), R2 + MOVD src_len+32(FP), R3 + MOVD key+48(FP), R4 + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 + + MOVD $·constants(SB), R10 + MOVD $·incRotMatrix(SB), R11 + + MOVW (R7), R20 + + AND $~255, R3, R13 + ADD R2, R13, R12 // R12 for block end + AND $255, R3, R13 +loop: + MOVD $NUM_ROUNDS, R21 + VLD1 (R11), [V30.S4, V31.S4] + + // load contants + // VLD4R (R10), [V0.S4, V1.S4, V2.S4, V3.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E940 + + // load keys + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V4.S4, V5.S4, V6.S4, V7.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE884 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V8.S4, V9.S4, V10.S4, V11.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE888 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V12.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8EC + + // VLD3R (R6), [V13.S4, V14.S4, V15.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8CD + + // update counter + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + +chacha: + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 12) + VADD V8.S4, V12.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V9.S4, V13.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V10.S4, V14.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V11.S4, V15.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 8) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 7) + VADD V12.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V15.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4 + // V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V5.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V6.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V7.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V4.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V15.B16, V0.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V12.B16, V1.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V2.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V3.B16, V14.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 12) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + // V0 += V5; V15 <<<= ((V0 XOR V15), 8) + // ... + VADD V5.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V6.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V7.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V4.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V0.B16, V15.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V12.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V13.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V14.B16, V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 7) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + SUB $1, R21 + CBNZ R21, chacha + + // VLD4R (R10), [V16.S4, V17.S4, V18.S4, V19.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E950 + + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V20.S4, V21.S4, V22.S4, V23.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE894 + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V16.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V17.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V18.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V19.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V24.S4, V25.S4, V26.S4, V27.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE898 + // restore R4 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V28.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8FC + // VLD3R (R6), [V29.S4, V30.S4, V31.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8DD + + VADD V20.S4, V4.S4, V4.S4 + VADD V21.S4, V5.S4, V5.S4 + VADD V22.S4, V6.S4, V6.S4 + VADD V23.S4, V7.S4, V7.S4 + VADD V24.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V25.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V26.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V27.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V28.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V29.S4, V13.S4, V13.S4 + VADD V30.S4, V14.S4, V14.S4 + VADD V31.S4, V15.S4, V15.S4 + + VZIP1 V1.S4, V0.S4, V16.S4 + VZIP2 V1.S4, V0.S4, V17.S4 + VZIP1 V3.S4, V2.S4, V18.S4 + VZIP2 V3.S4, V2.S4, V19.S4 + VZIP1 V5.S4, V4.S4, V20.S4 + VZIP2 V5.S4, V4.S4, V21.S4 + VZIP1 V7.S4, V6.S4, V22.S4 + VZIP2 V7.S4, V6.S4, V23.S4 + VZIP1 V9.S4, V8.S4, V24.S4 + VZIP2 V9.S4, V8.S4, V25.S4 + VZIP1 V11.S4, V10.S4, V26.S4 + VZIP2 V11.S4, V10.S4, V27.S4 + VZIP1 V13.S4, V12.S4, V28.S4 + VZIP2 V13.S4, V12.S4, V29.S4 + VZIP1 V15.S4, V14.S4, V30.S4 + VZIP2 V15.S4, V14.S4, V31.S4 + VZIP1 V18.D2, V16.D2, V0.D2 + VZIP2 V18.D2, V16.D2, V4.D2 + VZIP1 V19.D2, V17.D2, V8.D2 + VZIP2 V19.D2, V17.D2, V12.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16] + + VZIP1 V22.D2, V20.D2, V1.D2 + VZIP2 V22.D2, V20.D2, V5.D2 + VZIP1 V23.D2, V21.D2, V9.D2 + VZIP2 V23.D2, V21.D2, V13.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16] + VZIP1 V26.D2, V24.D2, V2.D2 + VZIP2 V26.D2, V24.D2, V6.D2 + VZIP1 V27.D2, V25.D2, V10.D2 + VZIP2 V27.D2, V25.D2, V14.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16] + VZIP1 V30.D2, V28.D2, V3.D2 + VZIP2 V30.D2, V28.D2, V7.D2 + VZIP1 V31.D2, V29.D2, V11.D2 + VZIP2 V31.D2, V29.D2, V15.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16] + VEOR V0.B16, V16.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V17.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V18.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V19.B16, V19.B16 + VST1.P [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V4.B16, V20.B16, V20.B16 + VEOR V5.B16, V21.B16, V21.B16 + VEOR V6.B16, V22.B16, V22.B16 + VEOR V7.B16, V23.B16, V23.B16 + VST1.P [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V8.B16, V24.B16, V24.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V25.B16, V25.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V26.B16, V26.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V27.B16, V27.B16 + VST1.P [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V12.B16, V28.B16, V28.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V29.B16, V29.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V30.B16, V30.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V31.B16, V31.B16 + VST1.P [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16], 64(R1) + + ADD $4, R20 + MOVW R20, (R7) // update counter + + CMP R2, R12 + BGT loop + + RET + + +DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 + +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x00(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x04(SB)/4, $0x00000001 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x08(SB)/4, $0x00000002 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x00000003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x10(SB)/4, $0x02010003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x14(SB)/4, $0x06050407 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x18(SB)/4, $0x0A09080B +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x0E0D0C0F +GLOBL ·incRotMatrix(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93eb5ae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms +// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01. +package chacha20 + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "math/bits" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias" +) + +const ( + // KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes. + KeySize = 32 + + // NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this + // cipher, in bytes. + // + // Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same + // key is reused more than 2³² times. + NonceSize = 12 + + // NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of + // this cipher, in bytes. + NonceSizeX = 24 +) + +// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key +// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface. +type Cipher struct { + // The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter + // (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce. + key [8]uint32 + counter uint32 + nonce [3]uint32 + + // The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous + // XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are + // computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks. + buf [bufSize]byte + len int + + // overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be + // generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic. + overflow bool + + // The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they + // are computed the first time. + precompDone bool + p1, p5, p9, p13 uint32 + p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32 + p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32 +} + +var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil) + +// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given +// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided, +// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce +// have any other length. +// +// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows +// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more +// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism. +// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305. +func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + c := &Cipher{} + return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce) +} + +func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size") + } + if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX { + // XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a + // derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See + // draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3. + key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16]) + cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + nonce = cNonce + } else if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size") + } + + key, nonce = key[:KeySize], nonce[:NonceSize] // bounds check elimination hint + c.key = [8]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]), + } + c.nonce = [3]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]), + } + return c, nil +} + +// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state. +const ( + j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa + j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3 + j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by + j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k +) + +const blockSize = 64 + +// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words. +// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16 +// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time. +func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) { + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12) + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7) + return a, b, c, d +} + +// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will +// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far. +// +// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less +// than the current value. +// +// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the +// counter value. +func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) { + // Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this + // implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled + // back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks + // we have already output. + outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize + if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter { + panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter") + } + + // In the general case, we set the new counter value and reset s.len to 0, + // causing the next call to XORKeyStream to refill the buffer. However, if + // we're advancing within the existing buffer, we can save work by simply + // setting s.len. + if counter < s.counter { + s.len = int(s.counter-counter) * blockSize + } else { + s.counter = counter + s.len = 0 + } +} + +// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the +// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all. +// +// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable +// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will +// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst. +// +// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of +// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher +// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call. +func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + if len(dst) < len(src) { + panic("chacha20: output smaller than input") + } + dst = dst[:len(src)] + if alias.InexactOverlap(dst, src) { + panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap") + } + + // First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream. + if s.len != 0 { + keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:] + if len(src) < len(keyStream) { + keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)] + } + _ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint + for i, b := range keyStream { + dst[i] = src[i] ^ b + } + s.len -= len(keyStream) + dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):] + } + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + + // If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output, + // panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember + // not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained. + numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 { + panic("chacha20: counter overflow") + } else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 { + s.overflow = true + } + + // xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a + // multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a + // time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize. + + full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize + if full > 0 { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full]) + } + dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:] + + // If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic + // one that does one block at a time. + const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize + if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:] + copy(buf, src) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf) + s.len = len(buf) - copy(dst, buf) + return + } + + // If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and + // keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation. + if len(src) > 0 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + copy(s.buf[:], src) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:]) + s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:]) + } +} + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) { + if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 { + panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length") + } + + // To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state + // (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling, + // alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13) + // or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12). + // + // 0:cccccccc 1:cccccccc 2:cccccccc 3:cccccccc + // 4:kkkkkkkk 5:kkkkkkkk 6:kkkkkkkk 7:kkkkkkkk + // 8:kkkkkkkk 9:kkkkkkkk 10:kkkkkkkk 11:kkkkkkkk + // 12:bbbbbbbb 13:nnnnnnnn 14:nnnnnnnn 15:nnnnnnnn + // + // c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce + var ( + c0, c1, c2, c3 = j0, j1, j2, j3 + c4, c5, c6, c7 = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3] + c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7] + _, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2] + ) + + // Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can + // calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and + // for future XORKeyStream invocations. + if !s.precompDone { + s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13) + s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14) + s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15) + s.precompDone = true + } + + // A condition of len(src) > 0 would be sufficient, but this also + // acts as a bounds check elimination hint. + for len(src) >= 64 && len(dst) >= 64 { + // The remainder of the first column round. + fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter) + + // The second diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14) + + // The remaining 18 rounds. + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + // Column round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + // Add back the initial state to generate the key stream, then + // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result. + addXor(dst[0:4], src[0:4], x0, c0) + addXor(dst[4:8], src[4:8], x1, c1) + addXor(dst[8:12], src[8:12], x2, c2) + addXor(dst[12:16], src[12:16], x3, c3) + addXor(dst[16:20], src[16:20], x4, c4) + addXor(dst[20:24], src[20:24], x5, c5) + addXor(dst[24:28], src[24:28], x6, c6) + addXor(dst[28:32], src[28:32], x7, c7) + addXor(dst[32:36], src[32:36], x8, c8) + addXor(dst[36:40], src[36:40], x9, c9) + addXor(dst[40:44], src[40:44], x10, c10) + addXor(dst[44:48], src[44:48], x11, c11) + addXor(dst[48:52], src[48:52], x12, s.counter) + addXor(dst[52:56], src[52:56], x13, c13) + addXor(dst[56:60], src[56:60], x14, c14) + addXor(dst[60:64], src[60:64], x15, c15) + + s.counter += 1 + + src, dst = src[blockSize:], dst[blockSize:] + } +} + +// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes +// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other +// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction. +func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + out := make([]byte, 32) + return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce) +} + +func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size") + } + if len(nonce) != 16 { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size") + } + + x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3 + x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]) + x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]) + x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]) + x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]) + x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]) + x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]) + x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]) + x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]) + x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]) + x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]) + x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]) + x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16]) + + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + // Diagonal round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Column round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + _ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15) + return out, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c709b728 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!arm64 && !s390x && !ppc64 && !ppc64le) || !gc || purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = blockSize + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd183d9b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego && (ppc64 || ppc64le) + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a660b411 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.s @@ -0,0 +1,501 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment: +// # ==================================================================== +// # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL +// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and +// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further +// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. +// # ==================================================================== + +// Code for the perl script that generates the ppc64 assembler +// can be found in the cryptogams repository at the link below. It is based on +// the original from openssl. + +// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91 + +// The differences in this and the original implementation are +// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants. + +//go:build gc && !purego && (ppc64 || ppc64le) + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define OUT R3 +#define INP R4 +#define LEN R5 +#define KEY R6 +#define CNT R7 +#define TMP R15 + +#define CONSTBASE R16 +#define BLOCKS R17 + +// for VPERMXOR +#define MASK R18 + +DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x00000001 +DATA consts<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA consts<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA consts<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA consts<>+0x20(SB)/4, $0x00000004 +DATA consts<>+0x24(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA consts<>+0x28(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA consts<>+0x2c(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA consts<>+0x30(SB)/4, $0x0e0f0c0d +DATA consts<>+0x34(SB)/4, $0x0a0b0809 +DATA consts<>+0x38(SB)/4, $0x06070405 +DATA consts<>+0x3c(SB)/4, $0x02030001 +DATA consts<>+0x40(SB)/4, $0x0d0e0f0c +DATA consts<>+0x44(SB)/4, $0x090a0b08 +DATA consts<>+0x48(SB)/4, $0x05060704 +DATA consts<>+0x4c(SB)/4, $0x01020300 +DATA consts<>+0x50(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x54(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x58(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x5c(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x60(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x64(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x68(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x6c(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x70(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x74(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x78(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x7c(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x84(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x8c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA consts<>+0x94(SB)/4, $0x00000001 +DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/4, $0x00000002 +DATA consts<>+0x9c(SB)/4, $0x00000003 +DATA consts<>+0xa0(SB)/4, $0x11223300 +DATA consts<>+0xa4(SB)/4, $0x55667744 +DATA consts<>+0xa8(SB)/4, $0x99aabb88 +DATA consts<>+0xac(SB)/4, $0xddeeffcc +DATA consts<>+0xb0(SB)/4, $0x22330011 +DATA consts<>+0xb4(SB)/4, $0x66774455 +DATA consts<>+0xb8(SB)/4, $0xaabb8899 +DATA consts<>+0xbc(SB)/4, $0xeeffccdd +GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xc0 + +#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64 +#define BE_XXBRW_INIT() \ + LVSL (R0)(R0), V24 \ + VSPLTISB $3, V25 \ + VXOR V24, V25, V24 \ + +#define BE_XXBRW(vr) VPERM vr, vr, V24, vr +#else +#define BE_XXBRW_INIT() +#define BE_XXBRW(vr) +#endif + +//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40 + MOVD out+0(FP), OUT + MOVD inp+8(FP), INP + MOVD len+16(FP), LEN + MOVD key+24(FP), KEY + MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT + + // Addressing for constants + MOVD $consts<>+0x00(SB), CONSTBASE + MOVD $16, R8 + MOVD $32, R9 + MOVD $48, R10 + MOVD $64, R11 + SRD $6, LEN, BLOCKS + // for VPERMXOR + MOVD $consts<>+0xa0(SB), MASK + MOVD $16, R20 + // V16 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48 + ADD $80,CONSTBASE + + // Load key into V17,V18 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R0), VS49 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R8), VS50 + + // Load CNT, NONCE into V19 + LXVW4X (CNT)(R0), VS51 + + // Clear V27 + VXOR V27, V27, V27 + + BE_XXBRW_INIT() + + // V28 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60 + + // Load mask constants for VPERMXOR + LXVW4X (MASK)(R0), V20 + LXVW4X (MASK)(R20), V21 + + // splat slot from V19 -> V26 + VSPLTW $0, V19, V26 + + VSLDOI $4, V19, V27, V19 + VSLDOI $12, V27, V19, V19 + + VADDUWM V26, V28, V26 + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + PCALIGN $16 +loop_outer_vsx: + // V0, V1, V2, V3 + LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32 + LXVW4X (R8)(CONSTBASE), VS33 + LXVW4X (R9)(CONSTBASE), VS34 + LXVW4X (R10)(CONSTBASE), VS35 + + // splat values from V17, V18 into V4-V11 + VSPLTW $0, V17, V4 + VSPLTW $1, V17, V5 + VSPLTW $2, V17, V6 + VSPLTW $3, V17, V7 + VSPLTW $0, V18, V8 + VSPLTW $1, V18, V9 + VSPLTW $2, V18, V10 + VSPLTW $3, V18, V11 + + // VOR + VOR V26, V26, V12 + + // splat values from V19 -> V13, V14, V15 + VSPLTW $1, V19, V13 + VSPLTW $2, V19, V14 + VSPLTW $3, V19, V15 + + // splat const values + VSPLTISW $-16, V27 + VSPLTISW $12, V28 + VSPLTISW $8, V29 + VSPLTISW $7, V30 + PCALIGN $16 +loop_vsx: + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VPERMXOR V12, V0, V21, V12 + VPERMXOR V13, V1, V21, V13 + VPERMXOR V14, V2, V21, V14 + VPERMXOR V15, V3, V21, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VPERMXOR V12, V0, V20, V12 + VPERMXOR V13, V1, V20, V13 + VPERMXOR V14, V2, V20, V14 + VPERMXOR V15, V3, V20, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VPERMXOR V15, V0, V21, V15 + VPERMXOR V12, V1, V21, V12 + VPERMXOR V13, V2, V21, V13 + VPERMXOR V14, V3, V21, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VPERMXOR V15, V0, V20, V15 + VPERMXOR V12, V1, V20, V12 + VPERMXOR V13, V2, V20, V13 + VPERMXOR V14, V3, V20, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + BDNZ loop_vsx + + VADDUWM V12, V26, V12 + + VMRGEW V0, V1, V27 + VMRGEW V2, V3, V28 + + VMRGOW V0, V1, V0 + VMRGOW V2, V3, V2 + + VMRGEW V4, V5, V29 + VMRGEW V6, V7, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33 + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34 + + VMRGOW V4, V5, V4 + VMRGOW V6, V7, V6 + + VMRGEW V8, V9, V27 + VMRGEW V10, V11, V28 + + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37 + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38 + + VMRGOW V8, V9, V8 + VMRGOW V10, V11, V10 + + VMRGEW V12, V13, V29 + VMRGEW V14, V15, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41 + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42 + + VMRGOW V12, V13, V12 + VMRGOW V14, V15, V14 + + VSPLTISW $4, V27 + VADDUWM V26, V27, V26 + + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $0, VS45 + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $3, VS47 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS44 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS46 + + VADDUWM V0, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V4, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V8, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V12, V19, V12 + + BE_XXBRW(V0) + BE_XXBRW(V4) + BE_XXBRW(V8) + BE_XXBRW(V12) + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + // Bottom of loop + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V1, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V5, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V9, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V13, V19, V12 + + BE_XXBRW(V0) + BE_XXBRW(V4) + BE_XXBRW(V8) + BE_XXBRW(V12) + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(V10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V2, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V6, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V10, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V14, V19, V12 + + BE_XXBRW(V0) + BE_XXBRW(V4) + BE_XXBRW(V8) + BE_XXBRW(V12) + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V3, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V7, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V11, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V15, V19, V12 + + BE_XXBRW(V0) + BE_XXBRW(V4) + BE_XXBRW(V8) + BE_XXBRW(V12) + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + BNE loop_outer_vsx + +done_vsx: + // Increment counter by number of 64 byte blocks + MOVWZ (CNT), R14 + ADD BLOCKS, R14 + MOVWZ R14, (CNT) + RET + +tail_vsx: + ADD $32, R1, R11 + MOVD LEN, CTR + + // Save values on stack to copy from + STXVW4X VS32, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS36, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS40, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS44, (R11)(R10) + ADD $-1, R11, R12 + ADD $-1, INP + ADD $-1, OUT + PCALIGN $16 +looptail_vsx: + // Copying the result to OUT + // in bytes. + MOVBZU 1(R12), KEY + MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP + XOR KEY, TMP, KEY + MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT) + BDNZ looptail_vsx + + // Clear the stack values + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R10) + BR done_vsx diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..683ccfd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +package chacha20 + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX + +const bufSize = 256 + +// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only +// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s. +// +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) + } else { + c.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1eda91a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +#include "go_asm.h" +#include "textflag.h" + +// This is an implementation of the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm as +// specified in RFC 7539. It uses vector instructions to compute +// 4 keystream blocks in parallel (256 bytes) which are then XORed +// with the bytes in the input slice. + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32 +// BSWAP: swap bytes in each 4-byte element +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x03020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x07060504 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x0b0a0908 +DATA ·constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x0f0e0d0c +// J0: [j0, j1, j2, j3] +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 + +#define BSWAP V5 +#define J0 V6 +#define KEY0 V7 +#define KEY1 V8 +#define NONCE V9 +#define CTR V10 +#define M0 V11 +#define M1 V12 +#define M2 V13 +#define M3 V14 +#define INC V15 +#define X0 V16 +#define X1 V17 +#define X2 V18 +#define X3 V19 +#define X4 V20 +#define X5 V21 +#define X6 V22 +#define X7 V23 +#define X8 V24 +#define X9 V25 +#define X10 V26 +#define X11 V27 +#define X12 V28 +#define X13 V29 +#define X14 V30 +#define X15 V31 + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 20 + +#define ROUND4(a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3, c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3) \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $16, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $16, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $16, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $16, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $12, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $12, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $12, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $12, d1, d1 \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $8, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $8, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $8, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $8, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $7, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $7, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $7, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $7, d1, d1 + +#define PERMUTE(mask, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VPERM v0, v0, mask, v0 \ + VPERM v1, v1, mask, v1 \ + VPERM v2, v2, mask, v2 \ + VPERM v3, v3, mask, v3 + +#define ADDV(x, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VAF x, v0, v0 \ + VAF x, v1, v1 \ + VAF x, v2, v2 \ + VAF x, v3, v3 + +#define XORV(off, dst, src, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VLM off(src), M0, M3 \ + PERMUTE(BSWAP, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VX v0, M0, M0 \ + VX v1, M1, M1 \ + VX v2, M2, M2 \ + VX v3, M3, M3 \ + VSTM M0, M3, off(dst) + +#define SHUFFLE(a, b, c, d, t, u, v, w) \ + VMRHF a, c, t \ // t = {a[0], c[0], a[1], c[1]} + VMRHF b, d, u \ // u = {b[0], d[0], b[1], d[1]} + VMRLF a, c, v \ // v = {a[2], c[2], a[3], c[3]} + VMRLF b, d, w \ // w = {b[2], d[2], b[3], d[3]} + VMRHF t, u, a \ // a = {a[0], b[0], c[0], d[0]} + VMRLF t, u, b \ // b = {a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1]} + VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]} + VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]} + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0] + LMG src+24(FP), R3, R4 // R3=&src[0] R4=len(src) + MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter + + // load BSWAP and J0 + VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0 + + // setup + MOVD $95, R0 + VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1 + VLL R0, (R6), NONCE + VZERO M0 + VLEIB $7, $32, M0 + VSRLB M0, NONCE, NONCE + + // initialize counter values + VLREPF (R7), CTR + VZERO INC + VLEIF $1, $1, INC + VLEIF $2, $2, INC + VLEIF $3, $3, INC + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + VREPIF $4, INC + +chacha: + VREPF $0, J0, X0 + VREPF $1, J0, X1 + VREPF $2, J0, X2 + VREPF $3, J0, X3 + VREPF $0, KEY0, X4 + VREPF $1, KEY0, X5 + VREPF $2, KEY0, X6 + VREPF $3, KEY0, X7 + VREPF $0, KEY1, X8 + VREPF $1, KEY1, X9 + VREPF $2, KEY1, X10 + VREPF $3, KEY1, X11 + VLR CTR, X12 + VREPF $1, NONCE, X13 + VREPF $2, NONCE, X14 + VREPF $3, NONCE, X15 + + MOVD $(NUM_ROUNDS/2), R1 + +loop: + ROUND4(X0, X4, X12, X8, X1, X5, X13, X9, X2, X6, X14, X10, X3, X7, X15, X11) + ROUND4(X0, X5, X15, X10, X1, X6, X12, X11, X2, X7, X13, X8, X3, X4, X14, X9) + + ADD $-1, R1 + BNE loop + + // decrement length + ADD $-256, R4 + + // rearrange vectors + SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3) + SHUFFLE(X4, X5, X6, X7, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY0, X4, X5, X6, X7) + SHUFFLE(X8, X9, X10, X11, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY1, X8, X9, X10, X11) + VAF CTR, X12, X12 + SHUFFLE(X12, X13, X14, X15, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(NONCE, X12, X13, X14, X15) + + // increment counters + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + + // xor keystream with plaintext + XORV(0*64, R2, R3, X0, X4, X8, X12) + XORV(1*64, R2, R3, X1, X5, X9, X13) + XORV(2*64, R2, R3, X2, X6, X10, X14) + XORV(3*64, R2, R3, X3, X7, X11, X15) + + // increment pointers + MOVD $256(R2), R2 + MOVD $256(R3), R3 + + CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha + + VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c2d04851 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found src the LICENSE file. + +package chacha20 + +import "runtime" + +// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses. +const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" || + runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" || + runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" + +// addXor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with (a + b) and +// places the result in little endian byte order in dst. +func addXor(dst, src []byte, a, b uint32) { + _, _ = src[3], dst[3] // bounds check elimination hint + if unaligned { + // The compiler should optimize this code into + // 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores. + // TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably + // good job with the generic code below. + // See issue #25111 for more details. + v := uint32(src[0]) + v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8 + v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16 + v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24 + v ^= a + b + dst[0] = byte(v) + dst[1] = byte(v >> 8) + dst[2] = byte(v >> 16) + dst[3] = byte(v >> 24) + } else { + a += b + dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(a) + dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(a>>8) + dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(a>>16) + dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(a>>24) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..048faef3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of the X25519 function, which +// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519 +// according to [RFC 7748]. +// +// The curve25519 package is a wrapper for the X25519 implementation in the +// crypto/ecdh package. It is [frozen] and is not accepting new features. +// +// [RFC 7748]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7748 +// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen +package curve25519 + +import "crypto/ecdh" + +// ScalarMult sets dst to the product scalar * point. +// +// Deprecated: when provided a low-order point, ScalarMult will set dst to all +// zeroes, irrespective of the scalar. Instead, use the X25519 function, which +// will return an error. +func ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + if _, err := x25519(dst, scalar[:], point[:]); err != nil { + // The only error condition for x25519 when the inputs are 32 bytes long + // is if the output would have been the all-zero value. + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = 0 + } + } +} + +// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product scalar * base where base is the +// standard generator. +// +// It is recommended to use the X25519 function with Basepoint instead, as +// copying into fixed size arrays can lead to unexpected bugs. +func ScalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + curve := ecdh.X25519() + priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(scalar[:]) + if err != nil { + panic("curve25519: " + err.Error()) + } + copy(dst[:], priv.PublicKey().Bytes()) +} + +const ( + // ScalarSize is the size of the scalar input to X25519. + ScalarSize = 32 + // PointSize is the size of the point input to X25519. + PointSize = 32 +) + +// Basepoint is the canonical Curve25519 generator. +var Basepoint []byte + +var basePoint = [32]byte{9} + +func init() { Basepoint = basePoint[:] } + +// X25519 returns the result of the scalar multiplication (scalar * point), +// according to RFC 7748, Section 5. scalar, point and the return value are +// slices of 32 bytes. +// +// scalar can be generated at random, for example with crypto/rand. point should +// be either Basepoint or the output of another X25519 call. +// +// If point is Basepoint (but not if it's a different slice with the same +// contents) a precomputed implementation might be used for performance. +func X25519(scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // Outline the body of function, to let the allocation be inlined in the + // caller, and possibly avoid escaping to the heap. + var dst [32]byte + return x25519(&dst, scalar, point) +} + +func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + curve := ecdh.X25519() + pub, err := curve.NewPublicKey(point) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(scalar) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out, err := priv.ECDH(pub) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + copy(dst[:], out) + return dst[:], nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..551ff0c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !purego + +// Package alias implements memory aliasing tests. +package alias + +import "unsafe" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[len(y)-1])) && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[len(x)-1])) +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6fe61b5c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build purego + +// Package alias implements memory aliasing tests. +package alias + +// This is the Google App Engine standard variant based on reflect +// because the unsafe package and cgo are disallowed. + +import "reflect" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + reflect.ValueOf(&x[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&y[len(y)-1]).Pointer() && + reflect.ValueOf(&y[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&x[len(x)-1]).Pointer() +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d99551f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!amd64 && !loong64 && !ppc64le && !ppc64 && !s390x) || !gc || purego + +package poly1305 + +type mac struct{ macGeneric } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4aaea810 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as +// specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf. +// +// Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an +// attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a +// key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different +// messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other +// messages with the same key. +// +// Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was +// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce. +// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified +// directly. +package poly1305 + +import "crypto/subtle" + +// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator. +const TagSize = 16 + +// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := New(key) + h.Write(m) + h.Sum(out[:0]) +} + +// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key. +func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool { + var tmp [16]byte + Sum(&tmp, m, key) + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1 +} + +// New returns a new MAC computing an authentication +// tag of all data written to it with the given key. +// This allows writing the message progressively instead +// of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use +// the Sum function instead. +// +// The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating +// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker +// to forge messages at will. +func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC { + m := &MAC{} + initialize(key, &m.macState) + return m +} + +// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag +// of the data written to it. +// +// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations, +// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security. +// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling +// Sum or Verify causes it to panic. +type MAC struct { + mac // platform-dependent implementation + + finalized bool +} + +// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return. +func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize } + +// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code. +// It never returns an error. +// +// It must not be called after the first call of Sum or Verify. +func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if h.finalized { + panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum or Verify") + } + return h.mac.Write(p) +} + +// Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the +// message authentication code. +func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte { + var mac [TagSize]byte + h.mac.Sum(&mac) + h.finalized = true + return append(b, mac[:]...) +} + +// Verify returns whether the authenticator of all data written to +// the message authentication code matches the expected value. +func (h *MAC) Verify(expected []byte) bool { + var mac [TagSize]byte + h.mac.Sum(&mac) + h.finalized = true + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expected, mac[:]) == 1 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13375738 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +// Code generated by command: go run sum_amd64_asm.go -out ../sum_amd64.s -pkg poly1305. DO NOT EDIT. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +// func update(state *macState, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVQ state+0(FP), DI + MOVQ msg_base+8(FP), SI + MOVQ msg_len+16(FP), R15 + MOVQ (DI), R8 + MOVQ 8(DI), R9 + MOVQ 16(DI), R10 + MOVQ 24(DI), R11 + MOVQ 32(DI), R12 + CMPQ R15, $0x10 + JB bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + ADDQ (SI), R8 + ADCQ 8(SI), R9 + ADCQ $0x01, R10 + LEAQ 16(SI), SI + +multiply: + MOVQ R11, AX + MULQ R8 + MOVQ AX, BX + MOVQ DX, CX + MOVQ R11, AX + MULQ R9 + ADDQ AX, CX + ADCQ $0x00, DX + MOVQ R11, R13 + IMULQ R10, R13 + ADDQ DX, R13 + MOVQ R12, AX + MULQ R8 + ADDQ AX, CX + ADCQ $0x00, DX + MOVQ DX, R8 + MOVQ R12, R14 + IMULQ R10, R14 + MOVQ R12, AX + MULQ R9 + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R14 + ADDQ R8, R13 + ADCQ $0x00, R14 + MOVQ BX, R8 + MOVQ CX, R9 + MOVQ R13, R10 + ANDQ $0x03, R10 + MOVQ R13, BX + ANDQ $-4, BX + ADDQ BX, R8 + ADCQ R14, R9 + ADCQ $0x00, R10 + SHRQ $0x02, R14, R13 + SHRQ $0x02, R14 + ADDQ R13, R8 + ADCQ R14, R9 + ADCQ $0x00, R10 + SUBQ $0x10, R15 + CMPQ R15, $0x10 + JAE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + TESTQ R15, R15 + JZ done + MOVQ $0x00000001, BX + XORQ CX, CX + XORQ R13, R13 + ADDQ R15, SI + +flush_buffer: + SHLQ $0x08, BX, CX + SHLQ $0x08, BX + MOVB -1(SI), R13 + XORQ R13, BX + DECQ SI + DECQ R15 + JNZ flush_buffer + ADDQ BX, R8 + ADCQ CX, R9 + ADCQ $0x00, R10 + MOVQ $0x00000010, R15 + JMP multiply + +done: + MOVQ R8, (DI) + MOVQ R9, 8(DI) + MOVQ R10, 16(DI) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_asm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_asm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..315b84ac --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_asm.go @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego && (amd64 || loong64 || ppc64 || ppc64le) + +package poly1305 + +//go:noescape +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec2202bd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file provides the generic implementation of Sum and MAC. Other files +// might provide optimized assembly implementations of some of this code. + +package poly1305 + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "math/bits" +) + +// Poly1305 [RFC 7539] is a relatively simple algorithm: the authentication tag +// for a 64 bytes message is approximately +// +// s + m[0:16] * r⁴ + m[16:32] * r³ + m[32:48] * r² + m[48:64] * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// for some secret r and s. It can be computed sequentially like +// +// for len(msg) > 0: +// h += read(msg, 16) +// h *= r +// h %= 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// return h + s +// +// All the complexity is about doing performant constant-time math on numbers +// larger than any available numeric type. + +func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := newMACGeneric(key) + h.Write(msg) + h.Sum(out) +} + +func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) macGeneric { + m := macGeneric{} + initialize(key, &m.macState) + return m +} + +// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is, +// the value of [x0, x1, x2] is x[0] + x[1] * 2⁶⁴ + x[2] * 2¹²⁸. +type macState struct { + // h is the main accumulator. It is to be interpreted modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5, but + // can grow larger during and after rounds. It must, however, remain below + // 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). + h [3]uint64 + // r and s are the private key components. + r [2]uint64 + s [2]uint64 +} + +type macGeneric struct { + macState + + buffer [TagSize]byte + offset int +} + +// Write splits the incoming message into TagSize chunks, and passes them to +// update. It buffers incomplete chunks. +func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +// Sum flushes the last incomplete chunk from the buffer, if any, and generates +// the MAC output. It does not modify its state, in order to allow for multiple +// calls to Sum, even if no Write is allowed after Sum. +func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + updateGeneric(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} + +// [rMask0, rMask1] is the specified Poly1305 clamping mask in little-endian. It +// clears some bits of the secret coefficient to make it possible to implement +// multiplication more efficiently. +const ( + rMask0 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF + rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +) + +// initialize loads the 256-bit key into the two 128-bit secret values r and s. +func initialize(key *[32]byte, m *macState) { + m.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0 + m.r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1 + m.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24]) + m.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32]) +} + +// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the +// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics. +type uint128 struct { + lo, hi uint64 +} + +func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bits.Mul64(a, b) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func add128(a, b uint128) uint128 { + lo, c := bits.Add64(a.lo, b.lo, 0) + hi, c := bits.Add64(a.hi, b.hi, c) + if c != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 { + a.lo = a.lo>>2 | (a.hi&3)<<62 + a.hi = a.hi >> 2 + return a +} + +// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of +// 128 bits of message, it computes +// +// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last +// incomplete chunk is the final one. +func updateGeneric(state *macState, msg []byte) { + h0, h1, h2 := state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] + r0, r1 := state.r[0], state.r[1] + + for len(msg) > 0 { + var c uint64 + + // For the first step, h + m, we use a chain of bits.Add64 intrinsics. + // The resulting value of h might exceed 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be partially + // reduced at the end of the multiplication below. + // + // The spec requires us to set a bit just above the message size, not to + // hide leading zeroes. For full chunks, that's 1 << 128, so we can just + // add 1 to the most significant (2¹²⁸) limb, h2. + if len(msg) >= TagSize { + h0, c = bits.Add64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bits.Add64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + 1 + + msg = msg[TagSize:] + } else { + var buf [TagSize]byte + copy(buf[:], msg) + buf[len(msg)] = 1 + + h0, c = bits.Add64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bits.Add64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + + msg = nil + } + + // Multiplication of big number limbs is similar to elementary school + // columnar multiplication. Instead of digits, there are 64-bit limbs. + // + // We are multiplying a 3 limbs number, h, by a 2 limbs number, r. + // + // h2 h1 h0 x + // r1 r0 = + // ---------------- + // h2r0 h1r0 h0r0 <-- individual 128-bit products + // + h2r1 h1r1 h0r1 + // ------------------------ + // m3 m2 m1 m0 <-- result in 128-bit overlapping limbs + // ------------------------ + // m3.hi m2.hi m1.hi m0.hi <-- carry propagation + // + m3.lo m2.lo m1.lo m0.lo + // ------------------------------- + // t4 t3 t2 t1 t0 <-- final result in 64-bit limbs + // + // The main difference from pen-and-paper multiplication is that we do + // carry propagation in a separate step, as if we wrote two digit sums + // at first (the 128-bit limbs), and then carried the tens all at once. + + h0r0 := mul64(h0, r0) + h1r0 := mul64(h1, r0) + h2r0 := mul64(h2, r0) + h0r1 := mul64(h0, r1) + h1r1 := mul64(h1, r1) + h2r1 := mul64(h2, r1) + + // Since h2 is known to be at most 7 (5 + 1 + 1), and r0 and r1 have their + // top 4 bits cleared by rMask{0,1}, we know that their product is not going + // to overflow 64 bits, so we can ignore the high part of the products. + // + // This also means that the product doesn't have a fifth limb (t4). + if h2r0.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + if h2r1.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + + m0 := h0r0 + m1 := add128(h1r0, h0r1) // These two additions don't overflow thanks again + m2 := add128(h2r0, h1r1) // to the 4 masked bits at the top of r0 and r1. + m3 := h2r1 + + t0 := m0.lo + t1, c := bits.Add64(m1.lo, m0.hi, 0) + t2, c := bits.Add64(m2.lo, m1.hi, c) + t3, _ := bits.Add64(m3.lo, m2.hi, c) + + // Now we have the result as 4 64-bit limbs, and we need to reduce it + // modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The special shape of this Crandall prime lets us do + // a cheap partial reduction according to the reduction identity + // + // c * 2¹³⁰ + n = c * 5 + n mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 + // + // because 2¹³⁰ = 5 mod 2¹³⁰ - 5. Partial reduction since the result is + // likely to be larger than 2¹³⁰ - 5, but still small enough to fit the + // assumptions we make about h in the rest of the code. + // + // See also https://speakerdeck.com/gtank/engineering-prime-numbers?slide=23 + + // We split the final result at the 2¹³⁰ mark into h and cc, the carry. + // Note that the carry bits are effectively shifted left by 2, in other + // words, cc = c * 4 for the c in the reduction identity. + h0, h1, h2 = t0, t1, t2&maskLow2Bits + cc := uint128{t2 & maskNotLow2Bits, t3} + + // To add c * 5 to h, we first add cc = c * 4, and then add (cc >> 2) = c. + + h0, c = bits.Add64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bits.Add64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + cc = shiftRightBy2(cc) + + h0, c = bits.Add64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bits.Add64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + // h2 is at most 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, making the whole of h at most + // + // 5 * 2¹²⁸ + (2¹²⁸ - 1) = 6 * 2¹²⁸ - 1 + } + + state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] = h0, h1, h2 +} + +const ( + maskLow2Bits uint64 = 0x0000000000000003 + maskNotLow2Bits uint64 = ^maskLow2Bits +) + +// select64 returns x if v == 1 and y if v == 0, in constant time. +func select64(v, x, y uint64) uint64 { return ^(v-1)&x | (v-1)&y } + +// [p0, p1, p2] is 2¹³⁰ - 5 in little endian order. +const ( + p0 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB + p1 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF + p2 = 0x0000000000000003 +) + +// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes +// +// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ +func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) { + h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2] + + // After the partial reduction in updateGeneric, h might be more than + // 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be less than 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). To complete the reduction + // in constant time, we compute t = h - (2¹³⁰ - 5), and select h as the + // result if the subtraction underflows, and t otherwise. + + hMinusP0, b := bits.Sub64(h0, p0, 0) + hMinusP1, b := bits.Sub64(h1, p1, b) + _, b = bits.Sub64(h2, p2, b) + + // h = h if h < p else h - p + h0 = select64(b, h0, hMinusP0) + h1 = select64(b, h1, hMinusP1) + + // Finally, we compute the last Poly1305 step + // + // tag = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ + // + // by just doing a wide addition with the 128 low bits of h and discarding + // the overflow. + h0, c := bits.Add64(h0, s[0], 0) + h1, _ = bits.Add64(h1, s[1], c) + + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[0:8], h0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:16], h1) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_loong64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_loong64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc8361da --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_loong64.s @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +// func update(state *macState, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVV state+0(FP), R4 + MOVV msg_base+8(FP), R5 + MOVV msg_len+16(FP), R6 + + MOVV $0x10, R7 + + MOVV (R4), R8 // h0 + MOVV 8(R4), R9 // h1 + MOVV 16(R4), R10 // h2 + MOVV 24(R4), R11 // r0 + MOVV 32(R4), R12 // r1 + + BLT R6, R7, bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + MOVV (R5), R14 // msg[0:8] + MOVV 8(R5), R16 // msg[8:16] + ADDV R14, R8, R8 // h0 (x1 + y1 = z1', if z1' < x1 then z1' overflow) + ADDV R16, R9, R27 + SGTU R14, R8, R24 // h0.carry + SGTU R9, R27, R28 + ADDV R27, R24, R9 // h1 + SGTU R27, R9, R24 + OR R24, R28, R24 // h1.carry + ADDV $0x01, R24, R24 + ADDV R10, R24, R10 // h2 + + ADDV $16, R5, R5 // msg = msg[16:] + +multiply: + MULV R8, R11, R14 // h0r0.lo + MULHVU R8, R11, R15 // h0r0.hi + MULV R9, R11, R13 // h1r0.lo + MULHVU R9, R11, R16 // h1r0.hi + ADDV R13, R15, R15 + SGTU R13, R15, R24 + ADDV R24, R16, R16 + MULV R10, R11, R25 + ADDV R16, R25, R25 + MULV R8, R12, R13 // h0r1.lo + MULHVU R8, R12, R16 // h0r1.hi + ADDV R13, R15, R15 + SGTU R13, R15, R24 + ADDV R24, R16, R16 + MOVV R16, R8 + MULV R10, R12, R26 // h2r1 + MULV R9, R12, R13 // h1r1.lo + MULHVU R9, R12, R16 // h1r1.hi + ADDV R13, R25, R25 + ADDV R16, R26, R27 + SGTU R13, R25, R24 + ADDV R27, R24, R26 + ADDV R8, R25, R25 + SGTU R8, R25, R24 + ADDV R24, R26, R26 + AND $3, R25, R10 + AND $-4, R25, R17 + ADDV R17, R14, R8 + ADDV R26, R15, R27 + SGTU R17, R8, R24 + SGTU R26, R27, R28 + ADDV R27, R24, R9 + SGTU R27, R9, R24 + OR R24, R28, R24 + ADDV R24, R10, R10 + SLLV $62, R26, R27 + SRLV $2, R25, R28 + SRLV $2, R26, R26 + OR R27, R28, R25 + ADDV R25, R8, R8 + ADDV R26, R9, R27 + SGTU R25, R8, R24 + SGTU R26, R27, R28 + ADDV R27, R24, R9 + SGTU R27, R9, R24 + OR R24, R28, R24 + ADDV R24, R10, R10 + + SUBV $16, R6, R6 + BGE R6, R7, loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + BEQ R6, R0, done + MOVV $1, R14 + XOR R15, R15 + ADDV R6, R5, R5 + +flush_buffer: + MOVBU -1(R5), R25 + SRLV $56, R14, R24 + SLLV $8, R15, R28 + SLLV $8, R14, R14 + OR R24, R28, R15 + XOR R25, R14, R14 + SUBV $1, R6, R6 + SUBV $1, R5, R5 + BNE R6, R0, flush_buffer + + ADDV R14, R8, R8 + SGTU R14, R8, R24 + ADDV R15, R9, R27 + SGTU R15, R27, R28 + ADDV R27, R24, R9 + SGTU R27, R9, R24 + OR R24, R28, R24 + ADDV R10, R24, R10 + + MOVV $16, R6 + JMP multiply + +done: + MOVV R8, (R4) + MOVV R9, 8(R4) + MOVV R10, 16(R4) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6899a1da --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64x.s @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego && (ppc64 || ppc64le) + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This was ported from the amd64 implementation. + +#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le +#define LE_MOVD MOVD +#define LE_MOVWZ MOVWZ +#define LE_MOVHZ MOVHZ +#else +#define LE_MOVD MOVDBR +#define LE_MOVWZ MOVWBR +#define LE_MOVHZ MOVHBR +#endif + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2) \ + LE_MOVD (msg)( R0), t0; \ + LE_MOVD (msg)(R24), t1; \ + MOVD $1, t2; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t1, h1, h1; \ + ADDE t2, h2; \ + ADD $16, msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) \ + MULLD r0, h0, t0; \ + MULHDU r0, h0, t1; \ + MULLD r0, h1, t4; \ + MULHDU r0, h1, t5; \ + ADDC t4, t1, t1; \ + MULLD r0, h2, t2; \ + MULHDU r1, h0, t4; \ + MULLD r1, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t5, t2, t2; \ + ADDC h0, t1, t1; \ + MULLD h2, r1, t3; \ + ADDZE t4, h0; \ + MULHDU r1, h1, t5; \ + MULLD r1, h1, t4; \ + ADDC t4, t2, t2; \ + ADDE t5, t3, t3; \ + ADDC h0, t2, t2; \ + MOVD $-4, t4; \ + ADDZE t3; \ + RLDICL $0, t2, $62, h2; \ + AND t2, t4, h0; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, t1, h1; \ + SLD $62, t3, t4; \ + SRD $2, t2; \ + ADDZE h2; \ + OR t4, t2, t2; \ + SRD $2, t3; \ + ADDC t2, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, h1, h1; \ + ADDZE h2 + +// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVD state+0(FP), R3 + MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4 + MOVD msg_len+16(FP), R5 + + MOVD 0(R3), R8 // h0 + MOVD 8(R3), R9 // h1 + MOVD 16(R3), R10 // h2 + MOVD 24(R3), R11 // r0 + MOVD 32(R3), R12 // r1 + + MOVD $8, R24 + + CMP R5, $16 + BLT bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(R4, R8, R9, R10, R20, R21, R22) + + PCALIGN $16 +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R16, R17, R18, R14, R20, R21) + ADD $-16, R5 + CMP R5, $16 + BGE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + CMP R5, $0 + BEQ done + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R17 // h1 + +flush_buffer: + CMP R5, $8 + BLE just1 + + MOVD $8, R21 + SUB R21, R5, R21 + + // Greater than 8 -- load the rightmost remaining bytes in msg + // and put into R17 (h1) + LE_MOVD (R4)(R21), R17 + MOVD $16, R22 + + // Find the offset to those bytes + SUB R5, R22, R22 + SLD $3, R22 + + // Shift to get only the bytes in msg + SRD R22, R17, R17 + + // Put 1 at high end + MOVD $1, R23 + SLD $3, R21 + SLD R21, R23, R23 + OR R23, R17, R17 + + // Remainder is 8 + MOVD $8, R5 + +just1: + CMP R5, $8 + BLT less8 + + // Exactly 8 + LE_MOVD (R4), R16 + + CMP R17, $0 + + // Check if we've already set R17; if not + // set 1 to indicate end of msg. + BNE carry + MOVD $1, R17 + BR carry + +less8: + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R22 // shift count + CMP R5, $4 + BLT less4 + LE_MOVWZ (R4), R16 + ADD $4, R4 + ADD $-4, R5 + MOVD $32, R22 + +less4: + CMP R5, $2 + BLT less2 + LE_MOVHZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $16, R22 + ADD $-2, R5 + ADD $2, R4 + +less2: + CMP R5, $0 + BEQ insert1 + MOVBZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $8, R22 + +insert1: + // Insert 1 at end of msg + MOVD $1, R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + +carry: + // Add new values to h0, h1, h2 + ADDC R16, R8 + ADDE R17, R9 + ADDZE R10, R10 + MOVD $16, R5 + ADD R5, R4 + BR multiply + +done: + // Save h0, h1, h2 in state + MOVD R8, 0(R3) + MOVD R9, 8(R3) + MOVD R10, 16(R3) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1d033a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +package poly1305 + +import ( + "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" +) + +// updateVX is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector +// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is +// available. +// +//go:noescape +func updateVX(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a replacement for macGeneric that uses a larger buffer and redirects +// calls that would have gone to updateGeneric to updateVX if the vector +// facility is installed. +// +// A larger buffer is required for good performance because the vector +// implementation has a higher fixed cost per call than the generic +// implementation. +type mac struct { + macState + + buffer [16 * TagSize]byte // size must be a multiple of block size (16) + offset int +} + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < len(h.buffer) { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + updateVX(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } else { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + } + + tail := len(p) % len(h.buffer) // number of bytes to copy into buffer + body := len(p) - tail // number of bytes to process now + if body > 0 { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + updateVX(&h.macState, p[:body]) + } else { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:body]) + } + } + h.offset = copy(h.buffer[:], p[body:]) // copy tail bytes - can be 0 + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState + remainder := h.buffer[:h.offset] + + // Use the generic implementation if we have 2 or fewer blocks left + // to sum. The vector implementation has a higher startup time. + if cpu.S390X.HasVX && len(remainder) > 2*TagSize { + updateVX(&state, remainder) + } else if len(remainder) > 0 { + updateGeneric(&state, remainder) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0fe3a7c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This implementation of Poly1305 uses the vector facility (vx) +// to process up to 2 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration using an +// algorithm based on the one described in: +// +// NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe +// https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf +// +// This algorithm uses 5 26-bit limbs to represent a 130-bit +// value. These limbs are, for the most part, zero extended and +// placed into 64-bit vector register elements. Each vector +// register is 128-bits wide and so holds 2 of these elements. +// Using 26-bit limbs allows us plenty of headroom to accommodate +// accumulations before and after multiplication without +// overflowing either 32-bits (before multiplication) or 64-bits +// (after multiplication). +// +// In order to parallelise the operations required to calculate +// the sum we use two separate accumulators and then sum those +// in an extra final step. For compatibility with the generic +// implementation we perform this summation at the end of every +// updateVX call. +// +// To use two accumulators we must multiply the message blocks +// by r² rather than r. Only the final message block should be +// multiplied by r. +// +// Example: +// +// We want to calculate the sum (h) for a 64 byte message (m): +// +// h = m[0:16]r⁴ + m[16:32]r³ + m[32:48]r² + m[48:64]r +// +// To do this we split the calculation into the even indices +// and odd indices of the message. These form our SIMD 'lanes': +// +// h = m[ 0:16]r⁴ + m[32:48]r² + <- lane 0 +// m[16:32]r³ + m[48:64]r <- lane 1 +// +// To calculate this iteratively we refactor so that both lanes +// are written in terms of r² and r: +// +// h = (m[ 0:16]r² + m[32:48])r² + <- lane 0 +// (m[16:32]r² + m[48:64])r <- lane 1 +// ^ ^ +// | coefficients for second iteration +// coefficients for first iteration +// +// So in this case we would have two iterations. In the first +// both lanes are multiplied by r². In the second only the +// first lane is multiplied by r² and the second lane is +// instead multiplied by r. This gives use the odd and even +// powers of r that we need from the original equation. +// +// Notation: +// +// h - accumulator +// r - key +// m - message +// +// [a, b] - SIMD register holding two 64-bit values +// [a, b, c, d] - SIMD register holding four 32-bit values +// xᵢ[n] - limb n of variable x with bit width i +// +// Limbs are expressed in little endian order, so for 26-bit +// limbs x₂₆[4] will be the most significant limb and x₂₆[0] +// will be the least significant limb. + +// masking constants +#define MOD24 V0 // [0x0000000000ffffff, 0x0000000000ffffff] - mask low 24-bits +#define MOD26 V1 // [0x0000000003ffffff, 0x0000000003ffffff] - mask low 26-bits + +// expansion constants (see EXPAND macro) +#define EX0 V2 +#define EX1 V3 +#define EX2 V4 + +// key (r², r or 1 depending on context) +#define R_0 V5 +#define R_1 V6 +#define R_2 V7 +#define R_3 V8 +#define R_4 V9 + +// precalculated coefficients (5r², 5r or 0 depending on context) +#define R5_1 V10 +#define R5_2 V11 +#define R5_3 V12 +#define R5_4 V13 + +// message block (m) +#define M_0 V14 +#define M_1 V15 +#define M_2 V16 +#define M_3 V17 +#define M_4 V18 + +// accumulator (h) +#define H_0 V19 +#define H_1 V20 +#define H_2 V21 +#define H_3 V22 +#define H_4 V23 + +// temporary registers (for short-lived values) +#define T_0 V24 +#define T_1 V25 +#define T_2 V26 +#define T_3 V27 +#define T_4 V28 + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $0x30 +// EX0 +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0006050403020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x1016151413121110 +// EX1 +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x060c0b0a09080706 +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x161c1b1a19181716 +// EX2 +DATA ·constants<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0d0d0d0d0d0f0e0d +DATA ·constants<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x1d1d1d1d1d1f1e1d + +// MULTIPLY multiplies each lane of f and g, partially reduced +// modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The result, h, consists of partial products +// in each lane that need to be reduced further to produce the +// final result. +// +// h₁₃₀ = (f₁₃₀g₁₃₀) % 2¹³⁰ + (5f₁₃₀g₁₃₀) / 2¹³⁰ +// +// Note that the multiplication by 5 of the high bits is +// achieved by precalculating the multiplication of four of the +// g coefficients by 5. These are g51-g54. +#define MULTIPLY(f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g51, g52, g53, g54, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VMLOF f0, g0, h0 \ + VMLOF f0, g3, h3 \ + VMLOF f0, g1, h1 \ + VMLOF f0, g4, h4 \ + VMLOF f0, g2, h2 \ + VMLOF f1, g54, T_0 \ + VMLOF f1, g2, T_3 \ + VMLOF f1, g0, T_1 \ + VMLOF f1, g3, T_4 \ + VMLOF f1, g1, T_2 \ + VMALOF f2, g53, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f2, g1, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f2, g54, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f2, g2, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f2, g0, h2, h2 \ + VMALOF f3, g52, T_0, T_0 \ + VMALOF f3, g0, T_3, T_3 \ + VMALOF f3, g53, T_1, T_1 \ + VMALOF f3, g1, T_4, T_4 \ + VMALOF f3, g54, T_2, T_2 \ + VMALOF f4, g51, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f4, g54, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f4, g52, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f4, g0, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f4, g53, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_0, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_3, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_4, h4, h4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 + +// REDUCE performs the following carry operations in four +// stages, as specified in Bernstein & Schwabe: +// +// 1: h₂₆[0]->h₂₆[1] h₂₆[3]->h₂₆[4] +// 2: h₂₆[1]->h₂₆[2] h₂₆[4]->h₂₆[0] +// 3: h₂₆[0]->h₂₆[1] h₂₆[2]->h₂₆[3] +// 4: h₂₆[3]->h₂₆[4] +// +// The result is that all of the limbs are limited to 26-bits +// except for h₂₆[1] and h₂₆[4] which are limited to 27-bits. +// +// Note that although each limb is aligned at 26-bit intervals +// they may contain values that exceed 2²⁶ - 1, hence the need +// to carry the excess bits in each limb. +#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_0, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_1, h4, h4 \ + VESRLG $26, h1, T_2 \ + VESRLG $26, h4, T_3 \ + VN MOD26, h1, h1 \ + VN MOD26, h4, h4 \ + VESLG $2, T_3, T_4 \ + VAG T_3, T_4, T_4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_4, h0, h0 \ + VESRLG $26, h2, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h2, h2 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_0, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_2 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_2, h4, h4 + +// EXPAND splits the 128-bit little-endian values in0 and in1 +// into 26-bit big-endian limbs and places the results into +// the first and second lane of d₂₆[0:4] respectively. +// +// The EX0, EX1 and EX2 constants are arrays of byte indices +// for permutation. The permutation both reverses the bytes +// in the input and ensures the bytes are copied into the +// destination limb ready to be shifted into their final +// position. +#define EXPAND(in0, in1, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4) \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX0, d0 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX1, d2 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX2, d4 \ + VESRLG $26, d0, d1 \ + VESRLG $30, d2, d3 \ + VESRLG $4, d2, d2 \ + VN MOD26, d0, d0 \ // [in0₂₆[0], in1₂₆[0]] + VN MOD26, d3, d3 \ // [in0₂₆[3], in1₂₆[3]] + VN MOD26, d1, d1 \ // [in0₂₆[1], in1₂₆[1]] + VN MOD24, d4, d4 \ // [in0₂₆[4], in1₂₆[4]] + VN MOD26, d2, d2 // [in0₂₆[2], in1₂₆[2]] + +// func updateVX(state *macState, msg []byte) +TEXT ·updateVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD state+0(FP), R1 + LMG msg+8(FP), R2, R3 // R2=msg_base, R3=msg_len + + // load EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + + // generate masks + VGMG $(64-24), $63, MOD24 // [0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff] + VGMG $(64-26), $63, MOD26 // [0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff] + + // load h (accumulator) and r (key) from state + VZERO T_1 // [0, 0] + VL 0(R1), T_0 // [h₆₄[0], h₆₄[1]] + VLEG $0, 16(R1), T_1 // [h₆₄[2], 0] + VL 24(R1), T_2 // [r₆₄[0], r₆₄[1]] + VPDI $0, T_0, T_2, T_3 // [h₆₄[0], r₆₄[0]] + VPDI $5, T_0, T_2, T_4 // [h₆₄[1], r₆₄[1]] + + // unpack h and r into 26-bit limbs + // note: h₆₄[2] may have the low 3 bits set, so h₂₆[4] is a 27-bit value + VN MOD26, T_3, H_0 // [h₂₆[0], r₂₆[0]] + VZERO H_1 // [0, 0] + VZERO H_3 // [0, 0] + VGMG $(64-12-14), $(63-12), T_0 // [0x03fff000, 0x03fff000] - 26-bit mask with low 12 bits masked out + VESLG $24, T_1, T_1 // [h₆₄[2]<<24, 0] + VERIMG $-26&63, T_3, MOD26, H_1 // [h₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VESRLG $+52&63, T_3, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] - low 12 bits only + VERIMG $-14&63, T_4, MOD26, H_3 // [h₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VESRLG $40, T_4, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] - low 24 bits only + VERIMG $+12&63, T_4, T_0, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] - complete + VO T_1, H_4, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] - complete + + // replicate r across all 4 vector elements + VREPF $3, H_0, R_0 // [r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0]] + VREPF $3, H_1, R_1 // [r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VREPF $3, H_2, R_2 // [r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] + VREPF $3, H_3, R_3 // [r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3]] + VREPF $3, H_4, R_4 // [r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] + + // zero out lane 1 of h + VLEIG $1, $0, H_0 // [h₂₆[0], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_1 // [h₂₆[1], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_3 // [h₂₆[3], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], 0] + + // calculate 5r (ignore least significant limb) + VREPIF $5, T_0 + VMLF T_0, R_1, R5_1 // [5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1]] + VMLF T_0, R_2, R5_2 // [5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2]] + VMLF T_0, R_3, R5_3 // [5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3]] + VMLF T_0, R_4, R5_4 // [5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4]] + + // skip r² calculation if we are only calculating one block + CMPBLE R3, $16, skip + + // calculate r² + MULTIPLY(R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + REDUCE(M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + VGBM $0x0f0f, T_0 + VERIMG $0, M_0, T_0, R_0 // [r₂₆[0], r²₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r²₂₆[0]] + VERIMG $0, M_1, T_0, R_1 // [r₂₆[1], r²₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r²₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $0, M_2, T_0, R_2 // [r₂₆[2], r²₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r²₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $0, M_3, T_0, R_3 // [r₂₆[3], r²₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r²₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $0, M_4, T_0, R_4 // [r₂₆[4], r²₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r²₂₆[4]] + + // calculate 5r² (ignore least significant limb) + VREPIF $5, T_0 + VMLF T_0, R_1, R5_1 // [5r₂₆[1], 5r²₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r²₂₆[1]] + VMLF T_0, R_2, R5_2 // [5r₂₆[2], 5r²₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r²₂₆[2]] + VMLF T_0, R_3, R5_3 // [5r₂₆[3], 5r²₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r²₂₆[3]] + VMLF T_0, R_4, R5_4 // [5r₂₆[4], 5r²₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r²₂₆[4]] + +loop: + CMPBLE R3, $32, b2 // 2 or fewer blocks remaining, need to change key coefficients + + // load next 2 blocks from message + VLM (R2), T_0, T_1 + + // update message slice + SUB $32, R3 + MOVD $32(R2), R2 + + // unpack message blocks into 26-bit big-endian limbs + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // add 2¹²⁸ to each message block value + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + VLEIB $12, $1, M_4 + +multiply: + // accumulate the incoming message + VAG H_0, M_0, M_0 + VAG H_3, M_3, M_3 + VAG H_1, M_1, M_1 + VAG H_4, M_4, M_4 + VAG H_2, M_2, M_2 + + // multiply the accumulator by the key coefficient + MULTIPLY(M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry and partially reduce the partial products + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + CMPBNE R3, $0, loop + +finish: + // sum lane 0 and lane 1 and put the result in lane 1 + VZERO T_0 + VSUMQG H_0, T_0, H_0 + VSUMQG H_3, T_0, H_3 + VSUMQG H_1, T_0, H_1 + VSUMQG H_4, T_0, H_4 + VSUMQG H_2, T_0, H_2 + + // reduce again after summation + // TODO(mundaym): there might be a more efficient way to do this + // now that we only have 1 active lane. For example, we could + // simultaneously pack the values as we reduce them. + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry h[1] through to h[4] so that only h[4] can exceed 2²⁶ - 1 + // TODO(mundaym): in testing this final carry was unnecessary. + // Needs a proof before it can be removed though. + VESRLG $26, H_1, T_1 + VN MOD26, H_1, H_1 + VAQ T_1, H_2, H_2 + VESRLG $26, H_2, T_2 + VN MOD26, H_2, H_2 + VAQ T_2, H_3, H_3 + VESRLG $26, H_3, T_3 + VN MOD26, H_3, H_3 + VAQ T_3, H_4, H_4 + + // h is now < 2(2¹³⁰ - 5) + // Pack each lane in h₂₆[0:4] into h₁₂₈[0:1]. + VESLG $26, H_1, H_1 + VESLG $26, H_3, H_3 + VO H_0, H_1, H_0 + VO H_2, H_3, H_2 + VESLG $4, H_2, H_2 + VLEIB $7, $48, H_1 + VSLB H_1, H_2, H_2 + VO H_0, H_2, H_0 + VLEIB $7, $104, H_1 + VSLB H_1, H_4, H_3 + VO H_3, H_0, H_0 + VLEIB $7, $24, H_1 + VSRLB H_1, H_4, H_1 + + // update state + VSTEG $1, H_0, 0(R1) + VSTEG $0, H_0, 8(R1) + VSTEG $1, H_1, 16(R1) + RET + +b2: // 2 or fewer blocks remaining + CMPBLE R3, $16, b1 + + // Load the 2 remaining blocks (17-32 bytes remaining). + MOVD $-17(R3), R0 // index of final byte to load modulo 16 + VL (R2), T_0 // load full 16 byte block + VLL R0, 16(R2), T_1 // load final (possibly partial) block and pad with zeros to 16 bytes + + // The Poly1305 algorithm requires that a 1 bit be appended to + // each message block. If the final block is less than 16 bytes + // long then it is easiest to insert the 1 before the message + // block is split into 26-bit limbs. If, on the other hand, the + // final message block is 16 bytes long then we append the 1 bit + // after expansion as normal. + MOVBZ $1, R0 + MOVD $-16(R3), R3 // index of byte in last block to insert 1 at (could be 16) + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) // skip the insertion if the final block is 16 bytes long + VLVGB R3, R0, T_1 // insert 1 into the byte at index R3 + + // Split both blocks into 26-bit limbs in the appropriate lanes. + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the second to last block. + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the last block only if it is a + // full 16 byte block. + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $12, $1, M_4 + + // Finally, set up the coefficients for the final multiplication. + // We have previously saved r and 5r in the 32-bit even indexes + // of the R_[0-4] and R5_[1-4] coefficient registers. + // + // We want lane 0 to be multiplied by r² so that can be kept the + // same. We want lane 1 to be multiplied by r so we need to move + // the saved r value into the 32-bit odd index in lane 1 by + // rotating the 64-bit lane by 32. + VGBM $0x00ff, T_0 // [0, 0xffffffffffffffff] - mask lane 1 only + VERIMG $32, R_0, T_0, R_0 // [_, r²₂₆[0], _, r₂₆[0]] + VERIMG $32, R_1, T_0, R_1 // [_, r²₂₆[1], _, r₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $32, R_2, T_0, R_2 // [_, r²₂₆[2], _, r₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $32, R_3, T_0, R_3 // [_, r²₂₆[3], _, r₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $32, R_4, T_0, R_4 // [_, r²₂₆[4], _, r₂₆[4]] + VERIMG $32, R5_1, T_0, R5_1 // [_, 5r²₂₆[1], _, 5r₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $32, R5_2, T_0, R5_2 // [_, 5r²₂₆[2], _, 5r₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $32, R5_3, T_0, R5_3 // [_, 5r²₂₆[3], _, 5r₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $32, R5_4, T_0, R5_4 // [_, 5r²₂₆[4], _, 5r₂₆[4]] + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply + +skip: + CMPBEQ R3, $0, finish + +b1: // 1 block remaining + + // Load the final block (1-16 bytes). This will be placed into + // lane 0. + MOVD $-1(R3), R0 + VLL R0, (R2), T_0 // pad to 16 bytes with zeros + + // The Poly1305 algorithm requires that a 1 bit be appended to + // each message block. If the final block is less than 16 bytes + // long then it is easiest to insert the 1 before the message + // block is split into 26-bit limbs. If, on the other hand, the + // final message block is 16 bytes long then we append the 1 bit + // after expansion as normal. + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, T_0 + + // Set the message block in lane 1 to the value 0 so that it + // can be accumulated without affecting the final result. + VZERO T_1 + + // Split the final message block into 26-bit limbs in lane 0. + // Lane 1 will be contain 0. + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the last block only if it is a + // full 16 byte block. + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + + // We have previously saved r and 5r in the 32-bit even indexes + // of the R_[0-4] and R5_[1-4] coefficient registers. + // + // We want lane 0 to be multiplied by r so we need to move the + // saved r value into the 32-bit odd index in lane 0. We want + // lane 1 to be set to the value 1. This makes multiplication + // a no-op. We do this by setting lane 1 in every register to 0 + // and then just setting the 32-bit index 3 in R_0 to 1. + VZERO T_0 + MOVD $0, R0 + MOVD $0x10111213, R12 + VLVGP R12, R0, T_1 // [_, 0x10111213, _, 0x00000000] + VPERM T_0, R_0, T_1, R_0 // [_, r₂₆[0], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_1, T_1, R_1 // [_, r₂₆[1], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_2, T_1, R_2 // [_, r₂₆[2], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_3, T_1, R_3 // [_, r₂₆[3], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_4, T_1, R_4 // [_, r₂₆[4], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_1, T_1, R5_1 // [_, 5r₂₆[1], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_2, T_1, R5_2 // [_, 5r₂₆[2], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_3, T_1, R5_3 // [_, 5r₂₆[3], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_4, T_1, R5_4 // [_, 5r₂₆[4], _, 0] + + // Set the value of lane 1 to be 1. + VLEIF $3, $1, R_0 // [_, r₂₆[0], _, 1] + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1ab07d07 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "io" + "sync" +) + +// buffer provides a linked list buffer for data exchange +// between producer and consumer. Theoretically the buffer is +// of unlimited capacity as it does no allocation of its own. +type buffer struct { + // protects concurrent access to head, tail and closed + *sync.Cond + + head *element // the buffer that will be read first + tail *element // the buffer that will be read last + + closed bool +} + +// An element represents a single link in a linked list. +type element struct { + buf []byte + next *element +} + +// newBuffer returns an empty buffer that is not closed. +func newBuffer() *buffer { + e := new(element) + b := &buffer{ + Cond: newCond(), + head: e, + tail: e, + } + return b +} + +// write makes buf available for Read to receive. +// buf must not be modified after the call to write. +func (b *buffer) write(buf []byte) { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + e := &element{buf: buf} + b.tail.next = e + b.tail = e + b.Cond.Signal() + b.Cond.L.Unlock() +} + +// eof closes the buffer. Reads from the buffer once all +// the data has been consumed will receive io.EOF. +func (b *buffer) eof() { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + b.closed = true + b.Cond.Signal() + b.Cond.L.Unlock() +} + +// Read reads data from the internal buffer in buf. Reads will block +// if no data is available, or until the buffer is closed. +func (b *buffer) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + defer b.Cond.L.Unlock() + + for len(buf) > 0 { + // if there is data in b.head, copy it + if len(b.head.buf) > 0 { + r := copy(buf, b.head.buf) + buf, b.head.buf = buf[r:], b.head.buf[r:] + n += r + continue + } + // if there is a next buffer, make it the head + if len(b.head.buf) == 0 && b.head != b.tail { + b.head = b.head.next + continue + } + + // if at least one byte has been copied, return + if n > 0 { + break + } + + // if nothing was read, and there is nothing outstanding + // check to see if the buffer is closed. + if b.closed { + err = io.EOF + break + } + // out of buffers, wait for producer + b.Cond.Wait() + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..139fa31e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go @@ -0,0 +1,624 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "sort" + "time" +) + +// Certificate algorithm names from [PROTOCOL.certkeys]. These values can appear +// in Certificate.Type, PublicKey.Type, and ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms. +// Unlike key algorithm names, these are not passed to AlgorithmSigner nor +// returned by MultiAlgorithmSigner and don't appear in the Signature.Format +// field. +const ( + CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" + // Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed + // from major implementations. + CertAlgoDSAv01 = InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01 + // Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed + // from major implementations. + InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA256v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA384v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA521v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoSKED25519v01 = "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" + + // CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 and CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 can't appear as a + // Certificate.Type (or PublicKey.Type), but only in + // ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms. + CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 = "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 = "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" +) + +const ( + // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSAv01. + CertSigAlgoRSAv01 = CertAlgoRSAv01 + // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA256v01. + CertSigAlgoRSASHA2256v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 + // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA512v01. + CertSigAlgoRSASHA2512v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 +) + +// Certificate types distinguish between host and user +// certificates. The values can be set in the CertType field of +// Certificate. +const ( + UserCert = 1 + HostCert = 2 +) + +// Signature represents a cryptographic signature. +type Signature struct { + Format string + Blob []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// CertTimeInfinity can be used for OpenSSHCertV01.ValidBefore to indicate that +// a certificate does not expire. +const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1 + +// An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in +// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. The Certificate type implements the +// PublicKey interface, so it can be unmarshaled using +// ParsePublicKey. +type Certificate struct { + Nonce []byte + Key PublicKey + Serial uint64 + CertType uint32 + KeyId string + ValidPrincipals []string + ValidAfter uint64 + ValidBefore uint64 + Permissions + Reserved []byte + SignatureKey PublicKey + Signature *Signature +} + +// genericCertData holds the key-independent part of the certificate data. +// Overall, certificates contain an nonce, public key fields and +// key-independent fields. +type genericCertData struct { + Serial uint64 + CertType uint32 + KeyId string + ValidPrincipals []byte + ValidAfter uint64 + ValidBefore uint64 + CriticalOptions []byte + Extensions []byte + Reserved []byte + SignatureKey []byte + Signature []byte +} + +func marshalStringList(namelist []string) []byte { + var to []byte + for _, name := range namelist { + s := struct{ N string }{name} + to = append(to, Marshal(&s)...) + } + return to +} + +type optionsTuple struct { + Key string + Value []byte +} + +type optionsTupleValue struct { + Value string +} + +// serialize a map of critical options or extensions +// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, +// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty string value +func marshalTuples(tups map[string]string) []byte { + keys := make([]string, 0, len(tups)) + for key := range tups { + keys = append(keys, key) + } + sort.Strings(keys) + + var ret []byte + for _, key := range keys { + s := optionsTuple{Key: key} + if value := tups[key]; len(value) > 0 { + s.Value = Marshal(&optionsTupleValue{value}) + } + ret = append(ret, Marshal(&s)...) + } + return ret +} + +// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, +// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty option value +func parseTuples(in []byte) (map[string]string, error) { + tups := map[string]string{} + var lastKey string + var haveLastKey bool + + for len(in) > 0 { + var key, val, extra []byte + var ok bool + + if key, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + keyStr := string(key) + // according to [PROTOCOL.certkeys], the names must be in + // lexical order. + if haveLastKey && keyStr <= lastKey { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate options are not in lexical order") + } + lastKey, haveLastKey = keyStr, true + // the next field is a data field, which if non-empty has a string embedded + if val, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + if len(val) > 0 { + val, extra, ok = parseString(val) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + if len(extra) > 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected trailing data after certificate option value") + } + tups[keyStr] = string(val) + } else { + tups[keyStr] = "" + } + } + return tups, nil +} + +func parseCert(in []byte, privAlgo string) (*Certificate, error) { + nonce, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + + key, rest, err := parsePubKey(rest, privAlgo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var g genericCertData + if err := Unmarshal(rest, &g); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c := &Certificate{ + Nonce: nonce, + Key: key, + Serial: g.Serial, + CertType: g.CertType, + KeyId: g.KeyId, + ValidAfter: g.ValidAfter, + ValidBefore: g.ValidBefore, + } + + for principals := g.ValidPrincipals; len(principals) > 0; { + principal, rest, ok := parseString(principals) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + c.ValidPrincipals = append(c.ValidPrincipals, string(principal)) + principals = rest + } + + c.CriticalOptions, err = parseTuples(g.CriticalOptions) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.Extensions, err = parseTuples(g.Extensions) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.Reserved = g.Reserved + k, err := ParsePublicKey(g.SignatureKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // The Type() function is intended to return only certificate key types, but + // we use certKeyAlgoNames anyway for safety, to match [Certificate.Type]. + if _, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[k.Type()]; ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: the signature key type %q is invalid for certificates", k.Type()) + } + c.SignatureKey = k + c.Signature, rest, ok = parseSignatureBody(g.Signature) + if !ok || len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") + } + + return c, nil +} + +type openSSHCertSigner struct { + pub *Certificate + signer Signer +} + +type algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner struct { + *openSSHCertSigner + algorithmSigner AlgorithmSigner +} + +// NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose +// private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert +// doesn't match the key used by signer. +func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) { + if !bytes.Equal(cert.Key.Marshal(), signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key") + } + + switch s := signer.(type) { + case MultiAlgorithmSigner: + return &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ + &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s}, + supportedAlgorithms: s.Algorithms(), + }, nil + case AlgorithmSigner: + return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ + &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s}, nil + default: + return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil + } +} + +func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return s.signer.Sign(rand, data) +} + +func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return s.pub +} + +func (s *algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + return s.algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) +} + +const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address" + +// CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods +// can be plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback and +// ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. For the CertChecker to work, +// minimally, the IsAuthority callback should be set. +type CertChecker struct { + // SupportedCriticalOptions lists the CriticalOptions that the + // server application layer understands. These are only used + // for user certificates. + SupportedCriticalOptions []string + + // IsUserAuthority should return true if the key is recognized as an + // authority for user certificate. This must be set if this CertChecker + // will be checking user certificates. + IsUserAuthority func(auth PublicKey) bool + + // IsHostAuthority should report whether the key is recognized as + // an authority for this host. This must be set if this CertChecker + // will be checking host certificates. + IsHostAuthority func(auth PublicKey, address string) bool + + // Clock is used for verifying time stamps. If nil, time.Now + // is used. + Clock func() time.Time + + // UserKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.Authenticate encounters a + // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement validation + // of user keys or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. + UserKeyFallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) + + // HostKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.CheckHostKey encounters a + // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement host key + // validation or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. + HostKeyFallback HostKeyCallback + + // IsRevoked is called for each certificate so that revocation checking + // can be implemented. It should return true if the given certificate + // is revoked and false otherwise. If nil, no certificates are + // considered to have been revoked. + IsRevoked func(cert *Certificate) bool +} + +// CheckHostKey checks a host key certificate. This method can be +// plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback. +func (c *CertChecker) CheckHostKey(addr string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + cert, ok := key.(*Certificate) + if !ok { + if c.HostKeyFallback != nil { + return c.HostKeyFallback(addr, remote, key) + } + return errors.New("ssh: non-certificate host key") + } + if cert.CertType != HostCert { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate presented as a host key has type %d", cert.CertType) + } + if !c.IsHostAuthority(cert.SignatureKey, addr) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: no authorities for hostname: %v", addr) + } + + hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // Pass hostname only as principal for host certificates (consistent with OpenSSH) + return c.CheckCert(hostname, cert) +} + +// Authenticate checks a user certificate. Authenticate can be used as +// a value for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. +func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) { + cert, ok := pubKey.(*Certificate) + if !ok { + if c.UserKeyFallback != nil { + return c.UserKeyFallback(conn, pubKey) + } + return nil, errors.New("ssh: normal key pairs not accepted") + } + + if cert.CertType != UserCert { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has type %d", cert.CertType) + } + if !c.IsUserAuthority(cert.SignatureKey) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signed by unrecognized authority") + } + + if err := c.CheckCert(conn.User(), cert); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &cert.Permissions, nil +} + +// CheckCert checks CriticalOptions, ValidPrincipals, revocation, timestamp and +// the signature of the certificate. +func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error { + if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial) + } + + for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions { + // sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by + // serverAuthenticate + if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption { + continue + } + + found := false + for _, supp := range c.SupportedCriticalOptions { + if supp == opt { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported critical option %q in certificate", opt) + } + } + + if len(cert.ValidPrincipals) > 0 { + // By default, certs are valid for all users/hosts. + found := false + for _, p := range cert.ValidPrincipals { + if p == principal { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: principal %q not in the set of valid principals for given certificate: %q", principal, cert.ValidPrincipals) + } + } + + clock := c.Clock + if clock == nil { + clock = time.Now + } + + unixNow := clock().Unix() + if after := int64(cert.ValidAfter); after < 0 || unixNow < int64(cert.ValidAfter) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert is not yet valid") + } + if before := int64(cert.ValidBefore); cert.ValidBefore != uint64(CertTimeInfinity) && (unixNow >= before || before < 0) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has expired") + } + if err := cert.SignatureKey.Verify(cert.bytesForSigning(), cert.Signature); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signature does not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +// SignCert signs the certificate with an authority, setting the Nonce, +// SignatureKey, and Signature fields. If the authority implements the +// MultiAlgorithmSigner interface the first algorithm in the list is used. This +// is useful if you want to sign with a specific algorithm. As specified in +// [SSH-CERTS], Section 2.1.1, authority can't be a [Certificate]. +func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error { + c.Nonce = make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.Nonce); err != nil { + return err + } + // The Type() function is intended to return only certificate key types, but + // we use certKeyAlgoNames anyway for safety, to match [Certificate.Type]. + if _, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[authority.PublicKey().Type()]; ok { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificates cannot be used as authority (public key type %q)", + authority.PublicKey().Type()) + } + c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey() + + if v, ok := authority.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok { + if len(v.Algorithms()) == 0 { + return errors.New("the provided authority has no signature algorithm") + } + // Use the first algorithm in the list. + sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), v.Algorithms()[0]) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.Signature = sig + return nil + } else if v, ok := authority.(AlgorithmSigner); ok && v.PublicKey().Type() == KeyAlgoRSA { + // Default to KeyAlgoRSASHA512 for ssh-rsa signers. + // TODO: consider using KeyAlgoRSASHA256 as default. + sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), KeyAlgoRSASHA512) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.Signature = sig + return nil + } + + sig, err := authority.Sign(rand, c.bytesForSigning()) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.Signature = sig + return nil +} + +// certKeyAlgoNames is a mapping from known certificate algorithm names to the +// corresponding public key signature algorithm. +// +// This map must be kept in sync with the one in agent/client.go. +var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{ + CertAlgoRSAv01: KeyAlgoRSA, + CertAlgoRSASHA256v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA256, + CertAlgoRSASHA512v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01: InsecureKeyAlgoDSA, + CertAlgoECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoECDSA256, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01: KeyAlgoECDSA384, + CertAlgoECDSA521v01: KeyAlgoECDSA521, + CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, + CertAlgoED25519v01: KeyAlgoED25519, + CertAlgoSKED25519v01: KeyAlgoSKED25519, +} + +// underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is +// an advertised or negotiated public key or host key algorithm). These are +// usually the same, except for certificate algorithms. +func underlyingAlgo(algo string) string { + if a, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo]; ok { + return a + } + return algo +} + +// certificateAlgo returns the certificate algorithms that uses the provided +// underlying signature algorithm. +func certificateAlgo(algo string) (certAlgo string, ok bool) { + for certName, algoName := range certKeyAlgoNames { + if algoName == algo { + return certName, true + } + } + return "", false +} + +func (cert *Certificate) bytesForSigning() []byte { + c2 := *cert + c2.Signature = nil + out := c2.Marshal() + // Drop trailing signature length. + return out[:len(out)-4] +} + +// Marshal serializes c into OpenSSH's wire format. It is part of the +// PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Marshal() []byte { + generic := genericCertData{ + Serial: c.Serial, + CertType: c.CertType, + KeyId: c.KeyId, + ValidPrincipals: marshalStringList(c.ValidPrincipals), + ValidAfter: uint64(c.ValidAfter), + ValidBefore: uint64(c.ValidBefore), + CriticalOptions: marshalTuples(c.CriticalOptions), + Extensions: marshalTuples(c.Extensions), + Reserved: c.Reserved, + SignatureKey: c.SignatureKey.Marshal(), + } + if c.Signature != nil { + generic.Signature = Marshal(c.Signature) + } + genericBytes := Marshal(&generic) + keyBytes := c.Key.Marshal() + _, keyBytes, _ = parseString(keyBytes) + prefix := Marshal(&struct { + Name string + Nonce []byte + Key []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{c.Type(), c.Nonce, keyBytes}) + + result := make([]byte, 0, len(prefix)+len(genericBytes)) + result = append(result, prefix...) + result = append(result, genericBytes...) + return result +} + +// Type returns the certificate algorithm name. It is part of the PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Type() string { + certName, ok := certificateAlgo(c.Key.Type()) + if !ok { + panic("unknown certificate type for key type " + c.Key.Type()) + } + return certName +} + +// Verify verifies a signature against the certificate's public +// key. It is part of the PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + return c.Key.Verify(data, sig) +} + +func parseSignatureBody(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { + format, in, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + + out = &Signature{ + Format: string(format), + } + + if out.Blob, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return + } + + switch out.Format { + case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, KeyAlgoSKED25519, CertAlgoSKED25519v01: + out.Rest = in + return out, nil, ok + } + + return out, in, ok +} + +func parseSignature(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { + sigBytes, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + + out, trailing, ok := parseSignatureBody(sigBytes) + if !ok || len(trailing) > 0 { + return nil, nil, false + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc0bb7ab --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go @@ -0,0 +1,645 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "sync" +) + +const ( + minPacketLength = 9 + // channelMaxPacket contains the maximum number of bytes that will be + // sent in a single packet. As per RFC 4253, section 6.1, 32k is also + // the minimum. + channelMaxPacket = 1 << 15 + // We follow OpenSSH here. + channelWindowSize = 64 * channelMaxPacket +) + +// NewChannel represents an incoming request to a channel. It must either be +// accepted for use by calling Accept, or rejected by calling Reject. +type NewChannel interface { + // Accept accepts the channel creation request. It returns the Channel + // and a Go channel containing SSH requests. The Go channel must be + // serviced otherwise the Channel will hang. + Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) + + // Reject rejects the channel creation request. After calling + // this, no other methods on the Channel may be called. + Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error + + // ChannelType returns the type of the channel, as supplied by the + // client. + ChannelType() string + + // ExtraData returns the arbitrary payload for this channel, as supplied + // by the client. This data is specific to the channel type. + ExtraData() []byte +} + +// A Channel is an ordered, reliable, flow-controlled, duplex stream +// that is multiplexed over an SSH connection. +type Channel interface { + // Read reads up to len(data) bytes from the channel. + Read(data []byte) (int, error) + + // Write writes len(data) bytes to the channel. + Write(data []byte) (int, error) + + // Close signals end of channel use. No data may be sent after this + // call. + Close() error + + // CloseWrite signals the end of sending in-band + // data. Requests may still be sent, and the other side may + // still send data + CloseWrite() error + + // SendRequest sends a channel request. If wantReply is true, + // it will wait for a reply and return the result as a + // boolean, otherwise the return value will be false. Channel + // requests are out-of-band messages so they may be sent even + // if the data stream is closed or blocked by flow control. + // If the channel is closed before a reply is returned, io.EOF + // is returned. + SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) + + // Stderr returns an io.ReadWriter that writes to this channel + // with the extended data type set to stderr. Stderr may + // safely be read and written from a different goroutine than + // Read and Write respectively. + Stderr() io.ReadWriter +} + +// Request is a request sent outside of the normal stream of +// data. Requests can either be specific to an SSH channel, or they +// can be global. +type Request struct { + Type string + WantReply bool + Payload []byte + + ch *channel + mux *mux +} + +// Reply sends a response to a request. It must be called for all requests +// where WantReply is true and is a no-op otherwise. The payload argument is +// ignored for replies to channel-specific requests. +func (r *Request) Reply(ok bool, payload []byte) error { + if !r.WantReply { + return nil + } + + if r.ch == nil { + return r.mux.ackRequest(ok, payload) + } + + return r.ch.ackRequest(ok) +} + +// RejectionReason is an enumeration used when rejecting channel creation +// requests. See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +type RejectionReason uint32 + +const ( + Prohibited RejectionReason = iota + 1 + ConnectionFailed + UnknownChannelType + ResourceShortage +) + +// String converts the rejection reason to human readable form. +func (r RejectionReason) String() string { + switch r { + case Prohibited: + return "administratively prohibited" + case ConnectionFailed: + return "connect failed" + case UnknownChannelType: + return "unknown channel type" + case ResourceShortage: + return "resource shortage" + } + return fmt.Sprintf("unknown reason %d", int(r)) +} + +func min(a uint32, b int) uint32 { + if a < uint32(b) { + return a + } + return uint32(b) +} + +type channelDirection uint8 + +const ( + channelInbound channelDirection = iota + channelOutbound +) + +// channel is an implementation of the Channel interface that works +// with the mux class. +type channel struct { + // R/O after creation + chanType string + extraData []byte + localId, remoteId uint32 + + // maxIncomingPayload and maxRemotePayload are the maximum + // payload sizes of normal and extended data packets for + // receiving and sending, respectively. The wire packet will + // be 9 or 13 bytes larger (excluding encryption overhead). + maxIncomingPayload uint32 + maxRemotePayload uint32 + + mux *mux + + // decided is set to true if an accept or reject message has been sent + // (for outbound channels) or received (for inbound channels). + decided bool + + // direction contains either channelOutbound, for channels created + // locally, or channelInbound, for channels created by the peer. + direction channelDirection + + // Pending internal channel messages. + msg chan interface{} + + // Since requests have no ID, there can be only one request + // with WantReply=true outstanding. This lock is held by a + // goroutine that has such an outgoing request pending. + sentRequestMu sync.Mutex + + incomingRequests chan *Request + + sentEOF bool + + // thread-safe data + remoteWin window + pending *buffer + extPending *buffer + + // windowMu protects myWindow, the flow-control window, and myConsumed, + // the number of bytes consumed since we last increased myWindow + windowMu sync.Mutex + myWindow uint32 + myConsumed uint32 + + // writeMu serializes calls to mux.conn.writePacket() and + // protects sentClose and packetPool. This mutex must be + // different from windowMu, as writePacket can block if there + // is a key exchange pending. + writeMu sync.Mutex + sentClose bool + + // packetPool has a buffer for each extended channel ID to + // save allocations during writes. + packetPool map[uint32][]byte +} + +// writePacket sends a packet. If the packet is a channel close, it updates +// sentClose. This method takes the lock c.writeMu. +func (ch *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error { + ch.writeMu.Lock() + if ch.sentClose { + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + return io.EOF + } + ch.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose) + err := ch.mux.conn.writePacket(packet) + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + return err +} + +func (ch *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { + if debugMux { + log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", ch.mux.chanList.offset, msg) + } + + p := Marshal(msg) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], ch.remoteId) + return ch.writePacket(p) +} + +// WriteExtended writes data to a specific extended stream. These streams are +// used, for example, for stderr. +func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) { + if ch.sentEOF { + return 0, io.EOF + } + // 1 byte message type, 4 bytes remoteId, 4 bytes data length + opCode := byte(msgChannelData) + headerLength := uint32(9) + if extendedCode > 0 { + headerLength += 4 + opCode = msgChannelExtendedData + } + + ch.writeMu.Lock() + packet := ch.packetPool[extendedCode] + // We don't remove the buffer from packetPool, so + // WriteExtended calls from different goroutines will be + // flagged as errors by the race detector. + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + + for len(data) > 0 { + space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data)) + if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil { + return n, err + } + if want := headerLength + space; uint32(cap(packet)) < want { + packet = make([]byte, want) + } else { + packet = packet[:want] + } + + todo := data[:space] + + packet[0] = opCode + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], ch.remoteId) + if extendedCode > 0 { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[5:], uint32(extendedCode)) + } + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[headerLength-4:], uint32(len(todo))) + copy(packet[headerLength:], todo) + if err = ch.writePacket(packet); err != nil { + return n, err + } + + n += len(todo) + data = data[len(todo):] + } + + ch.writeMu.Lock() + ch.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + + return n, err +} + +func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error { + headerLen := 9 + isExtendedData := packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData + if isExtendedData { + headerLen = 13 + } + if len(packet) < headerLen { + // malformed data packet + return parseError(packet[0]) + } + + var extended uint32 + if isExtendedData { + extended = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[5:]) + } + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[headerLen-4 : headerLen]) + if length == 0 { + return nil + } + if length > ch.maxIncomingPayload { + // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect? + return errors.New("ssh: incoming packet exceeds maximum payload size") + } + + data := packet[headerLen:] + if length != uint32(len(data)) { + return errors.New("ssh: wrong packet length") + } + + ch.windowMu.Lock() + if ch.myWindow < length { + ch.windowMu.Unlock() + // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect with reason? + return errors.New("ssh: remote side wrote too much") + } + ch.myWindow -= length + ch.windowMu.Unlock() + + if extended == 1 { + ch.extPending.write(data) + } else if extended > 0 { + // discard other extended data. + } else { + ch.pending.write(data) + } + return nil +} + +func (c *channel) adjustWindow(adj uint32) error { + c.windowMu.Lock() + // Since myConsumed and myWindow are managed on our side, and can never + // exceed the initial window setting, we don't worry about overflow. + c.myConsumed += adj + var sendAdj uint32 + if (channelWindowSize-c.myWindow > 3*c.maxIncomingPayload) || + (c.myWindow < channelWindowSize/2) { + sendAdj = c.myConsumed + c.myConsumed = 0 + c.myWindow += sendAdj + } + c.windowMu.Unlock() + if sendAdj == 0 { + return nil + } + return c.sendMessage(windowAdjustMsg{ + AdditionalBytes: sendAdj, + }) +} + +func (c *channel) ReadExtended(data []byte, extended uint32) (n int, err error) { + switch extended { + case 1: + n, err = c.extPending.Read(data) + case 0: + n, err = c.pending.Read(data) + default: + return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: extended code %d unimplemented", extended) + } + + if n > 0 { + err = c.adjustWindow(uint32(n)) + // sendWindowAdjust can return io.EOF if the remote + // peer has closed the connection, however we want to + // defer forwarding io.EOF to the caller of Read until + // the buffer has been drained. + if n > 0 && err == io.EOF { + err = nil + } + } + + return n, err +} + +func (c *channel) close() { + c.pending.eof() + c.extPending.eof() + close(c.msg) + close(c.incomingRequests) + c.writeMu.Lock() + // This is not necessary for a normal channel teardown, but if + // there was another error, it is. + c.sentClose = true + c.writeMu.Unlock() + // Unblock writers. + c.remoteWin.close() +} + +// responseMessageReceived is called when a success or failure message is +// received on a channel to check that such a message is reasonable for the +// given channel. +func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error { + if ch.direction == channelInbound { + return errors.New("ssh: channel response message received on inbound channel") + } + if ch.decided { + return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel") + } + ch.decided = true + return nil +} + +func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error { + switch packet[0] { + case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData: + return ch.handleData(packet) + case msgChannelClose: + ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.remoteId}) + ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId) + ch.close() + return nil + case msgChannelEOF: + // RFC 4254 is mute on how EOF affects dataExt messages but + // it is logical to signal EOF at the same time. + ch.extPending.eof() + ch.pending.eof() + return nil + } + + decoded, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := decoded.(type) { + case *channelOpenFailureMsg: + if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { + return err + } + ch.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersID) + ch.msg <- msg + case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: + if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { + return err + } + if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid MaxPacketSize %d from peer", msg.MaxPacketSize) + } + ch.remoteId = msg.MyID + ch.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize + ch.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow) + ch.msg <- msg + case *windowAdjustMsg: + if !ch.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid window update for %d bytes", msg.AdditionalBytes) + } + case *channelRequestMsg: + req := Request{ + Type: msg.Request, + WantReply: msg.WantReply, + Payload: msg.RequestSpecificData, + ch: ch, + } + + ch.incomingRequests <- &req + default: + ch.msg <- msg + } + return nil +} + +func (m *mux) newChannel(chanType string, direction channelDirection, extraData []byte) *channel { + ch := &channel{ + remoteWin: window{Cond: newCond()}, + myWindow: channelWindowSize, + pending: newBuffer(), + extPending: newBuffer(), + direction: direction, + incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), + msg: make(chan interface{}, chanSize), + chanType: chanType, + extraData: extraData, + mux: m, + packetPool: make(map[uint32][]byte), + } + ch.localId = m.chanList.add(ch) + return ch +} + +var errUndecided = errors.New("ssh: must Accept or Reject channel") +var errDecidedAlready = errors.New("ssh: can call Accept or Reject only once") + +type extChannel struct { + code uint32 + ch *channel +} + +func (e *extChannel) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) { + return e.ch.WriteExtended(data, e.code) +} + +func (e *extChannel) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) { + return e.ch.ReadExtended(data, e.code) +} + +func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { + if ch.decided { + return nil, nil, errDecidedAlready + } + ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket + confirm := channelOpenConfirmMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + MyID: ch.localId, + MyWindow: ch.myWindow, + MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, + } + ch.decided = true + if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil +} + +func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error { + if ch.decided { + return errDecidedAlready + } + reject := channelOpenFailureMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + Reason: reason, + Message: message, + Language: "en", + } + ch.decided = true + return ch.sendMessage(reject) +} + +func (ch *channel) Read(data []byte) (int, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return 0, errUndecided + } + return ch.ReadExtended(data, 0) +} + +func (ch *channel) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return 0, errUndecided + } + return ch.WriteExtended(data, 0) +} + +func (ch *channel) CloseWrite() error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + ch.sentEOF = true + return ch.sendMessage(channelEOFMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId}) +} + +func (ch *channel) Close() error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + + return ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId}) +} + +// Extended returns an io.ReadWriter that sends and receives data on the given, +// SSH extended stream. Such streams are used, for example, for stderr. +func (ch *channel) Extended(code uint32) io.ReadWriter { + if !ch.decided { + return nil + } + return &extChannel{code, ch} +} + +func (ch *channel) Stderr() io.ReadWriter { + return ch.Extended(1) +} + +func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return false, errUndecided + } + + if wantReply { + ch.sentRequestMu.Lock() + defer ch.sentRequestMu.Unlock() + } + + msg := channelRequestMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + Request: name, + WantReply: wantReply, + RequestSpecificData: payload, + } + + if err := ch.sendMessage(msg); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + if wantReply { + m, ok := (<-ch.msg) + if !ok { + return false, io.EOF + } + switch m.(type) { + case *channelRequestFailureMsg: + return false, nil + case *channelRequestSuccessMsg: + return true, nil + default: + return false, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to channel request: %#v", m) + } + } + + return false, nil +} + +// ackRequest either sends an ack or nack to the channel request. +func (ch *channel) ackRequest(ok bool) error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + + var msg interface{} + if !ok { + msg = channelRequestFailureMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + } + } else { + msg = channelRequestSuccessMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + } + } + return ch.sendMessage(msg) +} + +func (ch *channel) ChannelType() string { + return ch.chanType +} + +func (ch *channel) ExtraData() []byte { + return ch.extraData +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7554ed57 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go @@ -0,0 +1,789 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/des" + "crypto/fips140" + "crypto/rc4" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" + "io" + "slices" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305" +) + +const ( + packetSizeMultiple = 16 // TODO(huin) this should be determined by the cipher. + + // RFC 4253 section 6.1 defines a minimum packet size of 32768 that implementations + // MUST be able to process (plus a few more kilobytes for padding and mac). The RFC + // indicates implementations SHOULD be able to handle larger packet sizes, but then + // waffles on about reasonable limits. + // + // OpenSSH caps their maxPacket at 256kB so we choose to do + // the same. maxPacket is also used to ensure that uint32 + // length fields do not overflow, so it should remain well + // below 4G. + maxPacket = 256 * 1024 +) + +// noneCipher implements cipher.Stream and provides no encryption. It is used +// by the transport before the first key-exchange. +type noneCipher struct{} + +func (c noneCipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + copy(dst, src) +} + +func newAESCTR(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return cipher.NewCTR(c, iv), nil +} + +func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { + return rc4.NewCipher(key) +} + +type cipherMode struct { + keySize int + ivSize int + create func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) +} + +func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + stream, err := createFunc(key, iv) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var streamDump []byte + if skip > 0 { + streamDump = make([]byte, 512) + } + + for remainingToDump := skip; remainingToDump > 0; { + dumpThisTime := remainingToDump + if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) { + dumpThisTime = len(streamDump) + } + stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime]) + remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime + } + + mac := macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey) + return &streamPacketCipher{ + mac: mac, + etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm, + macResult: make([]byte, mac.Size()), + cipher: stream, + }, nil + } +} + +// cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included +// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly configured. +// When FIPS mode is enabled, only FIPS-approved algorithms are included. +var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{} + +func init() { + cipherModes[CipherAES128CTR] = &cipherMode{16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)} + cipherModes[CipherAES192CTR] = &cipherMode{24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)} + cipherModes[CipherAES256CTR] = &cipherMode{32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)} + // Use of GCM with arbitrary IVs is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode, + // we'll wire it up to NewGCMForSSH in Go 1.26. + // + // For now it means we'll work with fips140=on but not fips140=only. + cipherModes[CipherAES128GCM] = &cipherMode{16, 12, newGCMCipher} + cipherModes[CipherAES256GCM] = &cipherMode{32, 12, newGCMCipher} + + if fips140.Enabled() { + defaultCiphers = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultCiphers, func(algo string) bool { + _, ok := cipherModes[algo] + return !ok + }) + return + } + + cipherModes[CipherChaCha20Poly1305] = &cipherMode{64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher} + // Insecure ciphers not included in the default configuration. + cipherModes[InsecureCipherRC4128] = &cipherMode{16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)} + cipherModes[InsecureCipherRC4256] = &cipherMode{32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)} + cipherModes[InsecureCipherRC4] = &cipherMode{16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)} + // CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config. + // (See https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a526.pdf). If absolutely + // needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it. + // You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if + // you do. + cipherModes[InsecureCipherAES128CBC] = &cipherMode{16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher} + cipherModes[InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC] = &cipherMode{24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher} +} + +// prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length +// and number of padding bytes. +const prefixLen = 5 + +// streamPacketCipher is a packetCipher using a stream cipher. +type streamPacketCipher struct { + mac hash.Hash + cipher cipher.Stream + etm bool + + // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. + prefix [prefixLen]byte + seqNumBytes [4]byte + padding [2 * packetSizeMultiple]byte + packetData []byte + macResult []byte +} + +// readCipherPacket reads and decrypt a single packet from the reader argument. +func (s *streamPacketCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var encryptedPaddingLength [1]byte + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + copy(encryptedPaddingLength[:], s.prefix[4:5]) + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) + } else { + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) + } + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(s.prefix[0:4]) + paddingLength := uint32(s.prefix[4]) + + var macSize uint32 + if s.mac != nil { + s.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) + if s.etm { + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:4]) + s.mac.Write(encryptedPaddingLength[:]) + } else { + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) + } + macSize = uint32(s.mac.Size()) + } + + if length <= paddingLength+1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too small") + } + + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") + } + + // the maxPacket check above ensures that length-1+macSize + // does not overflow. + if uint32(cap(s.packetData)) < length-1+macSize { + s.packetData = make([]byte, length-1+macSize) + } else { + s.packetData = s.packetData[:length-1+macSize] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.packetData); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + mac := s.packetData[length-1:] + data := s.packetData[:length-1] + + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + s.mac.Write(data) + } + + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(data, data) + + if s.mac != nil { + if !s.etm { + s.mac.Write(data) + } + s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(s.macResult, mac) != 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") + } + } + + return s.packetData[:length-paddingLength-1], nil +} + +// writeCipherPacket encrypts and sends a packet of data to the writer argument +func (s *streamPacketCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + if len(packet) > maxPacket { + return errors.New("ssh: packet too large") + } + + aadlen := 0 + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + // packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes + aadlen = 4 + } + + paddingLength := packetSizeMultiple - (prefixLen+len(packet)-aadlen)%packetSizeMultiple + if paddingLength < 4 { + paddingLength += packetSizeMultiple + } + + length := len(packet) + 1 + paddingLength + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.prefix[:], uint32(length)) + s.prefix[4] = byte(paddingLength) + padding := s.padding[:paddingLength] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, padding); err != nil { + return err + } + + if s.mac != nil { + s.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) + + if s.etm { + // For EtM algorithms, the packet length must stay unencrypted, + // but the following data (padding length) must be encrypted + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) + } + + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) + + if !s.etm { + // For non-EtM algorithms, the algorithm is applied on unencrypted data + s.mac.Write(packet) + s.mac.Write(padding) + } + } + + if !(s.mac != nil && s.etm) { + // For EtM algorithms, the padding length has already been encrypted + // and the packet length must remain unencrypted + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) + } + + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(packet, packet) + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(padding, padding) + + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + // For EtM algorithms, packet and padding must be encrypted + s.mac.Write(packet) + s.mac.Write(padding) + } + + if _, err := w.Write(s.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := w.Write(packet); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := w.Write(padding); err != nil { + return err + } + + if s.mac != nil { + s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) + if _, err := w.Write(s.macResult); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + return nil +} + +type gcmCipher struct { + aead cipher.AEAD + prefix [4]byte + iv []byte + buf []byte +} + +func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(c) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &gcmCipher{ + aead: aead, + iv: iv, + }, nil +} + +const gcmTagSize = 16 + +func (c *gcmCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + // Pad out to multiple of 16 bytes. This is different from the + // stream cipher because that encrypts the length too. + padding := byte(packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(packet))%packetSizeMultiple) + if padding < 4 { + padding += packetSizeMultiple + } + + length := uint32(len(packet) + int(padding) + 1) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.prefix[:], length) + if _, err := w.Write(c.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + + if cap(c.buf) < int(length) { + c.buf = make([]byte, length) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:length] + } + + c.buf[0] = padding + copy(c.buf[1:], packet) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[1+len(packet):]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.buf = c.aead.Seal(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) + if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { + return err + } + c.incIV() + + return nil +} + +func (c *gcmCipher) incIV() { + for i := 4 + 7; i >= 4; i-- { + c.iv[i]++ + if c.iv[i] != 0 { + break + } + } +} + +func (c *gcmCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c.prefix[:]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded") + } + + if cap(c.buf) < int(length+gcmTagSize) { + c.buf = make([]byte, length+gcmTagSize) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:length+gcmTagSize] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + plain, err := c.aead.Open(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.incIV() + + if len(plain) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet") + } + + padding := plain[0] + if padding < 4 { + // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies + // the maximum size, which is 255. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) + } + + if int(padding+1) >= len(plain) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) + } + plain = plain[1 : length-uint32(padding)] + return plain, nil +} + +// cbcCipher implements aes128-cbc cipher defined in RFC 4253 section 6.1 +type cbcCipher struct { + mac hash.Hash + macSize uint32 + decrypter cipher.BlockMode + encrypter cipher.BlockMode + + // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. + seqNumBytes [4]byte + packetData []byte + macResult []byte + + // Amount of data we should still read to hide which + // verification error triggered. + oracleCamouflage uint32 +} + +func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + cbc := &cbcCipher{ + mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey), + decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv), + encrypter: cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(c, iv), + packetData: make([]byte, 1024), + } + if cbc.mac != nil { + cbc.macSize = uint32(cbc.mac.Size()) + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func maxUInt32(a, b int) uint32 { + if a > b { + return uint32(a) + } + return uint32(b) +} + +const ( + cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple = 8 + cbcMinPacketSize = 16 + cbcMinPaddingSize = 4 +) + +// cbcError represents a verification error that may leak information. +type cbcError string + +func (e cbcError) Error() string { return string(e) } + +func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + p, err := c.readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum, r) + if err != nil { + if _, ok := err.(cbcError); ok { + // Verification error: read a fixed amount of + // data, to make distinguishing between + // failing MAC and failing length check more + // difficult. + io.CopyN(io.Discard, r, int64(c.oracleCamouflage)) + } + } + return p, err +} + +func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + blockSize := c.decrypter.BlockSize() + + // Read the header, which will include some of the subsequent data in the + // case of block ciphers - this is copied back to the payload later. + // How many bytes of payload/padding will be read with this first read. + firstBlockLength := uint32((prefixLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize * blockSize) + firstBlock := c.packetData[:firstBlockLength] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, firstBlock); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c.oracleCamouflage = maxPacket + 4 + c.macSize - firstBlockLength + + c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(firstBlock, firstBlock) + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(firstBlock[:4]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too large") + } + if length+4 < maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSize, blockSize) { + // The minimum size of a packet is 16 (or the cipher block size, whichever + // is larger) bytes. + return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too small") + } + // The length of the packet (including the length field but not the MAC) must + // be a multiple of the block size or 8, whichever is larger. + if (length+4)%maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, blockSize) != 0 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length multiple") + } + + paddingLength := uint32(firstBlock[4]) + if paddingLength < cbcMinPaddingSize || length <= paddingLength+1 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length") + } + + // Positions within the c.packetData buffer: + macStart := 4 + length + paddingStart := macStart - paddingLength + + // Entire packet size, starting before length, ending at end of mac. + entirePacketSize := macStart + c.macSize + + // Ensure c.packetData is large enough for the entire packet data. + if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < entirePacketSize { + // Still need to upsize and copy, but this should be rare at runtime, only + // on upsizing the packetData buffer. + c.packetData = make([]byte, entirePacketSize) + copy(c.packetData, firstBlock) + } else { + c.packetData = c.packetData[:entirePacketSize] + } + + n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n) + + remainingCrypted := c.packetData[firstBlockLength:macStart] + c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(remainingCrypted, remainingCrypted) + + mac := c.packetData[macStart:] + if c.mac != nil { + c.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) + c.mac.Write(c.packetData[:macStart]) + c.macResult = c.mac.Sum(c.macResult[:0]) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c.macResult, mac) != 1 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: MAC failure") + } + } + + return c.packetData[prefixLen:paddingStart], nil +} + +func (c *cbcCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + effectiveBlockSize := maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, c.encrypter.BlockSize()) + + // Length of encrypted portion of the packet (header, payload, padding). + // Enforce minimum padding and packet size. + encLength := maxUInt32(prefixLen+len(packet)+cbcMinPaddingSize, cbcMinPaddingSize) + // Enforce block size. + encLength = (encLength + effectiveBlockSize - 1) / effectiveBlockSize * effectiveBlockSize + + length := encLength - 4 + paddingLength := int(length) - (1 + len(packet)) + + // Overall buffer contains: header, payload, padding, mac. + // Space for the MAC is reserved in the capacity but not the slice length. + bufferSize := encLength + c.macSize + if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < bufferSize { + c.packetData = make([]byte, encLength, bufferSize) + } else { + c.packetData = c.packetData[:encLength] + } + + p := c.packetData + + // Packet header. + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p, length) + p = p[4:] + p[0] = byte(paddingLength) + + // Payload. + p = p[1:] + copy(p, packet) + + // Padding. + p = p[len(packet):] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, p); err != nil { + return err + } + + if c.mac != nil { + c.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) + c.mac.Write(c.packetData) + // The MAC is now appended into the capacity reserved for it earlier. + c.packetData = c.mac.Sum(c.packetData) + } + + c.encrypter.CryptBlocks(c.packetData[:encLength], c.packetData[:encLength]) + + if _, err := w.Write(c.packetData); err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +// AEAD, which is described here: +// +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00 +// +// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC 4253 Section 6 +// also requires of stream ciphers. +type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct { + lengthKey [32]byte + contentKey [32]byte + buf []byte +} + +func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + if len(key) != 64 { + panic(len(key)) + } + + c := &chacha20Poly1305Cipher{ + buf: make([]byte, 256), + } + + copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32]) + copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:]) + return c, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes + + encryptedLength := c.buf[:4] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var lenBytes [4]byte + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength) + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") + } + + contentEnd := 4 + length + packetEnd := contentEnd + poly1305.TagSize + if uint32(cap(c.buf)) < packetEnd { + c.buf = make([]byte, packetEnd) + copy(c.buf[:], encryptedLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:packetEnd] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf[4:packetEnd]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + copy(mac[:], c.buf[contentEnd:packetEnd]) + if !poly1305.Verify(&mac, c.buf[:contentEnd], &polyKey) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") + } + + plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd] + s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain) + + if len(plain) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet") + } + + padding := plain[0] + if padding < 4 { + // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies + // the maximum size, which is 255. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) + } + + if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) + } + + plain = plain[1 : len(plain)-int(padding)] + + return plain, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error { + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes + + // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte + // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6. + const packetSizeMultiple = 8 + + padding := packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(payload))%packetSizeMultiple + if padding < 4 { + padding += packetSizeMultiple + } + + // size (4 bytes), padding (1), payload, padding, tag. + totalLength := 4 + 1 + len(payload) + padding + poly1305.TagSize + if cap(c.buf) < totalLength { + c.buf = make([]byte, totalLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:totalLength] + } + + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding)) + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4]) + c.buf[4] = byte(padding) + copy(c.buf[5:], payload) + packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[5+len(payload):packetEnd]); err != nil { + return err + } + + s.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd]) + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey) + + copy(c.buf[packetEnd:], mac[:]) + + if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..33079789 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net" + "os" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Client implements a traditional SSH client that supports shells, +// subprocesses, TCP port/streamlocal forwarding and tunneled dialing. +type Client struct { + Conn + + handleForwardsOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Client).handleForwards + + forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side + mu sync.Mutex + channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel +} + +// HandleChannelOpen returns a channel on which NewChannel requests +// for the given type are sent. If the type already is being handled, +// nil is returned. The channel is closed when the connection is closed. +func (c *Client) HandleChannelOpen(channelType string) <-chan NewChannel { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + if c.channelHandlers == nil { + // The SSH channel has been closed. + c := make(chan NewChannel) + close(c) + return c + } + + ch := c.channelHandlers[channelType] + if ch != nil { + return nil + } + + ch = make(chan NewChannel, chanSize) + c.channelHandlers[channelType] = ch + return ch +} + +// NewClient creates a Client on top of the given connection. +func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client { + conn := &Client{ + Conn: c, + channelHandlers: make(map[string]chan NewChannel, 1), + } + + go conn.handleGlobalRequests(reqs) + go conn.handleChannelOpens(chans) + go func() { + conn.Wait() + conn.forwards.closeAll() + }() + return conn +} + +// NewClientConn establishes an authenticated SSH connection using c +// as the underlying transport. The Request and NewChannel channels +// must be serviced or the connection will hang. +func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { + fullConf := *config + fullConf.SetDefaults() + if fullConf.HostKeyCallback == nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: must specify HostKeyCallback") + } + + conn := &connection{ + sshConn: sshConn{conn: c, user: fullConf.User}, + } + + if err := conn.clientHandshake(addr, &fullConf); err != nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: %w", err) + } + conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport) + return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil +} + +// clientHandshake performs the client side key exchange. See RFC 4253 Section +// 7. +func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) error { + if config.ClientVersion != "" { + c.clientVersion = []byte(config.ClientVersion) + } else { + c.clientVersion = []byte(packageVersion) + } + var err error + c.serverVersion, err = exchangeVersions(c.sshConn.conn, c.clientVersion) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + c.transport = newClientTransport( + newTransport(c.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, true /* is client */), + c.clientVersion, c.serverVersion, config, dialAddress, c.sshConn.RemoteAddr()) + if err := c.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { + return err + } + + c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID() + c.algorithms = c.transport.getAlgorithms() + return c.clientAuthenticate(config) +} + +// verifyHostKeySignature verifies the host key obtained in the key exchange. +// algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may be a certificate type. +func verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey PublicKey, algo string, result *kexResult) error { + sig, rest, ok := parseSignatureBody(result.Signature) + if len(rest) > 0 || !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") + } + + if a := underlyingAlgo(algo); sig.Format != a { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid signature algorithm %q, expected %q", sig.Format, a) + } + + return hostKey.Verify(result.H, sig) +} + +// NewSession opens a new Session for this client. (A session is a remote +// execution of a program.) +func (c *Client) NewSession() (*Session, error) { + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("session", nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return newSession(ch, in) +} + +func (c *Client) handleGlobalRequests(incoming <-chan *Request) { + for r := range incoming { + // This handles keepalive messages and matches + // the behaviour of OpenSSH. + r.Reply(false, nil) + } +} + +// handleChannelOpens channel open messages from the remote side. +func (c *Client) handleChannelOpens(in <-chan NewChannel) { + for ch := range in { + c.mu.Lock() + handler := c.channelHandlers[ch.ChannelType()] + c.mu.Unlock() + + if handler != nil { + handler <- ch + } else { + ch.Reject(UnknownChannelType, fmt.Sprintf("unknown channel type: %v", ch.ChannelType())) + } + } + + c.mu.Lock() + for _, ch := range c.channelHandlers { + close(ch) + } + c.channelHandlers = nil + c.mu.Unlock() +} + +// Dial starts a client connection to the given SSH server. It is a +// convenience function that connects to the given network address, +// initiates the SSH handshake, and then sets up a Client. For access +// to incoming channels and requests, use net.Dial with NewClientConn +// instead. +func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) { + conn, err := net.DialTimeout(network, addr, config.Timeout) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c, chans, reqs, err := NewClientConn(conn, addr, config) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return NewClient(c, chans, reqs), nil +} + +// HostKeyCallback is the function type used for verifying server +// keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or +// an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial +// or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the +// net.Conn underlying the SSH connection. +type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error + +// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by +// the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server. +type BannerCallback func(message string) error + +// A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be +// modified after having been passed to an SSH function. +type ClientConfig struct { + // Config contains configuration that is shared between clients and + // servers. + Config + + // User contains the username to authenticate as. + User string + + // Auth contains possible authentication methods to use with the + // server. Only the first instance of a particular RFC 4252 method will + // be used during authentication. + Auth []AuthMethod + + // HostKeyCallback is called during the cryptographic + // handshake to validate the server's host key. The client + // configuration must supply this callback for the connection + // to succeed. The functions InsecureIgnoreHostKey or + // FixedHostKey can be used for simplistic host key checks. + HostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback + + // BannerCallback is called during the SSH dance to display a custom + // server's message. The client configuration can supply this callback to + // handle it as wished. The function BannerDisplayStderr can be used for + // simplistic display on Stderr. + BannerCallback BannerCallback + + // ClientVersion contains the version identification string that will + // be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used. + ClientVersion string + + // HostKeyAlgorithms lists the public key algorithms that the client will + // accept from the server for host key authentication, in order of + // preference. If empty, a reasonable default is used. Any + // string returned from a PublicKey.Type method may be used, or + // any of the CertAlgo and KeyAlgo constants. + HostKeyAlgorithms []string + + // Timeout is the maximum amount of time for the TCP connection to establish. + // + // A Timeout of zero means no timeout. + Timeout time.Duration +} + +// InsecureIgnoreHostKey returns a function that can be used for +// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept any host key. It should +// not be used for production code. +func InsecureIgnoreHostKey() HostKeyCallback { + return func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + return nil + } +} + +type fixedHostKey struct { + key PublicKey +} + +func (f *fixedHostKey) check(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + if f.key == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: required host key was nil") + } + if !bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), f.key.Marshal()) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: host key mismatch") + } + return nil +} + +// FixedHostKey returns a function for use in +// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept only a specific host key. +func FixedHostKey(key PublicKey) HostKeyCallback { + hk := &fixedHostKey{key} + return hk.check +} + +// BannerDisplayStderr returns a function that can be used for +// ClientConfig.BannerCallback to display banners on os.Stderr. +func BannerDisplayStderr() BannerCallback { + return func(banner string) error { + _, err := os.Stderr.WriteString(banner) + + return err + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3127e499 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go @@ -0,0 +1,788 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "slices" + "strings" +) + +type authResult int + +const ( + authFailure authResult = iota + authPartialSuccess + authSuccess +) + +// clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252. +func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { + // initiate user auth session + if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceRequestMsg{serviceUserAuth})); err != nil { + return err + } + packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + // The server may choose to send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO at this point (if we + // advertised willingness to receive one, which we always do) or not. See + // RFC 8308, Section 2.4. + extensions := make(map[string][]byte) + if len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgExtInfo { + var extInfo extInfoMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &extInfo); err != nil { + return err + } + payload := extInfo.Payload + for i := uint32(0); i < extInfo.NumExtensions; i++ { + name, rest, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return parseError(msgExtInfo) + } + value, rest, ok := parseString(rest) + if !ok { + return parseError(msgExtInfo) + } + extensions[string(name)] = value + payload = rest + } + packet, err = c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + var serviceAccept serviceAcceptMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &serviceAccept); err != nil { + return err + } + + // during the authentication phase the client first attempts the "none" method + // then any untried methods suggested by the server. + var tried []string + var lastMethods []string + + sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID() + for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; { + ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand, extensions) + if err != nil { + // On disconnect, return error immediately + if _, ok := err.(*disconnectMsg); ok { + return err + } + // We return the error later if there is no other method left to + // try. + ok = authFailure + } + if ok == authSuccess { + // success + return nil + } else if ok == authFailure { + if m := auth.method(); !slices.Contains(tried, m) { + tried = append(tried, m) + } + } + if methods == nil { + methods = lastMethods + } + lastMethods = methods + + auth = nil + + findNext: + for _, a := range config.Auth { + candidateMethod := a.method() + if slices.Contains(tried, candidateMethod) { + continue + } + for _, meth := range methods { + if meth == candidateMethod { + auth = a + break findNext + } + } + } + + if auth == nil && err != nil { + // We have an error and there are no other authentication methods to + // try, so we return it. + return err + } + } + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods %v, no supported methods remain", tried) +} + +// An AuthMethod represents an instance of an RFC 4252 authentication method. +type AuthMethod interface { + // auth authenticates user over transport t. + // Returns true if authentication is successful. + // If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative + // method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored + // and the previous set of possible methods will be reused. + auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) + + // method returns the RFC 4252 method name. + method() string +} + +// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2. +type noneAuth int + +func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "none", + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (n *noneAuth) method() string { + return "none" +} + +// passwordCallback is an AuthMethod that fetches the password through +// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user. +type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error) + +func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + type passwordAuthMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Reply bool + Password string + } + + pw, err := cb() + // REVIEW NOTE: is there a need to support skipping a password attempt? + // The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password + // when prompting. + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + Reply: false, + Password: pw, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (cb passwordCallback) method() string { + return "password" +} + +// Password returns an AuthMethod using the given password. +func Password(secret string) AuthMethod { + return passwordCallback(func() (string, error) { return secret, nil }) +} + +// PasswordCallback returns an AuthMethod that uses a callback for +// fetching a password. +func PasswordCallback(prompt func() (secret string, err error)) AuthMethod { + return passwordCallback(prompt) +} + +type publickeyAuthMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + // HasSig indicates to the receiver packet that the auth request is signed and + // should be used for authentication of the request. + HasSig bool + Algoname string + PubKey []byte + // Sig is tagged with "rest" so Marshal will exclude it during + // validateKey + Sig []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// publicKeyCallback is an AuthMethod that uses a set of key +// pairs for authentication. +type publicKeyCallback func() ([]Signer, error) + +func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string { + return "publickey" +} + +func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, string, error) { + var as MultiAlgorithmSigner + keyFormat := signer.PublicKey().Type() + + // If the signer implements MultiAlgorithmSigner we use the algorithms it + // support, if it implements AlgorithmSigner we assume it supports all + // algorithms, otherwise only the key format one. + switch s := signer.(type) { + case MultiAlgorithmSigner: + as = s + case AlgorithmSigner: + as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: s, + supportedAlgorithms: algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)), + } + default: + as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: algorithmSignerWrapper{signer}, + supportedAlgorithms: []string{underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)}, + } + } + + getFallbackAlgo := func() (string, error) { + // Fallback to use if there is no "server-sig-algs" extension or a + // common algorithm cannot be found. We use the public key format if the + // MultiAlgorithmSigner supports it, otherwise we return an error. + if !slices.Contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common public key signature algorithm, server only supports %q for key type %q, signer only supports %v", + underlyingAlgo(keyFormat), keyFormat, as.Algorithms()) + } + return keyFormat, nil + } + + extPayload, ok := extensions["server-sig-algs"] + if !ok { + // If there is no "server-sig-algs" extension use the fallback + // algorithm. + algo, err := getFallbackAlgo() + return as, algo, err + } + + // The server-sig-algs extension only carries underlying signature + // algorithm, but we are trying to select a protocol-level public key + // algorithm, which might be a certificate type. Extend the list of server + // supported algorithms to include the corresponding certificate algorithms. + serverAlgos := strings.Split(string(extPayload), ",") + for _, algo := range serverAlgos { + if certAlgo, ok := certificateAlgo(algo); ok { + serverAlgos = append(serverAlgos, certAlgo) + } + } + + // Filter algorithms based on those supported by MultiAlgorithmSigner. + var keyAlgos []string + for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) { + if slices.Contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + keyAlgos = append(keyAlgos, algo) + } + } + + algo, err := findCommon("public key signature algorithm", keyAlgos, serverAlgos, true) + if err != nil { + // If there is no overlap, return the fallback algorithm to support + // servers that fail to list all supported algorithms. + algo, err := getFallbackAlgo() + return as, algo, err + } + return as, algo, nil +} + +func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + // Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is + // acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will + // attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat + // the process with the remaining keys. + + signers, err := cb() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + var methods []string + var errSigAlgo error + + origSignersLen := len(signers) + for idx := 0; idx < len(signers); idx++ { + signer := signers[idx] + pub := signer.PublicKey() + as, algo, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer, extensions) + if err != nil && errSigAlgo == nil { + // If we cannot negotiate a signature algorithm store the first + // error so we can return it to provide a more meaningful message if + // no other signers work. + errSigAlgo = err + continue + } + ok, err := validateKey(pub, algo, user, c) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + // OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 advertises support for rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 + // in the "server-sig-algs" extension but doesn't support these + // algorithms for certificate authentication, so if the server rejects + // the key try to use the obtained algorithm as if "server-sig-algs" had + // not been implemented if supported from the algorithm signer. + if !ok && idx < origSignersLen && isRSACert(algo) && algo != CertAlgoRSAv01 { + if slices.Contains(as.Algorithms(), KeyAlgoRSA) { + // We retry using the compat algorithm after all signers have + // been tried normally. + signers = append(signers, &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: as, + supportedAlgorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSA}, + }) + } + } + if !ok { + continue + } + + pubKey := pub.Marshal() + data := buildDataSignedForAuth(session, userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + }, algo, pubKey) + sign, err := as.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo)) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // manually wrap the serialized signature in a string + s := Marshal(sign) + sig := make([]byte, stringLength(len(s))) + marshalString(sig, s) + msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + HasSig: true, + Algoname: algo, + PubKey: pubKey, + Sig: sig, + } + p := Marshal(&msg) + if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + var success authResult + success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not + // contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any + // other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when + // additional authentication methods are required. + if success == authSuccess || !slices.Contains(methods, cb.method()) { + return success, methods, err + } + } + + return authFailure, methods, errSigAlgo +} + +// validateKey validates the key provided is acceptable to the server. +func validateKey(key PublicKey, algo string, user string, c packetConn) (bool, error) { + pubKey := key.Marshal() + msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "publickey", + HasSig: false, + Algoname: algo, + PubKey: pubKey, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&msg)); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + return confirmKeyAck(key, c) +} + +func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) { + pubKey := key.Marshal() + + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return false, err + } + case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: + var msg userAuthPubKeyOkMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return false, err + } + // According to RFC 4252 Section 7 the algorithm in + // SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK should match that of the request but some + // servers send the key type instead. OpenSSH allows any algorithm + // that matches the public key, so we do the same. + // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/86bdd385/sshconnect2.c#L709 + if !slices.Contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(key.Type()), msg.Algo) { + return false, nil + } + if !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) { + return false, nil + } + return true, nil + case msgUserAuthFailure: + return false, nil + default: + return false, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthPubKeyOk, packet[0]) + } + } +} + +// PublicKeys returns an AuthMethod that uses the given key +// pairs. +func PublicKeys(signers ...Signer) AuthMethod { + return publicKeyCallback(func() ([]Signer, error) { return signers, nil }) +} + +// PublicKeysCallback returns an AuthMethod that runs the given +// function to obtain a list of key pairs. +func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMethod { + return publicKeyCallback(getSigners) +} + +// handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded +// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and +// an error if an unexpected response was received. +func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) { + gotMsgExtInfo := false + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + case msgExtInfo: + // Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once. + if gotMsgExtInfo { + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) + } + gotMsgExtInfo = true + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return authSuccess, nil, nil + default: + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) + } + } +} + +func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error { + var msg userAuthBannerMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return err + } + + transport, ok := c.(*handshakeTransport) + if !ok { + return nil + } + + if transport.bannerCallback != nil { + return transport.bannerCallback(msg.Message) + } + + return nil +} + +// KeyboardInteractiveChallenge should print questions, optionally +// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers. +// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After +// successful authentication, the server may send a challenge with no +// questions, for which the name and instruction messages should be +// printed. RFC 4256 section 3.3 details how the UI should behave for +// both CLI and GUI environments. +type KeyboardInteractiveChallenge func(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) + +// KeyboardInteractive returns an AuthMethod using a prompt/response +// sequence controlled by the server. +func KeyboardInteractive(challenge KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) AuthMethod { + return challenge +} + +func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string { + return "keyboard-interactive" +} + +func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + type initiateMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Language string + Submethods string + } + + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&initiateMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "keyboard-interactive", + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + gotMsgExtInfo := false + gotUserAuthInfoRequest := false + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // like handleAuthResponse, but with less options. + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + continue + case msgExtInfo: + // Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once. + if gotMsgExtInfo { + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) + } + gotMsgExtInfo = true + continue + case msgUserAuthInfoRequest: + // OK + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + if !gotUserAuthInfoRequest { + return authFailure, msg.Methods, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return authSuccess, nil, nil + default: + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) + } + + var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + gotUserAuthInfoRequest = true + + // Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs. + rest := msg.Prompts + var prompts []string + var echos []bool + for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ { + prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest) + if !ok || len(r) == 0 { + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error") + } + prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt)) + echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0) + rest = r[1:] + } + + if len(rest) != 0 { + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs") + } + + answers, err := cb(msg.Name, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + if len(answers) != len(prompts) { + return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: incorrect number of answers from keyboard-interactive callback %d (expected %d)", len(answers), len(prompts)) + } + responseLength := 1 + 4 + for _, a := range answers { + responseLength += stringLength(len(a)) + } + serialized := make([]byte, responseLength) + p := serialized + p[0] = msgUserAuthInfoResponse + p = p[1:] + p = marshalUint32(p, uint32(len(answers))) + for _, a := range answers { + p = marshalString(p, []byte(a)) + } + + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + } +} + +type retryableAuthMethod struct { + authMethod AuthMethod + maxTries int +} + +func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) { + for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ { + ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand, extensions) + if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate + return ok, methods, err + } + } + return ok, methods, err +} + +func (r *retryableAuthMethod) method() string { + return r.authMethod.method() +} + +// RetryableAuthMethod is a decorator for other auth methods enabling them to +// be retried up to maxTries before considering that AuthMethod itself failed. +// If maxTries is <= 0, will retry indefinitely +// +// This is useful for interactive clients using challenge/response type +// authentication (e.g. Keyboard-Interactive, Password, etc) where the user +// could mistype their response resulting in the server issuing a +// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE (rfc4252 #8 [password] and rfc4256 #3.4 +// [keyboard-interactive]); Without this decorator, the non-retryable +// AuthMethod would be removed from future consideration, and never tried again +// (and so the user would never be able to retry their entry). +func RetryableAuthMethod(auth AuthMethod, maxTries int) AuthMethod { + return &retryableAuthMethod{authMethod: auth, maxTries: maxTries} +} + +// GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod is an AuthMethod with "gssapi-with-mic" authentication. +// See RFC 4462 section 3 +// gssAPIClient is implementation of the GSSAPIClient interface, see the definition of the interface for details. +// target is the server host you want to log in to. +func GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod(gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient, target string) AuthMethod { + if gssAPIClient == nil { + panic("gss-api client must be not nil with enable gssapi-with-mic") + } + return &gssAPIWithMICCallback{gssAPIClient: gssAPIClient, target: target} +} + +type gssAPIWithMICCallback struct { + gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient + target string +} + +func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + m := &userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: g.method(), + } + // The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.2. + m.Payload = appendU32(m.Payload, 1) + m.Payload = appendString(m.Payload, string(krb5OID)) + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(m)); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + // The server responds to the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with either an + // SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE if none of the mechanisms are supported or + // with an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.3. + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,so I don't want to check + // selected mech if it is valid. + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPIResp := &userAuthGSSAPIResponse{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIResp); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + // Start the loop into the exchange token. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.4. + var token []byte + defer g.gssAPIClient.DeleteSecContext() + for { + // Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and a remote peer. + nextToken, needContinue, err := g.gssAPIClient.InitSecContext("host@"+g.target, token, false) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if len(nextToken) > 0 { + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ + Token: nextToken, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + } + if !needContinue { + break + } + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: + userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp := &userAuthGSSAPIError{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("GSS-API Error:\n"+ + "Major Status: %d\n"+ + "Minor Status: %d\n"+ + "Error Message: %s\n", userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MajorStatus, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MinorStatus, + userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.Message) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token + } + } + // Binding Encryption Keys. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.5. + micField := buildMIC(string(session), user, "ssh-connection", "gssapi-with-mic") + micToken, err := g.gssAPIClient.GetMIC(micField) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIMIC{ + MIC: micToken, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) method() string { + return "gssapi-with-mic" +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e44e9c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go @@ -0,0 +1,727 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/fips140" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "io" + "math" + "slices" + "sync" + + _ "crypto/sha1" + _ "crypto/sha256" + _ "crypto/sha512" +) + +// These are string constants in the SSH protocol. +const ( + compressionNone = "none" + serviceUserAuth = "ssh-userauth" + serviceSSH = "ssh-connection" +) + +// The ciphers currently or previously implemented by this library, to use in +// [Config.Ciphers]. For a list, see the [Algorithms.Ciphers] returned by +// [SupportedAlgorithms] or [InsecureAlgorithms]. +const ( + CipherAES128GCM = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com" + CipherAES256GCM = "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" + CipherChaCha20Poly1305 = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + CipherAES128CTR = "aes128-ctr" + CipherAES192CTR = "aes192-ctr" + CipherAES256CTR = "aes256-ctr" + InsecureCipherAES128CBC = "aes128-cbc" + InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC = "3des-cbc" + InsecureCipherRC4 = "arcfour" + InsecureCipherRC4128 = "arcfour128" + InsecureCipherRC4256 = "arcfour256" +) + +// The key exchanges currently or previously implemented by this library, to use +// in [Config.KeyExchanges]. For a list, see the +// [Algorithms.KeyExchanges] returned by [SupportedAlgorithms] or +// [InsecureAlgorithms]. +const ( + InsecureKeyExchangeDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" + InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" + KeyExchangeDH14SHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" + KeyExchangeDH16SHA512 = "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" + KeyExchangeECDHP256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" + KeyExchangeECDHP384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" + KeyExchangeECDHP521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" + KeyExchangeCurve25519 = "curve25519-sha256" + InsecureKeyExchangeDHGEXSHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" + KeyExchangeDHGEXSHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" + // KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519 is supported from Go 1.24. + KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519 = "mlkem768x25519-sha256" + + // An alias for KeyExchangeCurve25519SHA256. This kex ID will be added if + // KeyExchangeCurve25519SHA256 is requested for backward compatibility with + // OpenSSH versions up to 7.2. + keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" +) + +// The message authentication code (MAC) currently or previously implemented by +// this library, to use in [Config.MACs]. For a list, see the +// [Algorithms.MACs] returned by [SupportedAlgorithms] or +// [InsecureAlgorithms]. +const ( + HMACSHA256ETM = "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com" + HMACSHA512ETM = "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" + HMACSHA256 = "hmac-sha2-256" + HMACSHA512 = "hmac-sha2-512" + HMACSHA1 = "hmac-sha1" + InsecureHMACSHA196 = "hmac-sha1-96" +) + +var ( + // supportedKexAlgos specifies key-exchange algorithms implemented by this + // package in preference order, excluding those with security issues. + supportedKexAlgos = []string{ + KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519, + KeyExchangeCurve25519, + KeyExchangeECDHP256, + KeyExchangeECDHP384, + KeyExchangeECDHP521, + KeyExchangeDH14SHA256, + KeyExchangeDH16SHA512, + KeyExchangeDHGEXSHA256, + } + // defaultKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange + // algorithms in preference order. + defaultKexAlgos = []string{ + KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519, + KeyExchangeCurve25519, + KeyExchangeECDHP256, + KeyExchangeECDHP384, + KeyExchangeECDHP521, + KeyExchangeDH14SHA256, + InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1, + } + // insecureKexAlgos specifies key-exchange algorithms implemented by this + // package and which have security issues. + insecureKexAlgos = []string{ + InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1, + InsecureKeyExchangeDH1SHA1, + InsecureKeyExchangeDHGEXSHA1, + } + // supportedCiphers specifies cipher algorithms implemented by this package + // in preference order, excluding those with security issues. + supportedCiphers = []string{ + CipherAES128GCM, + CipherAES256GCM, + CipherChaCha20Poly1305, + CipherAES128CTR, + CipherAES192CTR, + CipherAES256CTR, + } + // defaultCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers algorithms + // in preference order. + defaultCiphers = supportedCiphers + // insecureCiphers specifies cipher algorithms implemented by this + // package and which have security issues. + insecureCiphers = []string{ + InsecureCipherAES128CBC, + InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC, + InsecureCipherRC4256, + InsecureCipherRC4128, + InsecureCipherRC4, + } + // supportedMACs specifies MAC algorithms implemented by this package in + // preference order, excluding those with security issues. + supportedMACs = []string{ + HMACSHA256ETM, + HMACSHA512ETM, + HMACSHA256, + HMACSHA512, + HMACSHA1, + } + // defaultMACs specifies the default preference for MAC algorithms in + // preference order. + defaultMACs = []string{ + HMACSHA256ETM, + HMACSHA512ETM, + HMACSHA256, + HMACSHA512, + HMACSHA1, + InsecureHMACSHA196, + } + // insecureMACs specifies MAC algorithms implemented by this + // package and which have security issues. + insecureMACs = []string{ + InsecureHMACSHA196, + } + // supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. + // methods of authenticating servers) implemented by this package in + // preference order, excluding those with security issues. + supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{ + CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, + CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, + CertAlgoECDSA256v01, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01, + CertAlgoECDSA521v01, + CertAlgoED25519v01, + KeyAlgoRSASHA256, + KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + KeyAlgoECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA384, + KeyAlgoECDSA521, + KeyAlgoED25519, + } + // defaultHostKeyAlgos specifies the default preference for host-key + // algorithms in preference order. + defaultHostKeyAlgos = []string{ + CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, + CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, + CertAlgoRSAv01, + InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01, + CertAlgoECDSA256v01, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01, + CertAlgoECDSA521v01, + CertAlgoED25519v01, + KeyAlgoECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA384, + KeyAlgoECDSA521, + KeyAlgoRSASHA256, + KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + KeyAlgoRSA, + InsecureKeyAlgoDSA, + KeyAlgoED25519, + } + // insecureHostKeyAlgos specifies host-key algorithms implemented by this + // package and which have security issues. + insecureHostKeyAlgos = []string{ + KeyAlgoRSA, + InsecureKeyAlgoDSA, + CertAlgoRSAv01, + InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01, + } + // supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the supported client public key + // authentication algorithms. Note that this doesn't include certificate + // types since those use the underlying algorithm. Order is irrelevant. + supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{ + KeyAlgoED25519, + KeyAlgoSKED25519, + KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA384, + KeyAlgoECDSA521, + KeyAlgoRSASHA256, + KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + } + + // defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the preferred client public key + // authentication algorithms. This list is sent to the client if it supports + // the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant. + defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{ + KeyAlgoED25519, + KeyAlgoSKED25519, + KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA384, + KeyAlgoECDSA521, + KeyAlgoRSASHA256, + KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + KeyAlgoRSA, + InsecureKeyAlgoDSA, + } + // insecurePubKeyAuthAlgos specifies client public key authentication + // algorithms implemented by this package and which have security issues. + insecurePubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{ + KeyAlgoRSA, + InsecureKeyAlgoDSA, + } +) + +// NegotiatedAlgorithms defines algorithms negotiated between client and server. +type NegotiatedAlgorithms struct { + KeyExchange string + HostKey string + Read DirectionAlgorithms + Write DirectionAlgorithms +} + +// Algorithms defines a set of algorithms that can be configured in the client +// or server config for negotiation during a handshake. +type Algorithms struct { + KeyExchanges []string + Ciphers []string + MACs []string + HostKeys []string + PublicKeyAuths []string +} + +func init() { + if fips140.Enabled() { + defaultHostKeyAlgos = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultHostKeyAlgos, func(algo string) bool { + _, err := hashFunc(underlyingAlgo(algo)) + return err != nil + }) + defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos, func(algo string) bool { + _, err := hashFunc(underlyingAlgo(algo)) + return err != nil + }) + } +} + +func hashFunc(format string) (crypto.Hash, error) { + switch format { + case KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoSKED25519, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: + return crypto.SHA256, nil + case KeyAlgoECDSA384: + return crypto.SHA384, nil + case KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoECDSA521: + return crypto.SHA512, nil + case KeyAlgoED25519: + // KeyAlgoED25519 doesn't pre-hash. + return 0, nil + case KeyAlgoRSA, InsecureKeyAlgoDSA: + if fips140.Enabled() { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: hash algorithm for format %q not allowed in FIPS 140 mode", format) + } + return crypto.SHA1, nil + default: + return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: hash algorithm for format %q not mapped", format) + } +} + +// SupportedAlgorithms returns algorithms currently implemented by this package, +// excluding those with security issues, which are returned by +// InsecureAlgorithms. The algorithms listed here are in preference order. +func SupportedAlgorithms() Algorithms { + return Algorithms{ + Ciphers: slices.Clone(supportedCiphers), + MACs: slices.Clone(supportedMACs), + KeyExchanges: slices.Clone(supportedKexAlgos), + HostKeys: slices.Clone(supportedHostKeyAlgos), + PublicKeyAuths: slices.Clone(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos), + } +} + +// InsecureAlgorithms returns algorithms currently implemented by this package +// and which have security issues. +func InsecureAlgorithms() Algorithms { + return Algorithms{ + KeyExchanges: slices.Clone(insecureKexAlgos), + Ciphers: slices.Clone(insecureCiphers), + MACs: slices.Clone(insecureMACs), + HostKeys: slices.Clone(insecureHostKeyAlgos), + PublicKeyAuths: slices.Clone(insecurePubKeyAuthAlgos), + } +} + +var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone} + +// algorithmsForKeyFormat returns the supported signature algorithms for a given +// public key format (PublicKey.Type), in order of preference. See RFC 8332, +// Section 2. See also the note in sendKexInit on backwards compatibility. +func algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat string) []string { + switch keyFormat { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + return []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSA} + case CertAlgoRSAv01: + return []string{CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, CertAlgoRSAv01} + default: + return []string{keyFormat} + } +} + +// keyFormatForAlgorithm returns the key format corresponding to the given +// signature algorithm. It returns an empty string if the signature algorithm is +// invalid or unsupported. +func keyFormatForAlgorithm(sigAlgo string) string { + switch sigAlgo { + case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512: + return KeyAlgoRSA + case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01: + return CertAlgoRSAv01 + case KeyAlgoED25519, + KeyAlgoSKED25519, + KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA384, + KeyAlgoECDSA521, + InsecureKeyAlgoDSA, + InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01, + CertAlgoECDSA256v01, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01, + CertAlgoECDSA521v01, + CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, + CertAlgoED25519v01, + CertAlgoSKED25519v01: + return sigAlgo + default: + return "" + } +} + +// isRSA returns whether algo is a supported RSA algorithm, including certificate +// algorithms. +func isRSA(algo string) bool { + algos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(KeyAlgoRSA) + return slices.Contains(algos, underlyingAlgo(algo)) +} + +func isRSACert(algo string) bool { + _, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo] + if !ok { + return false + } + return isRSA(algo) +} + +// unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't +// match what we wanted. +func unexpectedMessageError(expected, got uint8) error { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected %d)", got, expected) +} + +// parseError results from a malformed SSH message. +func parseError(tag uint8) error { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: parse error in message type %d", tag) +} + +func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string, isClient bool) (string, error) { + for _, c := range client { + for _, s := range server { + if c == s { + return c, nil + } + } + } + err := &AlgorithmNegotiationError{ + What: what, + } + if isClient { + err.SupportedAlgorithms = client + err.RequestedAlgorithms = server + } else { + err.SupportedAlgorithms = server + err.RequestedAlgorithms = client + } + return "", err +} + +// AlgorithmNegotiationError defines the error returned if the client and the +// server cannot agree on an algorithm for key exchange, host key, cipher, MAC. +type AlgorithmNegotiationError struct { + What string + // RequestedAlgorithms lists the algorithms supported by the peer. + RequestedAlgorithms []string + // SupportedAlgorithms lists the algorithms supported on our side. + SupportedAlgorithms []string +} + +func (a *AlgorithmNegotiationError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; we offered: %v, peer offered: %v", + a.What, a.SupportedAlgorithms, a.RequestedAlgorithms) +} + +// DirectionAlgorithms defines the algorithms negotiated in one direction +// (either read or write). +type DirectionAlgorithms struct { + Cipher string + MAC string + compression string +} + +// rekeyBytes returns a rekeying intervals in bytes. +func (a *DirectionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 { + // According to RFC 4344 block ciphers should rekey after + // 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is + // 128. + switch a.Cipher { + case CipherAES128CTR, CipherAES192CTR, CipherAES256CTR, CipherAES128GCM, CipherAES256GCM, InsecureCipherAES128CBC: + return 16 * (1 << 32) + + } + + // For others, stick with RFC 4253 recommendation to rekey after 1 Gb of data. + return 1 << 30 +} + +var aeadCiphers = map[string]bool{ + CipherAES128GCM: true, + CipherAES256GCM: true, + CipherChaCha20Poly1305: true, +} + +func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *NegotiatedAlgorithms, err error) { + result := &NegotiatedAlgorithms{} + + result.KeyExchange, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + result.HostKey, err = findCommon("host key", clientKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, serverKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc, ctos := &result.Write, &result.Read + if isClient { + ctos, stoc = stoc, ctos + } + + ctos.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + if !aeadCiphers[ctos.Cipher] { + ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + + if !aeadCiphers[stoc.Cipher] { + stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + + ctos.compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc.compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient, isClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + return result, nil +} + +// If rekeythreshold is too small, we can't make any progress sending +// stuff. +const minRekeyThreshold uint64 = 256 + +// Config contains configuration data common to both ServerConfig and +// ClientConfig. +type Config struct { + // Rand provides the source of entropy for cryptographic + // primitives. If Rand is nil, the cryptographic random reader + // in package crypto/rand will be used. + Rand io.Reader + + // The maximum number of bytes sent or received after which a + // new key is negotiated. It must be at least 256. If + // unspecified, a size suitable for the chosen cipher is used. + RekeyThreshold uint64 + + // The allowed key exchanges algorithms. If unspecified then a default set + // of algorithms is used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. + KeyExchanges []string + + // The allowed cipher algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is + // used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. + Ciphers []string + + // The allowed MAC algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is + // used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. + MACs []string +} + +// SetDefaults sets sensible values for unset fields in config. This is +// exported for testing: Configs passed to SSH functions are copied and have +// default values set automatically. +func (c *Config) SetDefaults() { + if c.Rand == nil { + c.Rand = rand.Reader + } + if c.Ciphers == nil { + c.Ciphers = defaultCiphers + } + var ciphers []string + for _, c := range c.Ciphers { + if cipherModes[c] != nil { + // Ignore the cipher if we have no cipherModes definition. + ciphers = append(ciphers, c) + } + } + c.Ciphers = ciphers + + if c.KeyExchanges == nil { + c.KeyExchanges = defaultKexAlgos + } + var kexs []string + for _, k := range c.KeyExchanges { + if kexAlgoMap[k] != nil { + // Ignore the KEX if we have no kexAlgoMap definition. + kexs = append(kexs, k) + if k == KeyExchangeCurve25519 && !slices.Contains(c.KeyExchanges, keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH) { + kexs = append(kexs, keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH) + } + } + } + c.KeyExchanges = kexs + + if c.MACs == nil { + c.MACs = defaultMACs + } + var macs []string + for _, m := range c.MACs { + if macModes[m] != nil { + // Ignore the MAC if we have no macModes definition. + macs = append(macs, m) + } + } + c.MACs = macs + + if c.RekeyThreshold == 0 { + // cipher specific default + } else if c.RekeyThreshold < minRekeyThreshold { + c.RekeyThreshold = minRekeyThreshold + } else if c.RekeyThreshold >= math.MaxInt64 { + // Avoid weirdness if somebody uses -1 as a threshold. + c.RekeyThreshold = math.MaxInt64 + } +} + +// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove +// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7. algo is the advertised +// algorithm, and may be a certificate type. +func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo string, pubKey []byte) []byte { + data := struct { + Session []byte + Type byte + User string + Service string + Method string + Sign bool + Algo string + PubKey []byte + }{ + sessionID, + msgUserAuthRequest, + req.User, + req.Service, + req.Method, + true, + algo, + pubKey, + } + return Marshal(data) +} + +func appendU16(buf []byte, n uint16) []byte { + return append(buf, byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendU32(buf []byte, n uint32) []byte { + return append(buf, byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendU64(buf []byte, n uint64) []byte { + return append(buf, + byte(n>>56), byte(n>>48), byte(n>>40), byte(n>>32), + byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendInt(buf []byte, n int) []byte { + return appendU32(buf, uint32(n)) +} + +func appendString(buf []byte, s string) []byte { + buf = appendU32(buf, uint32(len(s))) + buf = append(buf, s...) + return buf +} + +func appendBool(buf []byte, b bool) []byte { + if b { + return append(buf, 1) + } + return append(buf, 0) +} + +// newCond is a helper to hide the fact that there is no usable zero +// value for sync.Cond. +func newCond() *sync.Cond { return sync.NewCond(new(sync.Mutex)) } + +// window represents the buffer available to clients +// wishing to write to a channel. +type window struct { + *sync.Cond + win uint32 // RFC 4254 5.2 says the window size can grow to 2^32-1 + writeWaiters int + closed bool +} + +// add adds win to the amount of window available +// for consumers. +func (w *window) add(win uint32) bool { + // a zero sized window adjust is a noop. + if win == 0 { + return true + } + w.L.Lock() + if w.win+win < win { + w.L.Unlock() + return false + } + w.win += win + // It is unusual that multiple goroutines would be attempting to reserve + // window space, but not guaranteed. Use broadcast to notify all waiters + // that additional window is available. + w.Broadcast() + w.L.Unlock() + return true +} + +// close sets the window to closed, so all reservations fail +// immediately. +func (w *window) close() { + w.L.Lock() + w.closed = true + w.Broadcast() + w.L.Unlock() +} + +// reserve reserves win from the available window capacity. +// If no capacity remains, reserve will block. reserve may +// return less than requested. +func (w *window) reserve(win uint32) (uint32, error) { + var err error + w.L.Lock() + w.writeWaiters++ + w.Broadcast() + for w.win == 0 && !w.closed { + w.Wait() + } + w.writeWaiters-- + if w.win < win { + win = w.win + } + w.win -= win + if w.closed { + err = io.EOF + } + w.L.Unlock() + return win, err +} + +// waitWriterBlocked waits until some goroutine is blocked for further +// writes. It is used in tests only. +func (w *window) waitWriterBlocked() { + w.Cond.L.Lock() + for w.writeWaiters == 0 { + w.Cond.Wait() + } + w.Cond.L.Unlock() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..613a71a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "fmt" + "net" +) + +// OpenChannelError is returned if the other side rejects an +// OpenChannel request. +type OpenChannelError struct { + Reason RejectionReason + Message string +} + +func (e *OpenChannelError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: rejected: %s (%s)", e.Reason, e.Message) +} + +// ConnMetadata holds metadata for the connection. +type ConnMetadata interface { + // User returns the user ID for this connection. + User() string + + // SessionID returns the session hash, also denoted by H. + SessionID() []byte + + // ClientVersion returns the client's version string as hashed + // into the session ID. + ClientVersion() []byte + + // ServerVersion returns the server's version string as hashed + // into the session ID. + ServerVersion() []byte + + // RemoteAddr returns the remote address for this connection. + RemoteAddr() net.Addr + + // LocalAddr returns the local address for this connection. + LocalAddr() net.Addr +} + +// Conn represents an SSH connection for both server and client roles. +// Conn is the basis for implementing an application layer, such +// as ClientConn, which implements the traditional shell access for +// clients. +type Conn interface { + ConnMetadata + + // SendRequest sends a global request, and returns the + // reply. If wantReply is true, it returns the response status + // and payload. See also RFC 4254, section 4. + SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) + + // OpenChannel tries to open an channel. If the request is + // rejected, it returns *OpenChannelError. On success it returns + // the SSH Channel and a Go channel for incoming, out-of-band + // requests. The Go channel must be serviced, or the + // connection will hang. + OpenChannel(name string, data []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) + + // Close closes the underlying network connection + Close() error + + // Wait blocks until the connection has shut down, and returns the + // error causing the shutdown. + Wait() error + + // TODO(hanwen): consider exposing: + // RequestKeyChange + // Disconnect +} + +// AlgorithmsConnMetadata is a ConnMetadata that can return the algorithms +// negotiated between client and server. +type AlgorithmsConnMetadata interface { + ConnMetadata + Algorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms +} + +// DiscardRequests consumes and rejects all requests from the +// passed-in channel. +func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) { + for req := range in { + if req.WantReply { + req.Reply(false, nil) + } + } +} + +// A connection represents an incoming connection. +type connection struct { + transport *handshakeTransport + sshConn + + // The connection protocol. + *mux +} + +func (c *connection) Close() error { + return c.sshConn.conn.Close() +} + +// sshConn provides net.Conn metadata, but disallows direct reads and +// writes. +type sshConn struct { + conn net.Conn + + user string + sessionID []byte + clientVersion []byte + serverVersion []byte + algorithms NegotiatedAlgorithms +} + +func dup(src []byte) []byte { + dst := make([]byte, len(src)) + copy(dst, src) + return dst +} + +func (c *sshConn) User() string { + return c.user +} + +func (c *sshConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.RemoteAddr() +} + +func (c *sshConn) Close() error { + return c.conn.Close() +} + +func (c *sshConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.LocalAddr() +} + +func (c *sshConn) SessionID() []byte { + return dup(c.sessionID) +} + +func (c *sshConn) ClientVersion() []byte { + return dup(c.clientVersion) +} + +func (c *sshConn) ServerVersion() []byte { + return dup(c.serverVersion) +} + +func (c *sshConn) Algorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms { + return c.algorithms +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b4de9ef --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +/* +Package ssh implements an SSH client and server. + +SSH is a transport security protocol, an authentication protocol and a +family of application protocols. The most typical application level +protocol is a remote shell and this is specifically implemented. However, +the multiplexed nature of SSH is exposed to users that wish to support +others. + +References: + + [PROTOCOL]: https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?rev=HEAD + [PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD + [SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1 + [SSH-CERTS]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-miller-ssh-cert-01 + [FIPS 140-3 mode]: https://go.dev/doc/security/fips140 + +This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself, +so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise. + +# FIPS 140-3 mode + +When the program is in [FIPS 140-3 mode], this package behaves as if only SP +800-140C and SP 800-140D approved cipher suites, signature algorithms, +certificate public key types and sizes, and key exchange and derivation +algorithms were implemented. Others are silently ignored and not negotiated, or +rejected. This set may depend on the algorithms supported by the FIPS 140-3 Go +Cryptographic Module selected with GOFIPS140, and may change across Go versions. +*/ +package ssh diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4be3cbb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go @@ -0,0 +1,847 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "net" + "slices" + "strings" + "sync" +) + +// debugHandshake, if set, prints messages sent and received. Key +// exchange messages are printed as if DH were used, so the debug +// messages are wrong when using ECDH. +const debugHandshake = false + +// chanSize sets the amount of buffering SSH connections. This is +// primarily for testing: setting chanSize=0 uncovers deadlocks more +// quickly. +const chanSize = 16 + +// maxPendingPackets sets the maximum number of packets to queue while waiting +// for KEX to complete. This limits the total pending data to maxPendingPackets +// * maxPacket bytes, which is ~16.8MB. +const maxPendingPackets = 64 + +// keyingTransport is a packet based transport that supports key +// changes. It need not be thread-safe. It should pass through +// msgNewKeys in both directions. +type keyingTransport interface { + packetConn + + // prepareKeyChange sets up a key change. The key change for a + // direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent + // or received. + prepareKeyChange(*NegotiatedAlgorithms, *kexResult) error + + // setStrictMode sets the strict KEX mode, notably triggering + // sequence number resets on sending or receiving msgNewKeys. + // If the sequence number is already > 1 when setStrictMode + // is called, an error is returned. + setStrictMode() error + + // setInitialKEXDone indicates to the transport that the initial key exchange + // was completed + setInitialKEXDone() +} + +// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport +// and offers a thread-safe writePacket() interface. +type handshakeTransport struct { + conn keyingTransport + config *Config + + serverVersion []byte + clientVersion []byte + + // hostKeys is non-empty if we are the server. In that case, + // it contains all host keys that can be used to sign the + // connection. + hostKeys []Signer + + // publicKeyAuthAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the server. In that case, + // it contains the supported client public key authentication algorithms. + publicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string + + // hostKeyAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the client. In that case, + // we accept these key types from the server as host key. + hostKeyAlgorithms []string + + // On read error, incoming is closed, and readError is set. + incoming chan []byte + readError error + + mu sync.Mutex + // Condition for the above mutex. It is used to notify a completed key + // exchange or a write failure. Writes can wait for this condition while a + // key exchange is in progress. + writeCond *sync.Cond + writeError error + sentInitPacket []byte + sentInitMsg *kexInitMsg + // Used to queue writes when a key exchange is in progress. The length is + // limited by pendingPacketsSize. Once full, writes will block until the key + // exchange is completed or an error occurs. If not empty, it is emptied + // all at once when the key exchange is completed in kexLoop. + pendingPackets [][]byte + writePacketsLeft uint32 + writeBytesLeft int64 + userAuthComplete bool // whether the user authentication phase is complete + + // If the read loop wants to schedule a kex, it pings this + // channel, and the write loop will send out a kex + // message. + requestKex chan struct{} + + // If the other side requests or confirms a kex, its kexInit + // packet is sent here for the write loop to find it. + startKex chan *pendingKex + kexLoopDone chan struct{} // closed (with writeError non-nil) when kexLoop exits + + // data for host key checking + hostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback + dialAddress string + remoteAddr net.Addr + + // bannerCallback is non-empty if we are the client and it has been set in + // ClientConfig. In that case it is called during the user authentication + // dance to handle a custom server's message. + bannerCallback BannerCallback + + // Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange. + algorithms *NegotiatedAlgorithms + + // Counters exclusively owned by readLoop. + readPacketsLeft uint32 + readBytesLeft int64 + + // The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet. + sessionID []byte + + // strictMode indicates if the other side of the handshake indicated + // that we should be following the strict KEX protocol restrictions. + strictMode bool +} + +type pendingKex struct { + otherInit []byte + done chan error +} + +func newHandshakeTransport(conn keyingTransport, config *Config, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte) *handshakeTransport { + t := &handshakeTransport{ + conn: conn, + serverVersion: serverVersion, + clientVersion: clientVersion, + incoming: make(chan []byte, chanSize), + requestKex: make(chan struct{}, 1), + startKex: make(chan *pendingKex), + kexLoopDone: make(chan struct{}), + + config: config, + } + t.writeCond = sync.NewCond(&t.mu) + t.resetReadThresholds() + t.resetWriteThresholds() + + // We always start with a mandatory key exchange. + t.requestKex <- struct{}{} + return t +} + +func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ClientConfig, dialAddr string, addr net.Addr) *handshakeTransport { + t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) + t.dialAddress = dialAddr + t.remoteAddr = addr + t.hostKeyCallback = config.HostKeyCallback + t.bannerCallback = config.BannerCallback + if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil { + t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms + } else { + t.hostKeyAlgorithms = defaultHostKeyAlgos + } + go t.readLoop() + go t.kexLoop() + return t +} + +func newServerTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ServerConfig) *handshakeTransport { + t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) + t.hostKeys = config.hostKeys + t.publicKeyAuthAlgorithms = config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms + go t.readLoop() + go t.kexLoop() + return t +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) getSessionID() []byte { + return t.sessionID +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) getAlgorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms { + return *t.algorithms +} + +// waitSession waits for the session to be established. This should be +// the first thing to call after instantiating handshakeTransport. +func (t *handshakeTransport) waitSession() error { + p, err := t.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if p[0] != msgNewKeys { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgNewKeys") + } + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) id() string { + if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { + return "server" + } + return "client" +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { + action := "got" + if write { + action = "sent" + } + + if p[0] == msgChannelData || p[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { + log.Printf("%s %s data (packet %d bytes)", t.id(), action, len(p)) + } else { + msg, err := decode(p) + log.Printf("%s %s %T %v (%v)", t.id(), action, msg, msg, err) + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) { + p, ok := <-t.incoming + if !ok { + return nil, t.readError + } + return p, nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() { + first := true + for { + p, err := t.readOnePacket(first) + first = false + if err != nil { + t.readError = err + close(t.incoming) + break + } + // If this is the first kex, and strict KEX mode is enabled, + // we don't ignore any messages, as they may be used to manipulate + // the packet sequence numbers. + if !(t.sessionID == nil && t.strictMode) && (p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug) { + continue + } + t.incoming <- p + } + + // Stop writers too. + t.recordWriteError(t.readError) + + // Unblock the writer should it wait for this. + close(t.startKex) + + // Don't close t.requestKex; it's also written to from writePacket. +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) pushPacket(p []byte) error { + if debugHandshake { + t.printPacket(p, true) + } + return t.conn.writePacket(p) +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) getWriteError() error { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + return t.writeError +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) recordWriteError(err error) { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.writeError == nil && err != nil { + t.writeError = err + t.writeCond.Broadcast() + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) requestKeyExchange() { + select { + case t.requestKex <- struct{}{}: + default: + // something already requested a kex, so do nothing. + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) resetWriteThresholds() { + t.writePacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold + if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { + t.writeBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) + } else if t.algorithms != nil { + t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.Write.rekeyBytes() + } else { + t.writeBytesLeft = 1 << 30 + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) kexLoop() { + +write: + for t.getWriteError() == nil { + var request *pendingKex + var sent bool + + for request == nil || !sent { + var ok bool + select { + case request, ok = <-t.startKex: + if !ok { + break write + } + case <-t.requestKex: + break + } + + if !sent { + if err := t.sendKexInit(); err != nil { + t.recordWriteError(err) + break + } + sent = true + } + } + + if err := t.getWriteError(); err != nil { + if request != nil { + request.done <- err + } + break + } + + // We're not servicing t.requestKex, but that is OK: + // we never block on sending to t.requestKex. + + // We're not servicing t.startKex, but the remote end + // has just sent us a kexInitMsg, so it can't send + // another key change request, until we close the done + // channel on the pendingKex request. + + err := t.enterKeyExchange(request.otherInit) + + t.mu.Lock() + t.writeError = err + t.sentInitPacket = nil + t.sentInitMsg = nil + + t.resetWriteThresholds() + + // we have completed the key exchange. Since the + // reader is still blocked, it is safe to clear out + // the requestKex channel. This avoids the situation + // where: 1) we consumed our own request for the + // initial kex, and 2) the kex from the remote side + // caused another send on the requestKex channel, + clear: + for { + select { + case <-t.requestKex: + // + default: + break clear + } + } + + request.done <- t.writeError + + // kex finished. Push packets that we received while + // the kex was in progress. Don't look at t.startKex + // and don't increment writtenSinceKex: if we trigger + // another kex while we are still busy with the last + // one, things will become very confusing. + for _, p := range t.pendingPackets { + t.writeError = t.pushPacket(p) + if t.writeError != nil { + break + } + } + t.pendingPackets = t.pendingPackets[:0] + // Unblock writePacket if waiting for KEX. + t.writeCond.Broadcast() + t.mu.Unlock() + } + + // Unblock reader. + t.conn.Close() + + // drain startKex channel. We don't service t.requestKex + // because nobody does blocking sends there. + for request := range t.startKex { + request.done <- t.getWriteError() + } + + // Mark that the loop is done so that Close can return. + close(t.kexLoopDone) +} + +// The protocol uses uint32 for packet counters, so we can't let them +// reach 1<<32. We will actually read and write more packets than +// this, though: the other side may send more packets, and after we +// hit this limit on writing we will send a few more packets for the +// key exchange itself. +const packetRekeyThreshold = (1 << 31) + +func (t *handshakeTransport) resetReadThresholds() { + t.readPacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold + if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { + t.readBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) + } else if t.algorithms != nil { + t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.Read.rekeyBytes() + } else { + t.readBytesLeft = 1 << 30 + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) { + p, err := t.conn.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if t.readPacketsLeft > 0 { + t.readPacketsLeft-- + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if t.readBytesLeft > 0 { + t.readBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if debugHandshake { + t.printPacket(p, false) + } + + if first && p[0] != msgKexInit { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgKexInit") + } + + if p[0] != msgKexInit { + return p, nil + } + + firstKex := t.sessionID == nil + + kex := pendingKex{ + done: make(chan error, 1), + otherInit: p, + } + t.startKex <- &kex + err = <-kex.done + + if debugHandshake { + log.Printf("%s exited key exchange (first %v), err %v", t.id(), firstKex, err) + } + + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + t.resetReadThresholds() + + // By default, a key exchange is hidden from higher layers by + // translating it into msgIgnore. + successPacket := []byte{msgIgnore} + if firstKex { + // sendKexInit() for the first kex waits for + // msgNewKeys so the authentication process is + // guaranteed to happen over an encrypted transport. + successPacket = []byte{msgNewKeys} + } + + return successPacket, nil +} + +const ( + kexStrictClient = "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" + kexStrictServer = "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" +) + +// sendKexInit sends a key change message. +func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.sentInitMsg != nil { + // kexInits may be sent either in response to the other side, + // or because our side wants to initiate a key change, so we + // may have already sent a kexInit. In that case, don't send a + // second kexInit. + return nil + } + + msg := &kexInitMsg{ + CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers, + CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers, + MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs, + MACsServerClient: t.config.MACs, + CompressionClientServer: supportedCompressions, + CompressionServerClient: supportedCompressions, + } + io.ReadFull(t.config.Rand, msg.Cookie[:]) + + // We mutate the KexAlgos slice, in order to add the kex-strict extension algorithm, + // and possibly to add the ext-info extension algorithm. Since the slice may be the + // user owned KeyExchanges, we create our own slice in order to avoid using user + // owned memory by mistake. + msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+2) // room for kex-strict and ext-info + msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...) + + isServer := len(t.hostKeys) > 0 + if isServer { + for _, k := range t.hostKeys { + // If k is a MultiAlgorithmSigner, we restrict the signature + // algorithms. If k is a AlgorithmSigner, presume it supports all + // signature algorithms associated with the key format. If k is not + // an AlgorithmSigner, we can only assume it only supports the + // algorithms that matches the key format. (This means that Sign + // can't pick a different default). + keyFormat := k.PublicKey().Type() + + switch s := k.(type) { + case MultiAlgorithmSigner: + for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) { + if slices.Contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algo) + } + } + case AlgorithmSigner: + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat)...) + default: + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, keyFormat) + } + } + + if t.sessionID == nil { + msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer) + } + } else { + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms + + // As a client we opt in to receiving SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so we know what + // algorithms the server supports for public key authentication. See RFC + // 8308, Section 2.1. + // + // We also send the strict KEX mode extension algorithm, in order to opt + // into the strict KEX mode. + if firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil; firstKeyExchange { + msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") + msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient) + } + + } + + packet := Marshal(msg) + + // writePacket destroys the contents, so save a copy. + packetCopy := make([]byte, len(packet)) + copy(packetCopy, packet) + + if err := t.pushPacket(packetCopy); err != nil { + return err + } + + t.sentInitMsg = msg + t.sentInitPacket = packet + + return nil +} + +var errSendBannerPhase = errors.New("ssh: SendAuthBanner outside of authentication phase") + +func (t *handshakeTransport) writePacket(p []byte) error { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + + switch p[0] { + case msgKexInit: + return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send kexInit") + case msgNewKeys: + return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send newKeys") + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if t.userAuthComplete { + return errSendBannerPhase + } + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + t.userAuthComplete = true + } + + if t.writeError != nil { + return t.writeError + } + + if t.sentInitMsg != nil { + if len(t.pendingPackets) < maxPendingPackets { + // Copy the packet so the writer can reuse the buffer. + cp := make([]byte, len(p)) + copy(cp, p) + t.pendingPackets = append(t.pendingPackets, cp) + return nil + } + for t.sentInitMsg != nil { + // Block and wait for KEX to complete or an error. + t.writeCond.Wait() + if t.writeError != nil { + return t.writeError + } + } + } + + if t.writeBytesLeft > 0 { + t.writeBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if t.writePacketsLeft > 0 { + t.writePacketsLeft-- + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if err := t.pushPacket(p); err != nil { + t.writeError = err + t.writeCond.Broadcast() + } + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) Close() error { + // Close the connection. This should cause the readLoop goroutine to wake up + // and close t.startKex, which will shut down kexLoop if running. + err := t.conn.Close() + + // Wait for the kexLoop goroutine to complete. + // At that point we know that the readLoop goroutine is complete too, + // because kexLoop itself waits for readLoop to close the startKex channel. + <-t.kexLoopDone + + return err +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error { + if debugHandshake { + log.Printf("%s entered key exchange", t.id()) + } + + otherInit := &kexInitMsg{} + if err := Unmarshal(otherInitPacket, otherInit); err != nil { + return err + } + + magics := handshakeMagics{ + clientVersion: t.clientVersion, + serverVersion: t.serverVersion, + clientKexInit: otherInitPacket, + serverKexInit: t.sentInitPacket, + } + + clientInit := otherInit + serverInit := t.sentInitMsg + isClient := len(t.hostKeys) == 0 + if isClient { + clientInit, serverInit = serverInit, clientInit + + magics.clientKexInit = t.sentInitPacket + magics.serverKexInit = otherInitPacket + } + + var err error + t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient, clientInit, serverInit) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if t.sessionID == nil && ((isClient && slices.Contains(serverInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)) || (!isClient && slices.Contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient))) { + t.strictMode = true + if err := t.conn.setStrictMode(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + // We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it. + // + // RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for + // first_kex_packet_follows. It states that the guessed packet + // should be ignored if the "kex algorithm and/or the host + // key algorithm is guessed wrong (server and client have + // different preferred algorithm), or if any of the other + // algorithms cannot be agreed upon". The other algorithms have + // already been checked above so the kex algorithm and host key + // algorithm are checked here. + if otherInit.FirstKexFollows && (clientInit.KexAlgos[0] != serverInit.KexAlgos[0] || clientInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0] != serverInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0]) { + // other side sent a kex message for the wrong algorithm, + // which we have to ignore. + if _, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.KeyExchange] + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.KeyExchange) + } + + var result *kexResult + if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { + result, err = t.server(kex, &magics) + } else { + result, err = t.client(kex, &magics) + } + + if err != nil { + return err + } + + firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil + if firstKeyExchange { + t.sessionID = result.H + } + result.SessionID = t.sessionID + + if err := t.conn.prepareKeyChange(t.algorithms, result); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = t.conn.writePacket([]byte{msgNewKeys}); err != nil { + return err + } + + // On the server side, after the first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO + // message with the server-sig-algs extension if the client supports it. See + // RFC 8308, Sections 2.4 and 3.1, and [PROTOCOL], Section 1.9. + if !isClient && firstKeyExchange && slices.Contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") { + supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList := strings.Join(t.publicKeyAuthAlgorithms, ",") + extInfo := &extInfoMsg{ + NumExtensions: 2, + Payload: make([]byte, 0, 4+15+4+len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)+4+16+4+1), + } + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("server-sig-algs")) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "server-sig-algs"...) + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList...) + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("ping@openssh.com")) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "ping@openssh.com"...) + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, 1) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "0"...) + if err := t.conn.writePacket(Marshal(extInfo)); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if packet, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { + return err + } else if packet[0] != msgNewKeys { + return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0]) + } + + if firstKeyExchange { + // Indicates to the transport that the first key exchange is completed + // after receiving SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS. + t.conn.setInitialKEXDone() + } + + return nil +} + +// algorithmSignerWrapper is an AlgorithmSigner that only supports the default +// key format algorithm. +// +// This is technically a violation of the AlgorithmSigner interface, but it +// should be unreachable given where we use this. Anyway, at least it returns an +// error instead of panicing or producing an incorrect signature. +type algorithmSignerWrapper struct { + Signer +} + +func (a algorithmSignerWrapper) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm != underlyingAlgo(a.PublicKey().Type()) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: algorithmSignerWrapper invoked with non-default algorithm") + } + return a.Sign(rand, data) +} + +func pickHostKey(hostKeys []Signer, algo string) AlgorithmSigner { + for _, k := range hostKeys { + if s, ok := k.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok { + if !slices.Contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + continue + } + } + + if algo == k.PublicKey().Type() { + return algorithmSignerWrapper{k} + } + + k, ok := k.(AlgorithmSigner) + if !ok { + continue + } + for _, a := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(k.PublicKey().Type()) { + if algo == a { + return k + } + } + } + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + hostKey := pickHostKey(t.hostKeys, t.algorithms.HostKey) + if hostKey == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: negotiated unsupported signature type") + } + + r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey, t.algorithms.HostKey) + return r, err +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + result, err := kex.Client(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKey, err := ParsePublicKey(result.HostKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, t.algorithms.HostKey, result); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + err = t.hostKeyCallback(t.dialAddress, t.remoteAddr, hostKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return result, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af81d266 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package bcrypt_pbkdf implements bcrypt_pbkdf(3) from OpenBSD. +// +// See https://flak.tedunangst.com/post/bcrypt-pbkdf and +// https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c. +package bcrypt_pbkdf + +import ( + "crypto/sha512" + "errors" + "golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish" +) + +const blockSize = 32 + +// Key derives a key from the password, salt and rounds count, returning a +// []byte of length keyLen that can be used as cryptographic key. +func Key(password, salt []byte, rounds, keyLen int) ([]byte, error) { + if rounds < 1 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: number of rounds is too small") + } + if len(password) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: empty password") + } + if len(salt) == 0 || len(salt) > 1<<20 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: bad salt length") + } + if keyLen > 1024 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: keyLen is too large") + } + + numBlocks := (keyLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + key := make([]byte, numBlocks*blockSize) + + h := sha512.New() + h.Write(password) + shapass := h.Sum(nil) + + shasalt := make([]byte, 0, sha512.Size) + cnt, tmp := make([]byte, 4), make([]byte, blockSize) + for block := 1; block <= numBlocks; block++ { + h.Reset() + h.Write(salt) + cnt[0] = byte(block >> 24) + cnt[1] = byte(block >> 16) + cnt[2] = byte(block >> 8) + cnt[3] = byte(block) + h.Write(cnt) + bcryptHash(tmp, shapass, h.Sum(shasalt)) + + out := make([]byte, blockSize) + copy(out, tmp) + for i := 2; i <= rounds; i++ { + h.Reset() + h.Write(tmp) + bcryptHash(tmp, shapass, h.Sum(shasalt)) + for j := 0; j < len(out); j++ { + out[j] ^= tmp[j] + } + } + + for i, v := range out { + key[i*numBlocks+(block-1)] = v + } + } + return key[:keyLen], nil +} + +var magic = []byte("OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite") + +func bcryptHash(out, shapass, shasalt []byte) { + c, err := blowfish.NewSaltedCipher(shapass, shasalt) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + for i := 0; i < 64; i++ { + blowfish.ExpandKey(shasalt, c) + blowfish.ExpandKey(shapass, c) + } + copy(out, magic) + for i := 0; i < 32; i += 8 { + for j := 0; j < 64; j++ { + c.Encrypt(out[i:i+8], out[i:i+8]) + } + } + // Swap bytes due to different endianness. + for i := 0; i < 32; i += 4 { + out[i+3], out[i+2], out[i+1], out[i] = out[i], out[i+1], out[i+2], out[i+3] + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f7fdd85 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go @@ -0,0 +1,807 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/fips140" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "slices" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" +) + +const ( + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in RFC 4253 and + // Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409. + oakleyGroup2 = "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC 4253 and + // Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526. + oakleyGroup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his is the group called diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 in RFC 8268 and + // Oakley Group 15 in RFC 3526. + oakleyGroup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his is the group called diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 in RFC 8268 and + // Oakley Group 16 in RFC 3526. + oakleyGroup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kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange. +type kexResult struct { + // Session hash. See also RFC 4253, section 8. + H []byte + + // Shared secret. See also RFC 4253, section 8. + K []byte + + // Host key as hashed into H. + HostKey []byte + + // Signature of H. + Signature []byte + + // A cryptographic hash function that matches the security + // level of the key exchange algorithm. It is used for + // calculating H, and for deriving keys from H and K. + Hash crypto.Hash + + // The session ID, which is the first H computed. This is used + // to derive key material inside the transport. + SessionID []byte +} + +// handshakeMagics contains data that is always included in the +// session hash. +type handshakeMagics struct { + clientVersion, serverVersion []byte + clientKexInit, serverKexInit []byte +} + +func (m *handshakeMagics) write(w io.Writer) { + writeString(w, m.clientVersion) + writeString(w, m.serverVersion) + writeString(w, m.clientKexInit) + writeString(w, m.serverKexInit) +} + +// kexAlgorithm abstracts different key exchange algorithms. +type kexAlgorithm interface { + // Server runs server-side key agreement, signing the result + // with a hostkey. algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may + // be a certificate type. + Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (*kexResult, error) + + // Client runs the client-side key agreement. Caller is + // responsible for verifying the host key signature. + Client(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) +} + +// dhGroup is a multiplicative group suitable for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement. +type dhGroup struct { + g, p, pMinus1 *big.Int + hashFunc crypto.Hash +} + +func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + if theirPublic.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(group.pMinus1) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, group.p), nil +} + +func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + var x *big.Int + for { + var err error + if x, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if x.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + X := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, x, group.p) + kexDHInit := kexDHInitMsg{ + X: X, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHInit)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexDHReply kexDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHReply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + h := group.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey) + writeInt(h, X) + writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: kexDHReply.HostKey, + Signature: kexDHReply.Signature, + Hash: group.hashFunc, + }, nil +} + +func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHInit kexDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHInit); err != nil { + return + } + + var y *big.Int + for { + if y, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { + return + } + if y.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p) + ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := group.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X) + writeInt(h, Y) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexDHReply := kexDHReplyMsg{ + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Y: Y, + Signature: sig, + } + packet = Marshal(&kexDHReply) + + err = c.writePacket(packet) + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: group.hashFunc, + }, err +} + +// ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as +// described in RFC 5656, section 4. +type ecdh struct { + curve elliptic.Curve +} + +func (kex *ecdh) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexInit := kexECDHInitMsg{ + ClientPubKey: elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y), + } + + serialized := Marshal(&kexInit) + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var reply kexECDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + x, y, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // generate shared secret + secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ephKey.D.Bytes()) + + h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, reply.HostKey) + writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) + marshalInt(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: reply.Signature, + Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), + }, nil +} + +// unmarshalECKey parses and checks an EC key. +func unmarshalECKey(curve elliptic.Curve, pubkey []byte) (x, y *big.Int, err error) { + x, y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, pubkey) + if x == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: elliptic.Unmarshal failure") + } + if !validateECPublicKey(curve, x, y) { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: public key not on curve") + } + return x, y, nil +} + +// validateECPublicKey checks that the point is a valid public key for +// the given curve. See [SEC1], 3.2.2 +func validateECPublicKey(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) bool { + if x.Sign() == 0 && y.Sign() == 0 { + return false + } + + if x.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { + return false + } + + if y.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { + return false + } + + if !curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) { + return false + } + + // We don't check if N * PubKey == 0, since + // + // - the NIST curves have cofactor = 1, so this is implicit. + // (We don't foresee an implementation that supports non NIST + // curves) + // + // - for ephemeral keys, we don't need to worry about small + // subgroup attacks. + return true +} + +func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexECDHInit kexECDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexECDHInit); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + clientX, clientY, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // We could cache this key across multiple users/multiple + // connection attempts, but the benefit is small. OpenSSH + // generates a new key for each incoming connection. + ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + serializedEphKey := elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y) + + // generate shared secret + secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(clientX, clientY, ephKey.D.Bytes()) + + h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeString(h, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, serializedEphKey) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) + marshalInt(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ + EphemeralPubKey: serializedEphKey, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + } + + serialized := Marshal(&reply) + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: sig, + Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), + }, nil +} + +// ecHash returns the hash to match the given elliptic curve, see RFC +// 5656, section 6.2.1 +func ecHash(curve elliptic.Curve) crypto.Hash { + bitSize := curve.Params().BitSize + switch { + case bitSize <= 256: + return crypto.SHA256 + case bitSize <= 384: + return crypto.SHA384 + } + return crypto.SHA512 +} + +// kexAlgoMap defines the supported KEXs. KEXs not included are not supported +// and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly configured. When FIPS mode is +// enabled, only FIPS-approved algorithms are included. +var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{} + +func init() { + // mlkem768x25519-sha256 we'll work with fips140=on but not fips140=only + // until Go 1.26. + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519] = &mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256{} + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeECDHP521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()} + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeECDHP384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()} + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeECDHP256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()} + + if fips140.Enabled() { + defaultKexAlgos = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultKexAlgos, func(algo string) bool { + _, ok := kexAlgoMap[algo] + return !ok + }) + return + } + + p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup2, 16) + kexAlgoMap[InsecureKeyExchangeDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + hashFunc: crypto.SHA1, + } + + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup14, 16) + group14 := &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + } + + kexAlgoMap[InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{ + g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1, + hashFunc: crypto.SHA1, + } + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeDH14SHA256] = &dhGroup{ + g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1, + hashFunc: crypto.SHA256, + } + + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup16, 16) + + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeDH16SHA512] = &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + hashFunc: crypto.SHA512, + } + + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeCurve25519] = &curve25519sha256{} + kexAlgoMap[keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH] = &curve25519sha256{} + kexAlgoMap[InsecureKeyExchangeDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1} + kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256} +} + +// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256 (formerly known as +// curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) key exchange method, as described in RFC 8731. +type curve25519sha256 struct{} + +type curve25519KeyPair struct { + priv [32]byte + pub [32]byte +} + +func (kp *curve25519KeyPair) generate(rand io.Reader) error { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, kp.priv[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + p, err := curve25519.X25519(kp.priv[:], curve25519.Basepoint) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("curve25519: %w", err) + } + if len(p) != 32 { + return fmt.Errorf("curve25519: internal error: X25519 returned %d bytes, expected 32", len(p)) + } + copy(kp.pub[:], p) + return nil +} + +func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + var kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexECDHInitMsg{kp.pub[:]})); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var reply kexECDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(reply.EphemeralPubKey) != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + secret, err := curve25519.X25519(kp.priv[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value is not valid: %w", err) + } + + h := crypto.SHA256.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, reply.HostKey) + writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) + writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + + ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: reply.Signature, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} + +func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexInit kexECDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexInit); err != nil { + return + } + + if len(kexInit.ClientPubKey) != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + var kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + secret, err := curve25519.X25519(kp.priv[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value is not valid: %w", err) + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := crypto.SHA256.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) + + ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ + EphemeralPubKey: kp.pub[:], + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&reply)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} + +// dhGEXSHA implements the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and +// diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key agreement protocols, +// as described in RFC 4419 +type dhGEXSHA struct { + hashFunc crypto.Hash +} + +const ( + dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits = 2048 + dhGroupExchangePreferredBits = 2048 + dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits = 8192 +) + +func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + // Send GexRequest + kexDHGexRequest := kexDHGexRequestMsg{ + MinBits: dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits, + PreferredBits: dhGroupExchangePreferredBits, + MaxBits: dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexRequest)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexGroup + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var msg kexDHGexGroupMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // reject if p's bit length < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits or > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits + if msg.P.BitLen() < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || msg.P.BitLen() > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server-generated gex p is out of range (%d bits)", msg.P.BitLen()) + } + + // Check if g is safe by verifying that 1 < g < p-1 + pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(msg.P, bigOne) + if msg.G.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || msg.G.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex g is not safe") + } + + // Send GexInit + pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(msg.P, 1) + x, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + X := new(big.Int).Exp(msg.G, x, msg.P) + kexDHGexInit := kexDHGexInitMsg{ + X: X, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexInit)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexReply + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexDHGexReply kexDHGexReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexReply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexReply.Y, x, msg.P) + + // Check if k is safe by verifying that k > 1 and k < p - 1 + if kInt.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kInt.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: derived k is not safe") + } + + h := gex.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, kexDHGexReply.HostKey) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits)) + writeInt(h, msg.P) + writeInt(h, msg.G) + writeInt(h, X) + writeInt(h, kexDHGexReply.Y) + K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) + marshalInt(K, kInt) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: kexDHGexReply.HostKey, + Signature: kexDHGexReply.Signature, + Hash: gex.hashFunc, + }, nil +} + +// Server half implementation of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange with SHA1 and SHA256. +func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + // Receive GexRequest + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHGexRequest kexDHGexRequestMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexRequest); err != nil { + return + } + // We check that the request received is valid and that the MaxBits + // requested are at least equal to our supported minimum. This is the same + // check done in OpenSSH: + // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/80a2f64b/kexgexs.c#L94 + // + // Furthermore, we also check that the required MinBits are less than or + // equal to 4096 because we can use up to Oakley Group 16. + if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < kexDHGexRequest.MinBits || kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits < kexDHGexRequest.MinBits || + kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits || kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || + kexDHGexRequest.MinBits > 4096 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: DH GEX request out of range, min: %d, max: %d, preferred: %d", kexDHGexRequest.MinBits, + kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits, kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits) + } + + var p *big.Int + // We hardcode sending Oakley Group 14 (2048 bits), Oakley Group 15 (3072 + // bits) or Oakley Group 16 (4096 bits), based on the requested max size. + if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 3072 { + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup14, 16) + } else if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 4096 { + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup15, 16) + } else { + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup16, 16) + } + + g := big.NewInt(2) + msg := &kexDHGexGroupMsg{ + P: p, + G: g, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(msg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexInit + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHGexInit kexDHGexInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexInit); err != nil { + return + } + + pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(p, 1) + + y, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) + if err != nil { + return + } + Y := new(big.Int).Exp(g, y, p) + + pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne) + if kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexInit.X, y, p) + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := gex.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, kexDHGexRequest.MinBits) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits) + writeInt(h, p) + writeInt(h, g) + writeInt(h, kexDHGexInit.X) + writeInt(h, Y) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) + marshalInt(K, kInt) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexDHGexReply := kexDHGexReplyMsg{ + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Y: Y, + Signature: sig, + } + packet = Marshal(&kexDHGexReply) + + err = c.writePacket(packet) + + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: gex.hashFunc, + }, err +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a035956f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go @@ -0,0 +1,1822 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/dsa" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/asn1" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/binary" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "slices" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf" +) + +// Public key algorithms names. These values can appear in PublicKey.Type, +// ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms, Signature.Format, or as AlgorithmSigner +// arguments. +const ( + KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa" + // Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed + // from major implementations. + KeyAlgoDSA = InsecureKeyAlgoDSA + // Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed + // from major implementations. + InsecureKeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss" + KeyAlgoECDSA256 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" + KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" + KeyAlgoECDSA384 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" + KeyAlgoECDSA521 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" + KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519" + KeyAlgoSKED25519 = "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com" + + // KeyAlgoRSASHA256 and KeyAlgoRSASHA512 are only public key algorithms, not + // public key formats, so they can't appear as a PublicKey.Type. The + // corresponding PublicKey.Type is KeyAlgoRSA. See RFC 8332, Section 2. + KeyAlgoRSASHA256 = "rsa-sha2-256" + KeyAlgoRSASHA512 = "rsa-sha2-512" +) + +const ( + // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSA. + SigAlgoRSA = KeyAlgoRSA + // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA256. + SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = KeyAlgoRSASHA256 + // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA512. + SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = KeyAlgoRSASHA512 +) + +// parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm. +// Use ParsePublicKey for keys with prepended algorithm. +func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + switch algo { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + return parseRSA(in) + case InsecureKeyAlgoDSA: + return parseDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: + return parseECDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: + return parseSKECDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoED25519: + return parseED25519(in) + case KeyAlgoSKED25519: + return parseSKEd25519(in) + case CertAlgoRSAv01, InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01: + cert, err := parseCert(in, certKeyAlgoNames[algo]) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return cert, nil, nil + } + if keyFormat := keyFormatForAlgorithm(algo); keyFormat != "" { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature algorithm %q isn't a key format; key is malformed and should be re-encoded with type %q", + algo, keyFormat) + } + + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown key algorithm: %v", algo) +} + +// parseAuthorizedKey parses a public key in OpenSSH authorized_keys format +// (see sshd(8) manual page) once the options and key type fields have been +// removed. +func parseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, err error) { + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + i = len(in) + } + base64Key := in[:i] + + key := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(base64Key))) + n, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(key, base64Key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + key = key[:n] + out, err = ParsePublicKey(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + comment = string(bytes.TrimSpace(in[i:])) + return out, comment, nil +} + +// ParseKnownHosts parses an entry in the format of the known_hosts file. +// +// The known_hosts format is documented in the sshd(8) manual page. This +// function will parse a single entry from in. On successful return, marker +// will contain the optional marker value (i.e. "cert-authority" or "revoked") +// or else be empty, hosts will contain the hosts that this entry matches, +// pubKey will contain the public key and comment will contain any trailing +// comment at the end of the line. See the sshd(8) manual page for the various +// forms that a host string can take. +// +// The unparsed remainder of the input will be returned in rest. This function +// can be called repeatedly to parse multiple entries. +// +// If no entries were found in the input then err will be io.EOF. Otherwise a +// non-nil err value indicates a parse error. +func ParseKnownHosts(in []byte) (marker string, hosts []string, pubKey PublicKey, comment string, rest []byte, err error) { + for len(in) > 0 { + end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') + if end != -1 { + rest = in[end+1:] + in = in[:end] + } else { + rest = nil + } + + end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') + if end != -1 { + in = in[:end] + } + + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { + in = rest + continue + } + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + // Strip out the beginning of the known_host key. + // This is either an optional marker or a (set of) hostname(s). + keyFields := bytes.Fields(in) + if len(keyFields) < 3 || len(keyFields) > 5 { + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid entry in known_hosts data") + } + + // keyFields[0] is either "@cert-authority", "@revoked" or a comma separated + // list of hosts + marker := "" + if keyFields[0][0] == '@' { + marker = string(keyFields[0][1:]) + keyFields = keyFields[1:] + } + + hosts := string(keyFields[0]) + // keyFields[1] contains the key type (e.g. “ssh-rsa”). + // However, that information is duplicated inside the + // base64-encoded key and so is ignored here. + + key := bytes.Join(keyFields[2:], []byte(" ")) + if pubKey, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(key); err != nil { + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, err + } + + return marker, strings.Split(hosts, ","), pubKey, comment, rest, nil + } + + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, io.EOF +} + +// ParseAuthorizedKey parses a public key from an authorized_keys file used in +// OpenSSH according to the sshd(8) manual page. Invalid lines are ignored. +func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []string, rest []byte, err error) { + var lastErr error + for len(in) > 0 { + end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') + if end != -1 { + rest = in[end+1:] + in = in[:end] + } else { + rest = nil + } + + end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') + if end != -1 { + in = in[:end] + } + + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { + in = rest + continue + } + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } else { + lastErr = err + } + + // No key type recognised. Maybe there's an options field at + // the beginning. + var b byte + inQuote := false + var candidateOptions []string + optionStart := 0 + for i, b = range in { + isEnd := !inQuote && (b == ' ' || b == '\t') + if (b == ',' && !inQuote) || isEnd { + if i-optionStart > 0 { + candidateOptions = append(candidateOptions, string(in[optionStart:i])) + } + optionStart = i + 1 + } + if isEnd { + break + } + if b == '"' && (i == 0 || (i > 0 && in[i-1] != '\\')) { + inQuote = !inQuote + } + } + for i < len(in) && (in[i] == ' ' || in[i] == '\t') { + i++ + } + if i == len(in) { + // Invalid line: unmatched quote + in = rest + continue + } + + in = in[i:] + i = bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { + options = candidateOptions + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } else { + lastErr = err + } + + in = rest + continue + } + + if lastErr != nil { + return nil, "", nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: no key found; last parsing error for ignored line: %w", lastErr) + } + + return nil, "", nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") +} + +// ParsePublicKey parses an SSH public key or certificate formatted for use in +// the SSH wire protocol according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func ParsePublicKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, err error) { + algo, in, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + var rest []byte + out, rest, err = parsePubKey(in, string(algo)) + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: trailing junk in public key") + } + + return out, err +} + +// MarshalAuthorizedKey serializes key for inclusion in an OpenSSH +// authorized_keys file. The return value ends with newline. +func MarshalAuthorizedKey(key PublicKey) []byte { + b := &bytes.Buffer{} + b.WriteString(key.Type()) + b.WriteByte(' ') + e := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, b) + e.Write(key.Marshal()) + e.Close() + b.WriteByte('\n') + return b.Bytes() +} + +// MarshalPrivateKey returns a PEM block with the private key serialized in the +// OpenSSH format. +func MarshalPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string) (*pem.Block, error) { + return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler) +} + +// MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a PEM block holding the encrypted +// private key serialized in the OpenSSH format. +func MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, passphrase []byte) (*pem.Block, error) { + return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase)) +} + +// PublicKey represents a public key using an unspecified algorithm. +// +// Some PublicKeys provided by this package also implement CryptoPublicKey. +type PublicKey interface { + // Type returns the key format name, e.g. "ssh-rsa". + Type() string + + // Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format, with the name + // prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use the ParsePublicKey function. + Marshal() []byte + + // Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this key. This + // method will hash the data appropriately first. sig.Format is allowed to + // be any signature algorithm compatible with the key type, the caller + // should check if it has more stringent requirements. + Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error +} + +// CryptoPublicKey, if implemented by a PublicKey, +// returns the underlying crypto.PublicKey form of the key. +type CryptoPublicKey interface { + CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey +} + +// A Signer can create signatures that verify against a public key. +// +// Some Signers provided by this package also implement MultiAlgorithmSigner. +type Signer interface { + // PublicKey returns the associated PublicKey. + PublicKey() PublicKey + + // Sign returns a signature for the given data. This method will hash the + // data appropriately first. The signature algorithm is expected to match + // the key format returned by the PublicKey.Type method (and not to be any + // alternative algorithm supported by the key format). + Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) +} + +// An AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying an algorithm to +// use for signing. +// +// An AlgorithmSigner can't advertise the algorithms it supports, unless it also +// implements MultiAlgorithmSigner, so it should be prepared to be invoked with +// every algorithm supported by the public key format. +type AlgorithmSigner interface { + Signer + + // SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specifying a desired + // signing algorithm. Callers may pass an empty string for the algorithm in + // which case the AlgorithmSigner will use a default algorithm. This default + // doesn't currently control any behavior in this package. + SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) +} + +// MultiAlgorithmSigner is an AlgorithmSigner that also reports the algorithms +// supported by that signer. +type MultiAlgorithmSigner interface { + AlgorithmSigner + + // Algorithms returns the available algorithms in preference order. The list + // must not be empty, and it must not include certificate types. + Algorithms() []string +} + +// NewSignerWithAlgorithms returns a signer restricted to the specified +// algorithms. The algorithms must be set in preference order. The list must not +// be empty, and it must not include certificate types. An error is returned if +// the specified algorithms are incompatible with the public key type. +func NewSignerWithAlgorithms(signer AlgorithmSigner, algorithms []string) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, error) { + if len(algorithms) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: please specify at least one valid signing algorithm") + } + var signerAlgos []string + supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(signer.PublicKey().Type())) + if s, ok := signer.(*multiAlgorithmSigner); ok { + signerAlgos = s.Algorithms() + } else { + signerAlgos = supportedAlgos + } + + for _, algo := range algorithms { + if !slices.Contains(supportedAlgos, algo) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported for key type %q", + algo, signer.PublicKey().Type()) + } + if !slices.Contains(signerAlgos, algo) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is restricted for the provided signer", algo) + } + } + return &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: signer, + supportedAlgorithms: algorithms, + }, nil +} + +type multiAlgorithmSigner struct { + AlgorithmSigner + supportedAlgorithms []string +} + +func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) Algorithms() []string { + return s.supportedAlgorithms +} + +func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm string) bool { + if algorithm == "" { + algorithm = underlyingAlgo(s.PublicKey().Type()) + } + for _, algo := range s.supportedAlgorithms { + if algorithm == algo { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if !s.isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported: %v", algorithm, s.supportedAlgorithms) + } + return s.AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) +} + +type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ssh-rsa" +} + +// parseRSA parses an RSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func parseRSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if w.E.BitLen() > 24 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: exponent too large") + } + e := w.E.Int64() + if e < 3 || e&1 == 0 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: incorrect exponent") + } + + var key rsa.PublicKey + key.E = int(e) + key.N = w.N + return (*rsaPublicKey)(&key), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + e := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(r.E)) + // RSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseRSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + wirekey := struct { + Name string + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + }{ + KeyAlgoRSA, + e, + r.N, + } + return Marshal(&wirekey) +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(r.Type()) + if !slices.Contains(supportedAlgos, sig.Format) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type()) + } + hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format) + if err != nil { + return err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + // Signatures in PKCS1v15 must match the key's modulus in + // length. However with SSH, some signers provide RSA + // signatures which are missing the MSB 0's of the bignum + // represented. With ssh-rsa signatures, this is encouraged by + // the spec (even though e.g. OpenSSH will give the full + // length unconditionally). With rsa-sha2-* signatures, the + // verifier is allowed to support these, even though they are + // out of spec. See RFC 4253 Section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and RFC + // 8332 Section 3 for rsa-sha2-* details. + // + // In practice: + // * OpenSSH always allows "short" signatures: + // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_8_P1/ssh-rsa.c#L526 + // but always generates padded signatures: + // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_8_P1/ssh-rsa.c#L439 + // + // * PuTTY versions 0.81 and earlier will generate short + // signatures for all RSA signature variants. Note that + // PuTTY is embedded in other software, such as WinSCP and + // FileZilla. At the time of writing, a patch has been + // applied to PuTTY to generate padded signatures for + // rsa-sha2-*, but not yet released: + // https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=a5bcf3d384e1bf15a51a6923c3724cbbee022d8e + // + // * SSH.NET versions 2024.0.0 and earlier will generate short + // signatures for all RSA signature variants, fixed in 2024.1.0: + // https://github.com/sshnet/SSH.NET/releases/tag/2024.1.0 + // + // As a result, we pad these up to the key size by inserting + // leading 0's. + // + // Note that support for short signatures with rsa-sha2-* may + // be removed in the future due to such signatures not being + // allowed by the spec. + blob := sig.Blob + keySize := (*rsa.PublicKey)(r).Size() + if len(blob) < keySize { + padded := make([]byte, keySize) + copy(padded[keySize-len(blob):], blob) + blob = padded + } + return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, blob) +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*rsa.PublicKey)(r) +} + +type dsaPublicKey dsa.PublicKey + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ssh-dss" +} + +func checkDSAParams(param *dsa.Parameters) error { + // SSH specifies FIPS 186-2, which only provided a single size + // (1024 bits) DSA key. FIPS 186-3 allows for larger key + // sizes, which would confuse SSH. + if l := param.P.BitLen(); l != 1024 { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported DSA key size %d", l) + } + + return nil +} + +// parseDSA parses an DSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func parseDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + P, Q, G, Y *big.Int + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + param := dsa.Parameters{ + P: w.P, + Q: w.Q, + G: w.G, + } + if err := checkDSAParams(¶m); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := &dsaPublicKey{ + Parameters: param, + Y: w.Y, + } + return key, w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // DSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + w := struct { + Name string + P, Q, G, Y *big.Int + }{ + k.Type(), + k.P, + k.Q, + k.G, + k.Y, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format) + if err != nil { + return err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + // Per RFC 4253, section 6.6, + // The value for 'dss_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing + // r, followed by s (which are 160-bit integers, without lengths or + // padding, unsigned, and in network byte order). + // For DSS purposes, sig.Blob should be exactly 40 bytes in length. + if len(sig.Blob) != 40 { + return errors.New("ssh: DSA signature parse error") + } + r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[:20]) + s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[20:]) + if dsa.Verify((*dsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, r, s) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*dsa.PublicKey)(k) +} + +type dsaPrivateKey struct { + *dsa.PrivateKey +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return (*dsaPublicKey)(&k.PrivateKey.PublicKey) +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, k.PublicKey().Type()) +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Algorithms() []string { + return []string{k.PublicKey().Type()} +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + + hash, err := hashFunc(k.PublicKey().Type()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, k.PrivateKey, digest) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + sig := make([]byte, 40) + rb := r.Bytes() + sb := s.Bytes() + + copy(sig[20-len(rb):20], rb) + copy(sig[40-len(sb):], sb) + + return &Signature{ + Format: k.PublicKey().Type(), + Blob: sig, + }, nil +} + +type ecdsaPublicKey ecdsa.PublicKey + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ecdsa-sha2-" + k.nistID() +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string { + switch k.Params().BitSize { + case 256: + return "nistp256" + case 384: + return "nistp384" + case 521: + return "nistp521" + } + panic("ssh: unsupported ecdsa key size") +} + +type ed25519PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Type() string { + return KeyAlgoED25519 +} + +func parseED25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + KeyBytes []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if l := len(w.KeyBytes); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + return ed25519PublicKey(w.KeyBytes), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + w := struct { + Name string + KeyBytes []byte + }{ + KeyAlgoED25519, + []byte(k), + } + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + if l := len(k); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + if ok := ed25519.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(k), b, sig.Blob); !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return ed25519.PublicKey(k) +} + +func supportedEllipticCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) bool { + return curve == elliptic.P256() || curve == elliptic.P384() || curve == elliptic.P521() +} + +// parseECDSA parses an ECDSA key according to RFC 5656, section 3.1. +func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + Curve string + KeyBytes []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := new(ecdsa.PublicKey) + + switch w.Curve { + case "nistp256": + key.Curve = elliptic.P256() + case "nistp384": + key.Curve = elliptic.P384() + case "nistp521": + key.Curve = elliptic.P521() + default: + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve") + } + + key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes) + if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point") + } + return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // See RFC 5656, section 3.1. + keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) + // ECDSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseECDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + w := struct { + Name string + ID string + Key []byte + }{ + k.Type(), + k.nistID(), + keyBytes, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format) + if err != nil { + return err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + // Per RFC 5656, section 3.1.2, + // The ecdsa_signature_blob value has the following specific encoding: + // mpint r + // mpint s + var ecSig struct { + R *big.Int + S *big.Int + } + + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil { + return err + } + + if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k) +} + +// skFields holds the additional fields present in U2F/FIDO2 signatures. +// See openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f 'SSH U2F Signatures' for details. +type skFields struct { + // Flags contains U2F/FIDO2 flags such as 'user present' + Flags byte + // Counter is a monotonic signature counter which can be + // used to detect concurrent use of a private key, should + // it be extracted from hardware. + Counter uint32 +} + +type skECDSAPublicKey struct { + // application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH. + // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. + application string + ecdsa.PublicKey +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Type() string { + return KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) nistID() string { + return "nistp256" +} + +func parseSKECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + Curve string + KeyBytes []byte + Application string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := new(skECDSAPublicKey) + key.application = w.Application + + if w.Curve != "nistp256" { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve") + } + key.Curve = elliptic.P256() + + key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes) + if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point") + } + + return key, w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // See RFC 5656, section 3.1. + keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) + w := struct { + Name string + ID string + Key []byte + Application string + }{ + k.Type(), + k.nistID(), + keyBytes, + k.application, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format) + if err != nil { + return err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write([]byte(k.application)) + appDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + h.Reset() + h.Write(data) + dataDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + var ecSig struct { + R *big.Int + S *big.Int + } + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil { + return err + } + + var skf skFields + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil { + return err + } + + blob := struct { + ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + Flags byte + Counter uint32 + MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{ + appDigest, + skf.Flags, + skf.Counter, + dataDigest, + } + + original := Marshal(blob) + + h.Reset() + h.Write(original) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(&k.PublicKey), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return &k.PublicKey +} + +type skEd25519PublicKey struct { + // application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH. + // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. + application string + ed25519.PublicKey +} + +func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Type() string { + return KeyAlgoSKED25519 +} + +func parseSKEd25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + KeyBytes []byte + Application string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if l := len(w.KeyBytes); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + key := new(skEd25519PublicKey) + key.application = w.Application + key.PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey(w.KeyBytes) + + return key, w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + w := struct { + Name string + KeyBytes []byte + Application string + }{ + KeyAlgoSKED25519, + []byte(k.PublicKey), + k.application, + } + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + if l := len(k.PublicKey); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format) + if err != nil { + return err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write([]byte(k.application)) + appDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + h.Reset() + h.Write(data) + dataDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + var edSig struct { + Signature []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &edSig); err != nil { + return err + } + + var skf skFields + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil { + return err + } + + blob := struct { + ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + Flags byte + Counter uint32 + MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{ + appDigest, + skf.Flags, + skf.Counter, + dataDigest, + } + + original := Marshal(blob) + + if ok := ed25519.Verify(k.PublicKey, original, edSig.Signature); !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return k.PublicKey +} + +// NewSignerFromKey takes an *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey, +// *ecdsa.PrivateKey or any other crypto.Signer and returns a +// corresponding Signer instance. ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or +// P-521. DSA keys must use parameter size L1024N160. +func NewSignerFromKey(key interface{}) (Signer, error) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case crypto.Signer: + return NewSignerFromSigner(key) + case *dsa.PrivateKey: + return newDSAPrivateKey(key) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } +} + +func newDSAPrivateKey(key *dsa.PrivateKey) (Signer, error) { + if err := checkDSAParams(&key.PublicKey.Parameters); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &dsaPrivateKey{key}, nil +} + +type wrappedSigner struct { + signer crypto.Signer + pubKey PublicKey +} + +// NewSignerFromSigner takes any crypto.Signer implementation and +// returns a corresponding Signer interface. This can be used, for +// example, with keys kept in hardware modules. +func NewSignerFromSigner(signer crypto.Signer) (Signer, error) { + pubKey, err := NewPublicKey(signer.Public()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &wrappedSigner{signer, pubKey}, nil +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return s.pubKey +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, s.pubKey.Type()) +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) Algorithms() []string { + return algorithmsForKeyFormat(s.pubKey.Type()) +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm == "" { + algorithm = s.pubKey.Type() + } + + if !slices.Contains(s.Algorithms(), algorithm) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %q for key format %q", algorithm, s.pubKey.Type()) + } + + hashFunc, err := hashFunc(algorithm) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var digest []byte + if hashFunc != 0 { + h := hashFunc.New() + h.Write(data) + digest = h.Sum(nil) + } else { + digest = data + } + + signature, err := s.signer.Sign(rand, digest, hashFunc) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // crypto.Signer.Sign is expected to return an ASN.1-encoded signature + // for ECDSA and DSA, but that's not the encoding expected by SSH, so + // re-encode. + switch s.pubKey.(type) { + case *ecdsaPublicKey, *dsaPublicKey: + type asn1Signature struct { + R, S *big.Int + } + asn1Sig := new(asn1Signature) + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, asn1Sig) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch s.pubKey.(type) { + case *ecdsaPublicKey: + signature = Marshal(asn1Sig) + + case *dsaPublicKey: + signature = make([]byte, 40) + r := asn1Sig.R.Bytes() + s := asn1Sig.S.Bytes() + copy(signature[20-len(r):20], r) + copy(signature[40-len(s):40], s) + } + } + + return &Signature{ + Format: algorithm, + Blob: signature, + }, nil +} + +// NewPublicKey takes an *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, +// or ed25519.PublicKey returns a corresponding PublicKey instance. +// ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or P-521. +func NewPublicKey(key interface{}) (PublicKey, error) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + return (*rsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + if !supportedEllipticCurve(key.Curve) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported") + } + return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case *dsa.PublicKey: + return (*dsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case ed25519.PublicKey: + if l := len(key); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + return ed25519PublicKey(key), nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } +} + +// ParsePrivateKey returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private key. It supports +// the same keys as ParseRawPrivateKey. If the private key is encrypted, it +// will return a PassphraseMissingError. +func ParsePrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (Signer, error) { + key, err := ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return NewSignerFromKey(key) +} + +// ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private +// key and passphrase. It supports the same keys as +// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase. +func ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (Signer, error) { + key, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return NewSignerFromKey(key) +} + +// encryptedBlock tells whether a private key is +// encrypted by examining its Proc-Type header +// for a mention of ENCRYPTED +// according to RFC 1421 Section 4.6.1.1. +func encryptedBlock(block *pem.Block) bool { + return strings.Contains(block.Headers["Proc-Type"], "ENCRYPTED") +} + +// A PassphraseMissingError indicates that parsing this private key requires a +// passphrase. Use ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase. +type PassphraseMissingError struct { + // PublicKey will be set if the private key format includes an unencrypted + // public key along with the encrypted private key. + PublicKey PublicKey +} + +func (*PassphraseMissingError) Error() string { + return "ssh: this private key is passphrase protected" +} + +// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It supports +// RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 private keys in PKCS#1, PKCS#8, OpenSSL, and OpenSSH +// formats. If the private key is encrypted, it will return a PassphraseMissingError. +func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") + } + + if encryptedBlock(block) { + return nil, &PassphraseMissingError{} + } + + switch block.Type { + case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) + // RFC5208 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5208 + case "PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "EC PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": + return ParseDSAPrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY": + return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(block.Bytes, unencryptedOpenSSHKey) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) + } +} + +// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a private key decrypted with +// passphrase from a PEM encoded private key. If the passphrase is wrong, it +// will return x509.IncorrectPasswordError. +func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (interface{}, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") + } + + if block.Type == "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY" { + return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(block.Bytes, passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase)) + } + + if !encryptedBlock(block) || !x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: not an encrypted key") + } + + buf, err := x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, passphrase) + if err != nil { + if err == x509.IncorrectPasswordError { + return nil, err + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys: %v", err) + } + + var result interface{} + + switch block.Type { + case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": + result, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(buf) + case "EC PRIVATE KEY": + result, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(buf) + case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": + result, err = ParseDSAPrivateKey(buf) + default: + err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) + } + // Because of deficiencies in the format, DecryptPEMBlock does not always + // detect an incorrect password. In these cases decrypted DER bytes is + // random noise. If the parsing of the key returns an asn1.StructuralError + // we return x509.IncorrectPasswordError. + if _, ok := err.(asn1.StructuralError); ok { + return nil, x509.IncorrectPasswordError + } + + return result, err +} + +// ParseDSAPrivateKey returns a DSA private key from its ASN.1 DER encoding, as +// specified by the OpenSSL DSA man page. +func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) { + var k struct { + Version int + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + G *big.Int + Pub *big.Int + Priv *big.Int + } + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &k) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: failed to parse DSA key: " + err.Error()) + } + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: garbage after DSA key") + } + + return &dsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: dsa.PublicKey{ + Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ + P: k.P, + Q: k.Q, + G: k.G, + }, + Y: k.Pub, + }, + X: k.Priv, + }, nil +} + +func unencryptedOpenSSHKey(cipherName, kdfName, kdfOpts string, privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if kdfName != "none" || cipherName != "none" { + return nil, &PassphraseMissingError{} + } + if kdfOpts != "" { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key") + } + return privKeyBlock, nil +} + +func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase []byte) openSSHDecryptFunc { + return func(cipherName, kdfName, kdfOpts string, privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if kdfName == "none" || cipherName == "none" { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: key is not password protected") + } + if kdfName != "bcrypt" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown KDF %q, only supports %q", kdfName, "bcrypt") + } + + var opts struct { + Salt string + Rounds uint32 + } + if err := Unmarshal([]byte(kdfOpts), &opts); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, []byte(opts.Salt), int(opts.Rounds), 32+16) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + key, iv := k[:32], k[32:] + + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + switch cipherName { + case "aes256-ctr": + ctr := cipher.NewCTR(c, iv) + ctr.XORKeyStream(privKeyBlock, privKeyBlock) + case "aes256-cbc": + if len(privKeyBlock)%c.BlockSize() != 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid encrypted private key length, not a multiple of the block size") + } + cbc := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv) + cbc.CryptBlocks(privKeyBlock, privKeyBlock) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown cipher %q, only supports %q or %q", cipherName, "aes256-ctr", "aes256-cbc") + } + + return privKeyBlock, nil + } +} + +func unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) { + key := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, 8) + return key, "none", "none", "", nil +} + +func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase []byte) openSSHEncryptFunc { + return func(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) { + salt := make([]byte, 16) + if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil { + return nil, "", "", "", err + } + + opts := struct { + Salt []byte + Rounds uint32 + }{salt, 16} + + // Derive key to encrypt the private key block. + k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, salt, int(opts.Rounds), 32+aes.BlockSize) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", "", "", err + } + + // Add padding matching the block size of AES. + keyBlock := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, aes.BlockSize) + + // Encrypt the private key using the derived secret. + + dst := make([]byte, len(keyBlock)) + key, iv := k[:32], k[32:] + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", "", "", err + } + + stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv) + stream.XORKeyStream(dst, keyBlock) + + return dst, "aes256-ctr", "bcrypt", string(Marshal(opts)), nil + } +} + +const privateKeyAuthMagic = "openssh-key-v1\x00" + +type openSSHDecryptFunc func(CipherName, KdfName, KdfOpts string, PrivKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) +type openSSHEncryptFunc func(PrivKeyBlock []byte) (ProtectedKeyBlock []byte, cipherName, kdfName, kdfOptions string, err error) + +type openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey struct { + CipherName string + KdfName string + KdfOpts string + NumKeys uint32 + PubKey []byte + PrivKeyBlock []byte +} + +type openSSHPrivateKey struct { + Check1 uint32 + Check2 uint32 + Keytype string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type openSSHRSAPrivateKey struct { + N *big.Int + E *big.Int + D *big.Int + Iqmp *big.Int + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type openSSHEd25519PrivateKey struct { + Pub []byte + Priv []byte + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type openSSHECDSAPrivateKey struct { + Curve string + Pub []byte + D *big.Int + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// parseOpenSSHPrivateKey parses an OpenSSH private key, using the decrypt +// function to unwrap the encrypted portion. unencryptedOpenSSHKey can be used +// as the decrypt function to parse an unencrypted private key. See +// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key. +func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { + if len(key) < len(privateKeyAuthMagic) || string(key[:len(privateKeyAuthMagic)]) != privateKeyAuthMagic { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key format") + } + remaining := key[len(privateKeyAuthMagic):] + + var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(remaining, &w); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if w.NumKeys != 1 { + // We only support single key files, and so does OpenSSH. + // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/4103a3ec7/sshkey.c#L4171 + return nil, errors.New("ssh: multi-key files are not supported") + } + + privKeyBlock, err := decrypt(w.CipherName, w.KdfName, w.KdfOpts, w.PrivKeyBlock) + if err != nil { + if err, ok := err.(*PassphraseMissingError); ok { + pub, errPub := ParsePublicKey(w.PubKey) + if errPub != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: failed to parse embedded public key: %v", errPub) + } + err.PublicKey = pub + } + return nil, err + } + + var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(privKeyBlock, &pk1); err != nil || pk1.Check1 != pk1.Check2 { + if w.CipherName != "none" { + return nil, x509.IncorrectPasswordError + } + return nil, errors.New("ssh: malformed OpenSSH key") + } + + switch pk1.Keytype { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + var key openSSHRSAPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk := &rsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{ + N: key.N, + E: int(key.E.Int64()), + }, + D: key.D, + Primes: []*big.Int{key.P, key.Q}, + } + + if err := pk.Validate(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk.Precompute() + + return pk, nil + case KeyAlgoED25519: + var key openSSHEd25519PrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(key.Priv) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: private key unexpected length") + } + + if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk := ed25519.PrivateKey(make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize)) + copy(pk, key.Priv) + return &pk, nil + case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: + var key openSSHECDSAPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var curve elliptic.Curve + switch key.Curve { + case "nistp256": + curve = elliptic.P256() + case "nistp384": + curve = elliptic.P384() + case "nistp521": + curve = elliptic.P521() + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled elliptic curve: " + key.Curve) + } + + X, Y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, key.Pub) + if X == nil || Y == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: failed to unmarshal public key") + } + + if key.D.Cmp(curve.Params().N) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: scalar is out of range") + } + + x, y := curve.ScalarBaseMult(key.D.Bytes()) + if x.Cmp(X) != 0 || y.Cmp(Y) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: public key does not match private key") + } + + return &ecdsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: ecdsa.PublicKey{ + Curve: curve, + X: X, + Y: Y, + }, + D: key.D, + }, nil + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled key type") + } +} + +func marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, encrypt openSSHEncryptFunc) (*pem.Block, error) { + var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey + var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey + + // Random check bytes. + var check uint32 + if err := binary.Read(rand.Reader, binary.BigEndian, &check); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk1.Check1 = check + pk1.Check2 = check + w.NumKeys = 1 + + // Use a []byte directly on ed25519 keys. + if k, ok := key.(*ed25519.PrivateKey); ok { + key = *k + } + + switch k := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + E := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(k.PublicKey.E)) + // Marshal public key: + // E and N are in reversed order in the public and private key. + pubKey := struct { + KeyType string + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + }{ + KeyAlgoRSA, + E, k.PublicKey.N, + } + w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) + + // Marshal private key. + key := openSSHRSAPrivateKey{ + N: k.PublicKey.N, + E: E, + D: k.D, + Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv, + P: k.Primes[0], + Q: k.Primes[1], + Comment: comment, + } + pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoRSA + pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) + case ed25519.PrivateKey: + pub := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize) + priv := make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize) + copy(pub, k[32:]) + copy(priv, k) + + // Marshal public key. + pubKey := struct { + KeyType string + Pub []byte + }{ + KeyAlgoED25519, pub, + } + w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) + + // Marshal private key. + key := openSSHEd25519PrivateKey{ + Pub: pub, + Priv: priv, + Comment: comment, + } + pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoED25519 + pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + var curve, keyType string + switch name := k.Curve.Params().Name; name { + case "P-256": + curve = "nistp256" + keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA256 + case "P-384": + curve = "nistp384" + keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA384 + case "P-521": + curve = "nistp521" + keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA521 + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled elliptic curve " + name) + } + + pub := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.PublicKey.X, k.PublicKey.Y) + + // Marshal public key. + pubKey := struct { + KeyType string + Curve string + Pub []byte + }{ + keyType, curve, pub, + } + w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) + + // Marshal private key. + key := openSSHECDSAPrivateKey{ + Curve: curve, + Pub: pub, + D: k.D, + Comment: comment, + } + pk1.Keytype = keyType + pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", k) + } + + var err error + // Add padding and encrypt the key if necessary. + w.PrivKeyBlock, w.CipherName, w.KdfName, w.KdfOpts, err = encrypt(Marshal(pk1)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + b := Marshal(w) + block := &pem.Block{ + Type: "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY", + Bytes: append([]byte(privateKeyAuthMagic), b...), + } + return block, nil +} + +func checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(pad []byte) error { + for i, b := range pad { + if int(b) != i+1 { + return errors.New("ssh: padding not as expected") + } + } + return nil +} + +func generateOpenSSHPadding(block []byte, blockSize int) []byte { + for i, l := 0, len(block); (l+i)%blockSize != 0; i++ { + block = append(block, byte(i+1)) + } + return block +} + +// FingerprintLegacyMD5 returns the user presentation of the key's +// fingerprint as described by RFC 4716 section 4. +func FingerprintLegacyMD5(pubKey PublicKey) string { + md5sum := md5.Sum(pubKey.Marshal()) + hexarray := make([]string, len(md5sum)) + for i, c := range md5sum { + hexarray[i] = hex.EncodeToString([]byte{c}) + } + return strings.Join(hexarray, ":") +} + +// FingerprintSHA256 returns the user presentation of the key's +// fingerprint as unpadded base64 encoded sha256 hash. +// This format was introduced from OpenSSH 6.8. +// https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648#section-3.2 (unpadded base64 encoding) +func FingerprintSHA256(pubKey PublicKey) string { + sha256sum := sha256.Sum256(pubKey.Marshal()) + hash := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(sha256sum[:]) + return "SHA256:" + hash +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..87d626fb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +// Message authentication support + +import ( + "crypto/fips140" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/sha512" + "hash" + "slices" +) + +type macMode struct { + keySize int + etm bool + new func(key []byte) hash.Hash +} + +// truncatingMAC wraps around a hash.Hash and truncates the output digest to +// a given size. +type truncatingMAC struct { + length int + hmac hash.Hash +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { + return t.hmac.Write(data) +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + out := t.hmac.Sum(in) + return out[:len(in)+t.length] +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Reset() { + t.hmac.Reset() +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int { + return t.length +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() } + +// macModes defines the supported MACs. MACs not included are not supported +// and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly configured. When FIPS mode is +// enabled, only FIPS-approved algorithms are included. +var macModes = map[string]*macMode{} + +func init() { + macModes[HMACSHA512ETM] = &macMode{64, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha512.New, key) + }} + macModes[HMACSHA256ETM] = &macMode{32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) + }} + macModes[HMACSHA512] = &macMode{64, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha512.New, key) + }} + macModes[HMACSHA256] = &macMode{32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) + }} + + if fips140.Enabled() { + defaultMACs = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultMACs, func(algo string) bool { + _, ok := macModes[algo] + return !ok + }) + return + } + + macModes[HMACSHA1] = &macMode{20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha1.New, key) + }} + macModes[InsecureHMACSHA196] = &macMode{20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return truncatingMAC{12, hmac.New(sha1.New, key)} + }} +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..251b9d06 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go @@ -0,0 +1,893 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "reflect" + "strconv" + "strings" +) + +// These are SSH message type numbers. They are scattered around several +// documents but many were taken from [SSH-PARAMETERS]. +const ( + msgIgnore = 2 + msgUnimplemented = 3 + msgDebug = 4 + msgNewKeys = 21 +) + +// SSH messages: +// +// These structures mirror the wire format of the corresponding SSH messages. +// They are marshaled using reflection with the marshal and unmarshal functions +// in this file. The only wrinkle is that a final member of type []byte with a +// ssh tag of "rest" receives the remainder of a packet when unmarshaling. + +// See RFC 4253, section 11.1. +const msgDisconnect = 1 + +// disconnectMsg is the message that signals a disconnect. It is also +// the error type returned from mux.Wait() +type disconnectMsg struct { + Reason uint32 `sshtype:"1"` + Message string + Language string +} + +func (d *disconnectMsg) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: disconnect, reason %d: %s", d.Reason, d.Message) +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 7.1. +const msgKexInit = 20 + +type kexInitMsg struct { + Cookie [16]byte `sshtype:"20"` + KexAlgos []string + ServerHostKeyAlgos []string + CiphersClientServer []string + CiphersServerClient []string + MACsClientServer []string + MACsServerClient []string + CompressionClientServer []string + CompressionServerClient []string + LanguagesClientServer []string + LanguagesServerClient []string + FirstKexFollows bool + Reserved uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 8. + +// Diffie-Hellman +const msgKexDHInit = 30 + +type kexDHInitMsg struct { + X *big.Int `sshtype:"30"` +} + +const msgKexECDHInit = 30 + +type kexECDHInitMsg struct { + ClientPubKey []byte `sshtype:"30"` +} + +const msgKexECDHReply = 31 + +type kexECDHReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` + EphemeralPubKey []byte + Signature []byte +} + +const msgKexDHReply = 31 + +type kexDHReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` + Y *big.Int + Signature []byte +} + +// See RFC 4419, section 5. +const msgKexDHGexGroup = 31 + +type kexDHGexGroupMsg struct { + P *big.Int `sshtype:"31"` + G *big.Int +} + +const msgKexDHGexInit = 32 + +type kexDHGexInitMsg struct { + X *big.Int `sshtype:"32"` +} + +const msgKexDHGexReply = 33 + +type kexDHGexReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"33"` + Y *big.Int + Signature []byte +} + +const msgKexDHGexRequest = 34 + +type kexDHGexRequestMsg struct { + MinBits uint32 `sshtype:"34"` + PreferredBits uint32 + MaxBits uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 10. +const msgServiceRequest = 5 + +type serviceRequestMsg struct { + Service string `sshtype:"5"` +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 10. +const msgServiceAccept = 6 + +type serviceAcceptMsg struct { + Service string `sshtype:"6"` +} + +// See RFC 8308, section 2.3 +const msgExtInfo = 7 + +type extInfoMsg struct { + NumExtensions uint32 `sshtype:"7"` + Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5. +const msgUserAuthRequest = 50 + +type userAuthRequestMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// Used for debug printouts of packets. +type userAuthSuccessMsg struct { +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 +const msgUserAuthFailure = 51 + +type userAuthFailureMsg struct { + Methods []string `sshtype:"51"` + PartialSuccess bool +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 +const msgUserAuthSuccess = 52 + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.4 +const msgUserAuthBanner = 53 + +type userAuthBannerMsg struct { + Message string `sshtype:"53"` + // unused, but required to allow message parsing + Language string +} + +// See RFC 4256, section 3.2 +const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60 +const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61 + +type userAuthInfoRequestMsg struct { + Name string `sshtype:"60"` + Instruction string + Language string + NumPrompts uint32 + Prompts []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpen = 90 + +type channelOpenMsg struct { + ChanType string `sshtype:"90"` + PeersID uint32 + PeersWindow uint32 + MaxPacketSize uint32 + TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +const msgChannelExtendedData = 95 +const msgChannelData = 94 + +// Used for debug print outs of packets. +type channelDataMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"94"` + Length uint32 + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpenConfirm = 91 + +type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"91"` + MyID uint32 + MyWindow uint32 + MaxPacketSize uint32 + TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpenFailure = 92 + +type channelOpenFailureMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"92"` + Reason RejectionReason + Message string + Language string +} + +const msgChannelRequest = 98 + +type channelRequestMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"98"` + Request string + WantReply bool + RequestSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. +const msgChannelSuccess = 99 + +type channelRequestSuccessMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"99"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. +const msgChannelFailure = 100 + +type channelRequestFailureMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"100"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 +const msgChannelClose = 97 + +type channelCloseMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"97"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 +const msgChannelEOF = 96 + +type channelEOFMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"96"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgGlobalRequest = 80 + +type globalRequestMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"80"` + WantReply bool + Data []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgRequestSuccess = 81 + +type globalRequestSuccessMsg struct { + Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"81"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgRequestFailure = 82 + +type globalRequestFailureMsg struct { + Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"82"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.2 +const msgChannelWindowAdjust = 93 + +type windowAdjustMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"93"` + AdditionalBytes uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 7 +const msgUserAuthPubKeyOk = 60 + +type userAuthPubKeyOkMsg struct { + Algo string `sshtype:"60"` + PubKey []byte +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIResponse = 60 + +type userAuthGSSAPIResponse struct { + SupportMech []byte `sshtype:"60"` +} + +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken = 61 + +type userAuthGSSAPIToken struct { + Token []byte `sshtype:"61"` +} + +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC = 66 + +type userAuthGSSAPIMIC struct { + MIC []byte `sshtype:"66"` +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3.9 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok = 64 + +type userAuthGSSAPIErrTok struct { + ErrorToken []byte `sshtype:"64"` +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3.8 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIError = 65 + +type userAuthGSSAPIError struct { + MajorStatus uint32 `sshtype:"65"` + MinorStatus uint32 + Message string + LanguageTag string +} + +// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9 +const msgPing = 192 + +type pingMsg struct { + Data string `sshtype:"192"` +} + +// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9 +const msgPong = 193 + +type pongMsg struct { + Data string `sshtype:"193"` +} + +// typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which +// should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character. +func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) { + tagStr := structType.Field(0).Tag.Get("sshtype") + + for _, tag := range strings.Split(tagStr, "|") { + i, err := strconv.Atoi(tag) + if err == nil { + tags = append(tags, byte(i)) + } + } + + return tags +} + +func fieldError(t reflect.Type, field int, problem string) error { + if problem != "" { + problem = ": " + problem + } + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unmarshal error for field %s of type %s%s", t.Field(field).Name, t.Name(), problem) +} + +var errShortRead = errors.New("ssh: short read") + +// Unmarshal parses data in SSH wire format into a structure. The out +// argument should be a pointer to struct. If the first member of the +// struct has the "sshtype" tag set to a '|'-separated set of numbers +// in decimal, the packet must start with one of those numbers. In +// case of error, Unmarshal returns a ParseError or +// UnexpectedMessageError. +func Unmarshal(data []byte, out interface{}) error { + v := reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem() + structType := v.Type() + expectedTypes := typeTags(structType) + + var expectedType byte + if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { + expectedType = expectedTypes[0] + } + + if len(data) == 0 { + return parseError(expectedType) + } + + if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { + goodType := false + for _, e := range expectedTypes { + if e > 0 && data[0] == e { + goodType = true + break + } + } + if !goodType { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected one of %v)", data[0], expectedTypes) + } + data = data[1:] + } + + var ok bool + for i := 0; i < v.NumField(); i++ { + field := v.Field(i) + t := field.Type() + switch t.Kind() { + case reflect.Bool: + if len(data) < 1 { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetBool(data[0] != 0) + data = data[1:] + case reflect.Array: + if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { + return fieldError(structType, i, "array of unsupported type") + } + if len(data) < t.Len() { + return errShortRead + } + for j, n := 0, t.Len(); j < n; j++ { + field.Index(j).Set(reflect.ValueOf(data[j])) + } + data = data[t.Len():] + case reflect.Uint64: + var u64 uint64 + if u64, data, ok = parseUint64(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(u64) + case reflect.Uint32: + var u32 uint32 + if u32, data, ok = parseUint32(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(uint64(u32)) + case reflect.Uint8: + if len(data) < 1 { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(uint64(data[0])) + data = data[1:] + case reflect.String: + var s []byte + if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { + return fieldError(structType, i, "") + } + field.SetString(string(s)) + case reflect.Slice: + switch t.Elem().Kind() { + case reflect.Uint8: + if structType.Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") == "rest" { + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(data)) + data = nil + } else { + var s []byte + if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(s)) + } + case reflect.String: + var nl []string + if nl, data, ok = parseNameList(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(nl)) + default: + return fieldError(structType, i, "slice of unsupported type") + } + case reflect.Ptr: + if t == bigIntType { + var n *big.Int + if n, data, ok = parseInt(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(n)) + } else { + return fieldError(structType, i, "pointer to unsupported type") + } + default: + return fieldError(structType, i, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported type: %v", t)) + } + } + + if len(data) != 0 { + return parseError(expectedType) + } + + return nil +} + +// Marshal serializes the message in msg to SSH wire format. The msg +// argument should be a struct or pointer to struct. If the first +// member has the "sshtype" tag set to a number in decimal, that +// number is prepended to the result. If the last of member has the +// "ssh" tag set to "rest", its contents are appended to the output. +func Marshal(msg interface{}) []byte { + out := make([]byte, 0, 64) + return marshalStruct(out, msg) +} + +func marshalStruct(out []byte, msg interface{}) []byte { + v := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(msg)) + msgTypes := typeTags(v.Type()) + if len(msgTypes) > 0 { + out = append(out, msgTypes[0]) + } + + for i, n := 0, v.NumField(); i < n; i++ { + field := v.Field(i) + switch t := field.Type(); t.Kind() { + case reflect.Bool: + var v uint8 + if field.Bool() { + v = 1 + } + out = append(out, v) + case reflect.Array: + if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("array of non-uint8 in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + for j, l := 0, t.Len(); j < l; j++ { + out = append(out, uint8(field.Index(j).Uint())) + } + case reflect.Uint32: + out = appendU32(out, uint32(field.Uint())) + case reflect.Uint64: + out = appendU64(out, uint64(field.Uint())) + case reflect.Uint8: + out = append(out, uint8(field.Uint())) + case reflect.String: + s := field.String() + out = appendInt(out, len(s)) + out = append(out, s...) + case reflect.Slice: + switch t.Elem().Kind() { + case reflect.Uint8: + if v.Type().Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") != "rest" { + out = appendInt(out, field.Len()) + } + out = append(out, field.Bytes()...) + case reflect.String: + offset := len(out) + out = appendU32(out, 0) + if n := field.Len(); n > 0 { + for j := 0; j < n; j++ { + f := field.Index(j) + if j != 0 { + out = append(out, ',') + } + out = append(out, f.String()...) + } + // overwrite length value + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[offset:], uint32(len(out)-offset-4)) + } + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("slice of unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + case reflect.Ptr: + if t == bigIntType { + var n *big.Int + nValue := reflect.ValueOf(&n) + nValue.Elem().Set(field) + needed := intLength(n) + oldLength := len(out) + + if cap(out)-len(out) < needed { + newOut := make([]byte, len(out), 2*(len(out)+needed)) + copy(newOut, out) + out = newOut + } + out = out[:oldLength+needed] + marshalInt(out[oldLength:], n) + } else { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("pointer to unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + } + } + + return out +} + +var bigOne = big.NewInt(1) + +func parseString(in []byte) (out, rest []byte, ok bool) { + if len(in) < 4 { + return + } + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in) + in = in[4:] + if uint32(len(in)) < length { + return + } + out = in[:length] + rest = in[length:] + ok = true + return +} + +var ( + comma = []byte{','} + emptyNameList = []string{} +) + +func parseNameList(in []byte) (out []string, rest []byte, ok bool) { + contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + if len(contents) == 0 { + out = emptyNameList + return + } + parts := bytes.Split(contents, comma) + out = make([]string, len(parts)) + for i, part := range parts { + out[i] = string(part) + } + return +} + +func parseInt(in []byte) (out *big.Int, rest []byte, ok bool) { + contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + out = new(big.Int) + + if len(contents) > 0 && contents[0]&0x80 == 0x80 { + // This is a negative number + notBytes := make([]byte, len(contents)) + for i := range notBytes { + notBytes[i] = ^contents[i] + } + out.SetBytes(notBytes) + out.Add(out, bigOne) + out.Neg(out) + } else { + // Positive number + out.SetBytes(contents) + } + ok = true + return +} + +func parseUint32(in []byte) (uint32, []byte, bool) { + if len(in) < 4 { + return 0, nil, false + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in), in[4:], true +} + +func parseUint64(in []byte) (uint64, []byte, bool) { + if len(in) < 8 { + return 0, nil, false + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(in), in[8:], true +} + +func intLength(n *big.Int) int { + length := 4 /* length bytes */ + if n.Sign() < 0 { + nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) + nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) + bitLen := nMinus1.BitLen() + if bitLen%8 == 0 { + // The number will need 0xff padding + length++ + } + length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 + } else if n.Sign() == 0 { + // A zero is the zero length string + } else { + bitLen := n.BitLen() + if bitLen%8 == 0 { + // The number will need 0x00 padding + length++ + } + length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 + } + + return length +} + +func marshalUint32(to []byte, n uint32) []byte { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(to, n) + return to[4:] +} + +func marshalUint64(to []byte, n uint64) []byte { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(to, n) + return to[8:] +} + +func marshalInt(to []byte, n *big.Int) []byte { + lengthBytes := to + to = to[4:] + length := 0 + + if n.Sign() < 0 { + // A negative number has to be converted to two's-complement + // form. So we'll subtract 1 and invert. If the + // most-significant-bit isn't set then we'll need to pad the + // beginning with 0xff in order to keep the number negative. + nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) + nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) + bytes := nMinus1.Bytes() + for i := range bytes { + bytes[i] ^= 0xff + } + if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 { + to[0] = 0xff + to = to[1:] + length++ + } + nBytes := copy(to, bytes) + to = to[nBytes:] + length += nBytes + } else if n.Sign() == 0 { + // A zero is the zero length string + } else { + bytes := n.Bytes() + if len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 { + // We'll have to pad this with a 0x00 in order to + // stop it looking like a negative number. + to[0] = 0 + to = to[1:] + length++ + } + nBytes := copy(to, bytes) + to = to[nBytes:] + length += nBytes + } + + lengthBytes[0] = byte(length >> 24) + lengthBytes[1] = byte(length >> 16) + lengthBytes[2] = byte(length >> 8) + lengthBytes[3] = byte(length) + return to +} + +func writeInt(w io.Writer, n *big.Int) { + length := intLength(n) + buf := make([]byte, length) + marshalInt(buf, n) + w.Write(buf) +} + +func writeString(w io.Writer, s []byte) { + var lengthBytes [4]byte + lengthBytes[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) + lengthBytes[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) + lengthBytes[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) + lengthBytes[3] = byte(len(s)) + w.Write(lengthBytes[:]) + w.Write(s) +} + +func stringLength(n int) int { + return 4 + n +} + +func marshalString(to []byte, s []byte) []byte { + to[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) + to[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) + to[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) + to[3] = byte(len(s)) + to = to[4:] + copy(to, s) + return to[len(s):] +} + +var bigIntType = reflect.TypeOf((*big.Int)(nil)) + +// Decode a packet into its corresponding message. +func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) { + var msg interface{} + switch packet[0] { + case msgDisconnect: + msg = new(disconnectMsg) + case msgServiceRequest: + msg = new(serviceRequestMsg) + case msgServiceAccept: + msg = new(serviceAcceptMsg) + case msgExtInfo: + msg = new(extInfoMsg) + case msgKexInit: + msg = new(kexInitMsg) + case msgKexDHInit: + msg = new(kexDHInitMsg) + case msgKexDHReply: + msg = new(kexDHReplyMsg) + case msgUserAuthRequest: + msg = new(userAuthRequestMsg) + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return new(userAuthSuccessMsg), nil + case msgUserAuthFailure: + msg = new(userAuthFailureMsg) + case msgUserAuthBanner: + msg = new(userAuthBannerMsg) + case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: + msg = new(userAuthPubKeyOkMsg) + case msgGlobalRequest: + msg = new(globalRequestMsg) + case msgRequestSuccess: + msg = new(globalRequestSuccessMsg) + case msgRequestFailure: + msg = new(globalRequestFailureMsg) + case msgChannelOpen: + msg = new(channelOpenMsg) + case msgChannelData: + msg = new(channelDataMsg) + case msgChannelOpenConfirm: + msg = new(channelOpenConfirmMsg) + case msgChannelOpenFailure: + msg = new(channelOpenFailureMsg) + case msgChannelWindowAdjust: + msg = new(windowAdjustMsg) + case msgChannelEOF: + msg = new(channelEOFMsg) + case msgChannelClose: + msg = new(channelCloseMsg) + case msgChannelRequest: + msg = new(channelRequestMsg) + case msgChannelSuccess: + msg = new(channelRequestSuccessMsg) + case msgChannelFailure: + msg = new(channelRequestFailureMsg) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIToken) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIMIC) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIErrTok) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIError) + default: + return nil, unexpectedMessageError(0, packet[0]) + } + if err := Unmarshal(packet, msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return msg, nil +} + +var packetTypeNames = map[byte]string{ + msgDisconnect: "disconnectMsg", + msgServiceRequest: "serviceRequestMsg", + msgServiceAccept: "serviceAcceptMsg", + msgExtInfo: "extInfoMsg", + msgKexInit: "kexInitMsg", + msgKexDHInit: "kexDHInitMsg", + msgKexDHReply: "kexDHReplyMsg", + msgUserAuthRequest: "userAuthRequestMsg", + msgUserAuthSuccess: "userAuthSuccessMsg", + msgUserAuthFailure: "userAuthFailureMsg", + msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: "userAuthPubKeyOkMsg", + msgGlobalRequest: "globalRequestMsg", + msgRequestSuccess: "globalRequestSuccessMsg", + msgRequestFailure: "globalRequestFailureMsg", + msgChannelOpen: "channelOpenMsg", + msgChannelData: "channelDataMsg", + msgChannelOpenConfirm: "channelOpenConfirmMsg", + msgChannelOpenFailure: "channelOpenFailureMsg", + msgChannelWindowAdjust: "windowAdjustMsg", + msgChannelEOF: "channelEOFMsg", + msgChannelClose: "channelCloseMsg", + msgChannelRequest: "channelRequestMsg", + msgChannelSuccess: "channelRequestSuccessMsg", + msgChannelFailure: "channelRequestFailureMsg", +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mlkem.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mlkem.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ddc0ed1f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mlkem.go @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/mlkem" + "crypto/sha256" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" +) + +// mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256 implements the hybrid ML-KEM768 with +// curve25519-sha256 key exchange method, as described by +// draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-05 section 2.3.3. +type mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256 struct{} + +func (kex *mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + var c25519kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := c25519kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + seed := make([]byte, mlkem.SeedSize) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, seed); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + mlkemDk, err := mlkem.NewDecapsulationKey768(seed) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hybridKey := append(mlkemDk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), c25519kp.pub[:]...) + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexECDHInitMsg{hybridKey})); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var reply kexECDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(reply.EphemeralPubKey) != mlkem.CiphertextSize768+32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's mlkem768x25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + // Perform KEM decapsulate operation to obtain shared key from ML-KEM. + mlkem768Secret, err := mlkemDk.Decapsulate(reply.EphemeralPubKey[:mlkem.CiphertextSize768]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Complete Curve25519 ECDH to obtain its shared key. + c25519Secret, err := curve25519.X25519(c25519kp.priv[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey[mlkem.CiphertextSize768:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: peer's mlkem768x25519 public value is not valid: %w", err) + } + // Compute actual shared key. + h := sha256.New() + h.Write(mlkem768Secret) + h.Write(c25519Secret) + secret := h.Sum(nil) + + h.Reset() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, reply.HostKey) + writeString(h, hybridKey) + writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + + K := make([]byte, stringLength(len(secret))) + marshalString(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: reply.Signature, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} + +func (kex *mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (*kexResult, error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexInit kexECDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexInit); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(kexInit.ClientPubKey) != mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768+32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's ML-KEM768/curve25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + encapsulationKey, err := mlkem.NewEncapsulationKey768(kexInit.ClientPubKey[:mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768]) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: peer's ML-KEM768 encapsulation key is not valid: %w", err) + } + // Perform KEM encapsulate operation to obtain ciphertext and shared key. + mlkem768Secret, mlkem768Ciphertext := encapsulationKey.Encapsulate() + + // Perform server side of Curve25519 ECDH to obtain server public value and + // shared key. + var c25519kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := c25519kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c25519Secret, err := curve25519.X25519(c25519kp.priv[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey[mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: peer's ML-KEM768/curve25519 public value is not valid: %w", err) + } + hybridKey := append(mlkem768Ciphertext, c25519kp.pub[:]...) + + // Compute actual shared key. + h := sha256.New() + h.Write(mlkem768Secret) + h.Write(c25519Secret) + secret := h.Sum(nil) + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h.Reset() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, hybridKey) + + K := make([]byte, stringLength(len(secret))) + marshalString(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ + EphemeralPubKey: hybridKey, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&reply)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2d24c63 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" +) + +// debugMux, if set, causes messages in the connection protocol to be +// logged. +const debugMux = false + +// chanList is a thread safe channel list. +type chanList struct { + // protects concurrent access to chans + sync.Mutex + + // chans are indexed by the local id of the channel, which the + // other side should send in the PeersId field. + chans []*channel + + // This is a debugging aid: it offsets all IDs by this + // amount. This helps distinguish otherwise identical + // server/client muxes + offset uint32 +} + +// Assigns a channel ID to the given channel. +func (c *chanList) add(ch *channel) uint32 { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + for i := range c.chans { + if c.chans[i] == nil { + c.chans[i] = ch + return uint32(i) + c.offset + } + } + c.chans = append(c.chans, ch) + return uint32(len(c.chans)-1) + c.offset +} + +// getChan returns the channel for the given ID. +func (c *chanList) getChan(id uint32) *channel { + id -= c.offset + + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { + return c.chans[id] + } + return nil +} + +func (c *chanList) remove(id uint32) { + id -= c.offset + c.Lock() + if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { + c.chans[id] = nil + } + c.Unlock() +} + +// dropAll forgets all channels it knows, returning them in a slice. +func (c *chanList) dropAll() []*channel { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + var r []*channel + + for _, ch := range c.chans { + if ch == nil { + continue + } + r = append(r, ch) + } + c.chans = nil + return r +} + +// mux represents the state for the SSH connection protocol, which +// multiplexes many channels onto a single packet transport. +type mux struct { + conn packetConn + chanList chanList + + incomingChannels chan NewChannel + + globalSentMu sync.Mutex + globalResponses chan interface{} + incomingRequests chan *Request + + errCond *sync.Cond + err error +} + +// When debugging, each new chanList instantiation has a different +// offset. +var globalOff uint32 + +func (m *mux) Wait() error { + m.errCond.L.Lock() + defer m.errCond.L.Unlock() + for m.err == nil { + m.errCond.Wait() + } + return m.err +} + +// newMux returns a mux that runs over the given connection. +func newMux(p packetConn) *mux { + m := &mux{ + conn: p, + incomingChannels: make(chan NewChannel, chanSize), + globalResponses: make(chan interface{}, 1), + incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), + errCond: newCond(), + } + if debugMux { + m.chanList.offset = atomic.AddUint32(&globalOff, 1) + } + + go m.loop() + return m +} + +func (m *mux) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { + p := Marshal(msg) + if debugMux { + log.Printf("send global(%d): %#v", m.chanList.offset, msg) + } + return m.conn.writePacket(p) +} + +func (m *mux) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) { + if wantReply { + m.globalSentMu.Lock() + defer m.globalSentMu.Unlock() + } + + if err := m.sendMessage(globalRequestMsg{ + Type: name, + WantReply: wantReply, + Data: payload, + }); err != nil { + return false, nil, err + } + + if !wantReply { + return false, nil, nil + } + + msg, ok := <-m.globalResponses + if !ok { + return false, nil, io.EOF + } + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *globalRequestFailureMsg: + return false, msg.Data, nil + case *globalRequestSuccessMsg: + return true, msg.Data, nil + default: + return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to request: %#v", msg) + } +} + +// ackRequest must be called after processing a global request that +// has WantReply set. +func (m *mux) ackRequest(ok bool, data []byte) error { + if ok { + return m.sendMessage(globalRequestSuccessMsg{Data: data}) + } + return m.sendMessage(globalRequestFailureMsg{Data: data}) +} + +func (m *mux) Close() error { + return m.conn.Close() +} + +// loop runs the connection machine. It will process packets until an +// error is encountered. To synchronize on loop exit, use mux.Wait. +func (m *mux) loop() { + var err error + for err == nil { + err = m.onePacket() + } + + for _, ch := range m.chanList.dropAll() { + ch.close() + } + + close(m.incomingChannels) + close(m.incomingRequests) + close(m.globalResponses) + + m.conn.Close() + + m.errCond.L.Lock() + m.err = err + m.errCond.Broadcast() + m.errCond.L.Unlock() + + if debugMux { + log.Println("loop exit", err) + } +} + +// onePacket reads and processes one packet. +func (m *mux) onePacket() error { + packet, err := m.conn.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if debugMux { + if packet[0] == msgChannelData || packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { + log.Printf("decoding(%d): data packet - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, len(packet)) + } else { + p, _ := decode(packet) + log.Printf("decoding(%d): %d %#v - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, packet[0], p, len(packet)) + } + } + + switch packet[0] { + case msgChannelOpen: + return m.handleChannelOpen(packet) + case msgGlobalRequest, msgRequestSuccess, msgRequestFailure: + return m.handleGlobalPacket(packet) + case msgPing: + var msg pingMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal ping@openssh.com message: %w", err) + } + return m.sendMessage(pongMsg(msg)) + } + + // assume a channel packet. + if len(packet) < 5 { + return parseError(packet[0]) + } + id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[1:]) + ch := m.chanList.getChan(id) + if ch == nil { + return m.handleUnknownChannelPacket(id, packet) + } + + return ch.handlePacket(packet) +} + +func (m *mux) handleGlobalPacket(packet []byte) error { + msg, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *globalRequestMsg: + m.incomingRequests <- &Request{ + Type: msg.Type, + WantReply: msg.WantReply, + Payload: msg.Data, + mux: m, + } + case *globalRequestSuccessMsg, *globalRequestFailureMsg: + m.globalResponses <- msg + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("not a global message %#v", msg)) + } + + return nil +} + +// handleChannelOpen schedules a channel to be Accept()ed. +func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error { + var msg channelOpenMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return err + } + + if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { + failMsg := channelOpenFailureMsg{ + PeersID: msg.PeersID, + Reason: ConnectionFailed, + Message: "invalid request", + Language: "en_US.UTF-8", + } + return m.sendMessage(failMsg) + } + + c := m.newChannel(msg.ChanType, channelInbound, msg.TypeSpecificData) + c.remoteId = msg.PeersID + c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize + c.remoteWin.add(msg.PeersWindow) + m.incomingChannels <- c + return nil +} + +func (m *mux) OpenChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { + ch, err := m.openChannel(chanType, extra) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil +} + +func (m *mux) openChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (*channel, error) { + ch := m.newChannel(chanType, channelOutbound, extra) + + ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket + + open := channelOpenMsg{ + ChanType: chanType, + PeersWindow: ch.myWindow, + MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, + TypeSpecificData: extra, + PeersID: ch.localId, + } + if err := m.sendMessage(open); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch msg := (<-ch.msg).(type) { + case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: + return ch, nil + case *channelOpenFailureMsg: + return nil, &OpenChannelError{msg.Reason, msg.Message} + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected packet in response to channel open: %T", msg) + } +} + +func (m *mux) handleUnknownChannelPacket(id uint32, packet []byte) error { + msg, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := msg.(type) { + // RFC 4254 section 5.4 says unrecognized channel requests should + // receive a failure response. + case *channelRequestMsg: + if msg.WantReply { + return m.sendMessage(channelRequestFailureMsg{ + PeersID: msg.PeersID, + }) + } + return nil + default: + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid channel %d", id) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..064dcbaf --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go @@ -0,0 +1,955 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "slices" + "strings" +) + +// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are +// specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user. +// The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is +// available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from +// the user-authentication phase to the application layer. +type Permissions struct { + // CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default + // permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with + // user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates + // defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to + // execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from + // the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces + // the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server + // implementations to enforce other critical options, such as + // "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake + // is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject + // connections that specify critical options that are unknown + // or not supported. + CriticalOptions map[string]string + + // Extensions are extra functionality that the server may + // offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an + // extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common + // extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding", + // "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does + // not act on any extension, and it is up to server + // implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to + // pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server + // application layer. + Extensions map[string]string + + // ExtraData allows to store user defined data. + ExtraData map[any]any +} + +type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct { + // AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic + // authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the + // results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN. + // GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions. + // This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with + // which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error. + AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error) + + // Server must be set. It's the implementation + // of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details. + Server GSSAPIServer +} + +// SendAuthBanner implements [ServerPreAuthConn]. +func (s *connection) SendAuthBanner(msg string) error { + return s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthBannerMsg{ + Message: msg, + })) +} + +func (*connection) unexportedMethodForFutureProofing() {} + +// ServerPreAuthConn is the interface available on an incoming server +// connection before authentication has completed. +type ServerPreAuthConn interface { + unexportedMethodForFutureProofing() // permits growing ServerPreAuthConn safely later, ala testing.TB + + ConnMetadata + + // SendAuthBanner sends a banner message to the client. + // It returns an error once the authentication phase has ended. + SendAuthBanner(string) error +} + +// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data. +type ServerConfig struct { + // Config contains configuration shared between client and server. + Config + + // PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms specifies the supported client public key + // authentication algorithms. Note that this should not include certificate + // types since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the + // client if it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant. + // If unspecified then a default set of algorithms is used. + PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string + + hostKeys []Signer + + // NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without + // authenticating. + // To determine NoClientAuth at runtime, set NoClientAuth to true + // and the optional NoClientAuthCallback to a non-nil value. + NoClientAuth bool + + // NoClientAuthCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user + // attempts to authenticate with auth method "none". + // NoClientAuth must also be set to true for this be used, or + // this func is unused. + NoClientAuthCallback func(ConnMetadata) (*Permissions, error) + + // MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts + // permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of + // attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited + // to 6. + MaxAuthTries int + + // PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user + // attempts to authenticate using a password. + PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) + + // PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client + // offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error + // if the given public key can be used to authenticate the + // given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A + // call to this function does not guarantee that the key + // offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data + // depending on the public key, store it inside a + // Permissions.Extensions entry. + PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) + + // VerifiedPublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called after a client + // successfully confirms having control over a key that was previously + // approved by PublicKeyCallback. The permissions object passed to the + // callback is the one returned by PublicKeyCallback for the given public + // key and its ownership is transferred to the callback. The returned + // Permissions object can be the same object, optionally modified, or a + // completely new object. If VerifiedPublicKeyCallback is non-nil, + // PublicKeyCallback is not allowed to return a PartialSuccessError, which + // can instead be returned by VerifiedPublicKeyCallback. + // + // VerifiedPublicKeyCallback does not affect which authentication methods + // are included in the list of methods that can be attempted by the client. + VerifiedPublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, + signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) + + // KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when + // keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC + // 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be + // used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple + // Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client + // should be presented a challenge even if the user is + // unknown. + KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error) + + // AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication + // attempts. + AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error) + + // PreAuthConnCallback, if non-nil, is called upon receiving a new connection + // before any authentication has started. The provided ServerPreAuthConn + // can be used at any time before authentication is complete, including + // after this callback has returned. + PreAuthConnCallback func(ServerPreAuthConn) + + // ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in + // the public handshake. + // If empty, a reasonable default is used. + // Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with + // "SSH-2.0-". + ServerVersion string + + // BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to + // the client after key exchange completed but before authentication. + BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string + + // GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used + // when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). + GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig +} + +// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host +// key exists with the same public key format, it is replaced. Each server +// config must have at least one host key. +func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) { + for i, k := range s.hostKeys { + if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() { + s.hostKeys[i] = key + return + } + } + + s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key) +} + +// cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is +// acceptable for a user. This is a FIFO cache. +type cachedPubKey struct { + user string + pubKeyData []byte + result error + perms *Permissions +} + +// maxCachedPubKeys is the number of cache entries we store. +// +// Due to consistent misuse of the PublicKeyCallback API, we have reduced this +// to 1, such that the only key in the cache is the most recently seen one. This +// forces the behavior that the last call to PublicKeyCallback will always be +// with the key that is used for authentication. +const maxCachedPubKeys = 1 + +// pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients +// will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to +// authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public +// key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn. +type pubKeyCache struct { + keys []cachedPubKey +} + +// get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple. +func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) { + for _, k := range c.keys { + if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) { + return k, true + } + } + return cachedPubKey{}, false +} + +// add adds the given tuple to the cache. +func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) { + if len(c.keys) >= maxCachedPubKeys { + c.keys = c.keys[1:] + } + c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate) +} + +// ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the +// server +type ServerConn struct { + Conn + + // If the succeeding authentication callback returned a + // non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here. + Permissions *Permissions +} + +// NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying +// transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is +// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The +// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection +// will hang. +// +// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for +// authentication errors. +func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { + fullConf := *config + fullConf.SetDefaults() + if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 { + fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6 + } + if len(fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms) == 0 { + fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos + } else { + for _, algo := range fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms { + if !slices.Contains(SupportedAlgorithms().PublicKeyAuths, algo) && !slices.Contains(InsecureAlgorithms().PublicKeyAuths, algo) { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported public key authentication algorithm %s", algo) + } + } + } + + s := &connection{ + sshConn: sshConn{conn: c}, + } + perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf) + if err != nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, err + } + return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil +} + +// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm, +// and serializes the result in SSH wire format. algo is the negotiate +// algorithm and may be a certificate type. +func signAndMarshal(k AlgorithmSigner, rand io.Reader, data []byte, algo string) ([]byte, error) { + sig, err := k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return Marshal(sig), nil +} + +// handshake performs key exchange and user authentication. +func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { + if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys") + } + + if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && + config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil || + config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") + } + + if config.ServerVersion != "" { + s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion) + } else { + s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion) + } + var err error + s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */) + s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config) + + if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // We just did the key change, so the session ID is established. + s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID() + s.algorithms = s.transport.getAlgorithms() + + var packet []byte + if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating") + } + serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{ + Service: serviceUserAuth, + } + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + s.mux = newMux(s.transport) + return perms, err +} + +func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error { + if addr == nil { + return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required") + } + + tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr) + } + + for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") { + if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil { + if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) { + return nil + } + } else { + _, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err) + } + + if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) { + return nil + } + } + } + + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr) +} + +func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, token []byte, s *connection, + sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) { + gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server + defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext() + var srcName string + for { + var ( + outToken []byte + needContinue bool + ) + outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(token) + if err != nil { + return err, nil, nil + } + if len(outToken) != 0 { + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ + Token: outToken, + })); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + } + if !needContinue { + break + } + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token + } + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method) + if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil { + return err, nil, nil + } + perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName) + return authErr, perms, nil +} + +// isAlgoCompatible checks if the signature format is compatible with the +// selected algorithm taking into account edge cases that occur with old +// clients. +func isAlgoCompatible(algo, sigFormat string) bool { + // Compatibility for old clients. + // + // For certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 signature format can + // be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 for the algorithm + // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com. + // + // With gpg-agent < 2.2.6 the algorithm can be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 + // for signature format ssh-rsa. + if isRSA(algo) && isRSA(sigFormat) { + return true + } + // Standard case: the underlying algorithm must match the signature format. + return underlyingAlgo(algo) == sigFormat +} + +// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is +// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication +// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication +// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate. +type ServerAuthError struct { + // Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication + // callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth. + Errors []error +} + +func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string { + var errs []string + for _, err := range l.Errors { + errs = append(errs, err.Error()) + } + return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]" +} + +// ServerAuthCallbacks defines server-side authentication callbacks. +type ServerAuthCallbacks struct { + // PasswordCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PasswordCallback]. + PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) + + // PublicKeyCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback]. + PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) + + // KeyboardInteractiveCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback]. + KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error) + + // GSSAPIWithMICConfig behaves like [ServerConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig]. + GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig +} + +// PartialSuccessError can be returned by any of the [ServerConfig] +// authentication callbacks to indicate to the client that authentication has +// partially succeeded, but further steps are required. +type PartialSuccessError struct { + // Next defines the authentication callbacks to apply to further steps. The + // available methods communicated to the client are based on the non-nil + // ServerAuthCallbacks fields. + Next ServerAuthCallbacks +} + +func (p *PartialSuccessError) Error() string { + return "ssh: authenticated with partial success" +} + +// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no +// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal +// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries +// 'none' authentication to discover available methods. +// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn. +var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet") + +// BannerError is an error that can be returned by authentication handlers in +// ServerConfig to send a banner message to the client. +type BannerError struct { + Err error + Message string +} + +func (b *BannerError) Unwrap() error { + return b.Err +} + +func (b *BannerError) Error() string { + if b.Err == nil { + return b.Message + } + return b.Err.Error() +} + +func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { + if config.PreAuthConnCallback != nil { + config.PreAuthConnCallback(s) + } + + sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID() + var cache pubKeyCache + var perms *Permissions + + authFailures := 0 + noneAuthCount := 0 + var authErrs []error + var calledBannerCallback bool + partialSuccessReturned := false + // Set the initial authentication callbacks from the config. They can be + // changed if a PartialSuccessError is returned. + authConfig := ServerAuthCallbacks{ + PasswordCallback: config.PasswordCallback, + PublicKeyCallback: config.PublicKeyCallback, + KeyboardInteractiveCallback: config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback, + GSSAPIWithMICConfig: config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig, + } + +userAuthLoop: + for { + if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 { + discMsg := &disconnectMsg{ + Reason: 2, + Message: "too many authentication failures", + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + authErrs = append(authErrs, discMsg) + return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} + } + + var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg + if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { + if err == io.EOF { + return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} + } + return nil, err + } else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service) + } + + if s.user != userAuthReq.User && partialSuccessReturned { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: client changed the user after a partial success authentication, previous user %q, current user %q", + s.user, userAuthReq.User) + } + + s.user = userAuthReq.User + + if !calledBannerCallback && config.BannerCallback != nil { + calledBannerCallback = true + if msg := config.BannerCallback(s); msg != "" { + if err := s.SendAuthBanner(msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + } + + perms = nil + authErr := ErrNoAuth + + switch userAuthReq.Method { + case "none": + noneAuthCount++ + // We don't allow none authentication after a partial success + // response. + if config.NoClientAuth && !partialSuccessReturned { + if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil { + perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s) + } else { + authErr = nil + } + } + case "password": + if authConfig.PasswordCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured") + break + } + payload := userAuthReq.Payload + if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + payload = payload[1:] + password, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + perms, authErr = authConfig.PasswordCallback(s, password) + case "keyboard-interactive": + if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured") + break + } + + prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s} + perms, authErr = authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge) + case "publickey": + if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured") + break + } + payload := userAuthReq.Payload + if len(payload) < 1 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + isQuery := payload[0] == 0 + payload = payload[1:] + algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + algo := string(algoBytes) + if !slices.Contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo) + break + } + + pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData) + if !ok { + candidate.user = s.user + candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData + candidate.perms, candidate.result = authConfig.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey) + _, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError) + if isPartialSuccessError && config.VerifiedPublicKeyCallback != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid library usage: PublicKeyCallback must not return partial success when VerifiedPublicKeyCallback is defined") + } + + if (candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError) && + candidate.perms != nil && + candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && + candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" { + if err := checkSourceAddress( + s.RemoteAddr(), + candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]); err != nil { + candidate.result = err + } + } + cache.add(candidate) + } + + if isQuery { + // The client can query if the given public key + // would be okay. + + if len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + _, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError) + if candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError { + okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{ + Algo: algo, + PubKey: pubKeyData, + } + if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + continue userAuthLoop + } + authErr = candidate.result + } else { + sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload) + if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + // Ensure the declared public key algo is compatible with the + // decoded one. This check will ensure we don't accept e.g. + // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public + // key type. The algorithm and public key type must be + // consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither. + if !slices.Contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", + pubKey.Type(), algo) + break + } + // Ensure the public key algo and signature algo + // are supported. Compare the private key + // algorithm name that corresponds to algo with + // sig.Format. This is usually the same, but + // for certs, the names differ. + if !slices.Contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format) + break + } + if !isAlgoCompatible(algo, sig.Format) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo) + break + } + + signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData) + + if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + authErr = candidate.result + perms = candidate.perms + if authErr == nil && config.VerifiedPublicKeyCallback != nil { + // Only call VerifiedPublicKeyCallback after the key has been accepted + // and successfully verified. If authErr is non-nil, the key is not + // considered verified and the callback must not run. + perms, authErr = config.VerifiedPublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey, perms, algo) + } + } + case "gssapi-with-mic": + if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured") + break + } + gssapiConfig := authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig + userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication. + if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported") + break + } + var i uint32 + present := false + for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ { + if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) { + present = true + break + } + } + if !present { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism") + break + } + // Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3. + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{ + SupportMech: krb5OID, + })); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4. + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID, + userAuthReq) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + default: + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method) + } + + authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr) + + if config.AuthLogCallback != nil { + config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr) + } + + var bannerErr *BannerError + if errors.As(authErr, &bannerErr) { + if bannerErr.Message != "" { + if err := s.SendAuthBanner(bannerErr.Message); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + } + + if authErr == nil { + break userAuthLoop + } + + var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg + + if partialSuccess, ok := authErr.(*PartialSuccessError); ok { + // After a partial success error we don't allow changing the user + // name and execute the NoClientAuthCallback. + partialSuccessReturned = true + + // In case a partial success is returned, the server may send + // a new set of authentication methods. + authConfig = partialSuccess.Next + + // Reset pubkey cache, as the new PublicKeyCallback might + // accept a different set of public keys. + cache = pubKeyCache{} + + // Send back a partial success message to the user. + failureMsg.PartialSuccess = true + } else { + // Allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty. + if authFailures > 0 || userAuthReq.Method != "none" || noneAuthCount != 1 { + authFailures++ + } + if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries { + // If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the + // final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are + // no more authentication methods which can be attempted, + // and this message may cause the client to re-attempt + // authentication while we send the disconnect message. + // Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of + // the loop. + // + // The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this, + // RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure + // be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE + // message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect + // after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which + // message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure + // message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to + // disconnect, should we only send that message.) + // + // Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last + // failed authentication attempt, and given they are typically + // considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable + // to match that behavior. + continue + } + } + + if authConfig.PasswordCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password") + } + if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey") + } + if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive") + } + if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil && + authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic") + } + + if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods available") + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return perms, nil +} + +// sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by +// asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn. +type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct { + *connection +} + +func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) { + if len(questions) != len(echos) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length") + } + + var prompts []byte + for i := range questions { + prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i]) + prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i]) + } + + if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{ + Name: name, + Instruction: instruction, + NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)), + Prompts: prompts, + })); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse { + return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0]) + } + packet = packet[1:] + + n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet) + if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) + } + + for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ { + ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) + } + + answers = append(answers, string(ans)) + packet = rest + } + if len(packet) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message") + } + + return answers, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..acef6225 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go @@ -0,0 +1,647 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +// Session implements an interactive session described in +// "RFC 4254, section 6". + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "sync" +) + +type Signal string + +// POSIX signals as listed in RFC 4254 Section 6.10. +const ( + SIGABRT Signal = "ABRT" + SIGALRM Signal = "ALRM" + SIGFPE Signal = "FPE" + SIGHUP Signal = "HUP" + SIGILL Signal = "ILL" + SIGINT Signal = "INT" + SIGKILL Signal = "KILL" + SIGPIPE Signal = "PIPE" + SIGQUIT Signal = "QUIT" + SIGSEGV Signal = "SEGV" + SIGTERM Signal = "TERM" + SIGUSR1 Signal = "USR1" + SIGUSR2 Signal = "USR2" +) + +var signals = map[Signal]int{ + SIGABRT: 6, + SIGALRM: 14, + SIGFPE: 8, + SIGHUP: 1, + SIGILL: 4, + SIGINT: 2, + SIGKILL: 9, + SIGPIPE: 13, + SIGQUIT: 3, + SIGSEGV: 11, + SIGTERM: 15, +} + +type TerminalModes map[uint8]uint32 + +// POSIX terminal mode flags as listed in RFC 4254 Section 8. +const ( + tty_OP_END = 0 + VINTR = 1 + VQUIT = 2 + VERASE = 3 + VKILL = 4 + VEOF = 5 + VEOL = 6 + VEOL2 = 7 + VSTART = 8 + VSTOP = 9 + VSUSP = 10 + VDSUSP = 11 + VREPRINT = 12 + VWERASE = 13 + VLNEXT = 14 + VFLUSH = 15 + VSWTCH = 16 + VSTATUS = 17 + VDISCARD = 18 + IGNPAR = 30 + PARMRK = 31 + INPCK = 32 + ISTRIP = 33 + INLCR = 34 + IGNCR = 35 + ICRNL = 36 + IUCLC = 37 + IXON = 38 + IXANY = 39 + IXOFF = 40 + IMAXBEL = 41 + IUTF8 = 42 // RFC 8160 + ISIG = 50 + ICANON = 51 + XCASE = 52 + ECHO = 53 + ECHOE = 54 + ECHOK = 55 + ECHONL = 56 + NOFLSH = 57 + TOSTOP = 58 + IEXTEN = 59 + ECHOCTL = 60 + ECHOKE = 61 + PENDIN = 62 + OPOST = 70 + OLCUC = 71 + ONLCR = 72 + OCRNL = 73 + ONOCR = 74 + ONLRET = 75 + CS7 = 90 + CS8 = 91 + PARENB = 92 + PARODD = 93 + TTY_OP_ISPEED = 128 + TTY_OP_OSPEED = 129 +) + +// A Session represents a connection to a remote command or shell. +type Session struct { + // Stdin specifies the remote process's standard input. + // If Stdin is nil, the remote process reads from an empty + // bytes.Buffer. + Stdin io.Reader + + // Stdout and Stderr specify the remote process's standard + // output and error. + // + // If either is nil, Run connects the corresponding file + // descriptor to an instance of io.Discard. There is a + // fixed amount of buffering that is shared for the two streams. + // If either blocks it may eventually cause the remote + // command to block. + Stdout io.Writer + Stderr io.Writer + + ch Channel // the channel backing this session + started bool // true once Start, Run or Shell is invoked. + copyFuncs []func() error + errors chan error // one send per copyFunc + + // true if pipe method is active + stdinpipe, stdoutpipe, stderrpipe bool + + // stdinPipeWriter is non-nil if StdinPipe has not been called + // and Stdin was specified by the user; it is the write end of + // a pipe connecting Session.Stdin to the stdin channel. + stdinPipeWriter io.WriteCloser + + exitStatus chan error +} + +// SendRequest sends an out-of-band channel request on the SSH channel +// underlying the session. +func (s *Session) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { + return s.ch.SendRequest(name, wantReply, payload) +} + +func (s *Session) Close() error { + return s.ch.Close() +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.4. +type setenvRequest struct { + Name string + Value string +} + +// Setenv sets an environment variable that will be applied to any +// command executed by Shell or Run. +func (s *Session) Setenv(name, value string) error { + msg := setenvRequest{ + Name: name, + Value: value, + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("env", true, Marshal(&msg)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: setenv failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.2. +type ptyRequestMsg struct { + Term string + Columns uint32 + Rows uint32 + Width uint32 + Height uint32 + Modelist string +} + +// RequestPty requests the association of a pty with the session on the remote host. +func (s *Session) RequestPty(term string, h, w int, termmodes TerminalModes) error { + var tm []byte + for k, v := range termmodes { + kv := struct { + Key byte + Val uint32 + }{k, v} + + tm = append(tm, Marshal(&kv)...) + } + tm = append(tm, tty_OP_END) + req := ptyRequestMsg{ + Term: term, + Columns: uint32(w), + Rows: uint32(h), + Width: uint32(w * 8), + Height: uint32(h * 8), + Modelist: string(tm), + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("pty-req", true, Marshal(&req)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: pty-req failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. +type subsystemRequestMsg struct { + Subsystem string +} + +// RequestSubsystem requests the association of a subsystem with the session on the remote host. +// A subsystem is a predefined command that runs in the background when the ssh session is initiated +func (s *Session) RequestSubsystem(subsystem string) error { + msg := subsystemRequestMsg{ + Subsystem: subsystem, + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("subsystem", true, Marshal(&msg)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: subsystem request failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.7. +type ptyWindowChangeMsg struct { + Columns uint32 + Rows uint32 + Width uint32 + Height uint32 +} + +// WindowChange informs the remote host about a terminal window dimension change to h rows and w columns. +func (s *Session) WindowChange(h, w int) error { + req := ptyWindowChangeMsg{ + Columns: uint32(w), + Rows: uint32(h), + Width: uint32(w * 8), + Height: uint32(h * 8), + } + _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("window-change", false, Marshal(&req)) + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.9. +type signalMsg struct { + Signal string +} + +// Signal sends the given signal to the remote process. +// sig is one of the SIG* constants. +func (s *Session) Signal(sig Signal) error { + msg := signalMsg{ + Signal: string(sig), + } + + _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("signal", false, Marshal(&msg)) + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. +type execMsg struct { + Command string +} + +// Start runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote +// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. +// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start or Shell. +func (s *Session) Start(cmd string) error { + if s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session already started") + } + req := execMsg{ + Command: cmd, + } + + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("exec", true, Marshal(&req)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: command %v failed", cmd) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.start() +} + +// Run runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote +// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. +// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, +// or CombinedOutput. +// +// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems +// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit +// status. +// +// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type +// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes +// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type +// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. +func (s *Session) Run(cmd string) error { + err := s.Start(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.Wait() +} + +// Output runs cmd on the remote host and returns its standard output. +func (s *Session) Output(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + var b bytes.Buffer + s.Stdout = &b + err := s.Run(cmd) + return b.Bytes(), err +} + +type singleWriter struct { + b bytes.Buffer + mu sync.Mutex +} + +func (w *singleWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + return w.b.Write(p) +} + +// CombinedOutput runs cmd on the remote host and returns its combined +// standard output and standard error. +func (s *Session) CombinedOutput(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + if s.Stderr != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") + } + var b singleWriter + s.Stdout = &b + s.Stderr = &b + err := s.Run(cmd) + return b.b.Bytes(), err +} + +// Shell starts a login shell on the remote host. A Session only +// accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, or CombinedOutput. +func (s *Session) Shell() error { + if s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session already started") + } + + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("shell", true, nil) + if err == nil && !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: could not start shell") + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.start() +} + +func (s *Session) start() error { + s.started = true + + type F func(*Session) + for _, setupFd := range []F{(*Session).stdin, (*Session).stdout, (*Session).stderr} { + setupFd(s) + } + + s.errors = make(chan error, len(s.copyFuncs)) + for _, fn := range s.copyFuncs { + go func(fn func() error) { + s.errors <- fn() + }(fn) + } + return nil +} + +// Wait waits for the remote command to exit. +// +// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems +// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit +// status. +// +// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type +// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes +// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type +// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. +func (s *Session) Wait() error { + if !s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session not started") + } + waitErr := <-s.exitStatus + + if s.stdinPipeWriter != nil { + s.stdinPipeWriter.Close() + } + var copyError error + for range s.copyFuncs { + if err := <-s.errors; err != nil && copyError == nil { + copyError = err + } + } + if waitErr != nil { + return waitErr + } + return copyError +} + +func (s *Session) wait(reqs <-chan *Request) error { + wm := Waitmsg{status: -1} + // Wait for msg channel to be closed before returning. + for msg := range reqs { + switch msg.Type { + case "exit-status": + wm.status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg.Payload)) + case "exit-signal": + var sigval struct { + Signal string + CoreDumped bool + Error string + Lang string + } + if err := Unmarshal(msg.Payload, &sigval); err != nil { + return err + } + + // Must sanitize strings? + wm.signal = sigval.Signal + wm.msg = sigval.Error + wm.lang = sigval.Lang + default: + // This handles keepalives and matches + // OpenSSH's behaviour. + if msg.WantReply { + msg.Reply(false, nil) + } + } + } + if wm.status == 0 { + return nil + } + if wm.status == -1 { + // exit-status was never sent from server + if wm.signal == "" { + // signal was not sent either. RFC 4254 + // section 6.10 recommends against this + // behavior, but it is allowed, so we let + // clients handle it. + return &ExitMissingError{} + } + wm.status = 128 + if _, ok := signals[Signal(wm.signal)]; ok { + wm.status += signals[Signal(wm.signal)] + } + } + + return &ExitError{wm} +} + +// ExitMissingError is returned if a session is torn down cleanly, but +// the server sends no confirmation of the exit status. +type ExitMissingError struct{} + +func (e *ExitMissingError) Error() string { + return "wait: remote command exited without exit status or exit signal" +} + +func (s *Session) stdin() { + if s.stdinpipe { + return + } + var stdin io.Reader + if s.Stdin == nil { + stdin = new(bytes.Buffer) + } else { + r, w := io.Pipe() + go func() { + _, err := io.Copy(w, s.Stdin) + w.CloseWithError(err) + }() + stdin, s.stdinPipeWriter = r, w + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.ch, stdin) + if err1 := s.ch.CloseWrite(); err == nil && err1 != io.EOF { + err = err1 + } + return err + }) +} + +func (s *Session) stdout() { + if s.stdoutpipe { + return + } + if s.Stdout == nil { + s.Stdout = io.Discard + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.Stdout, s.ch) + return err + }) +} + +func (s *Session) stderr() { + if s.stderrpipe { + return + } + if s.Stderr == nil { + s.Stderr = io.Discard + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.Stderr, s.ch.Stderr()) + return err + }) +} + +// sessionStdin reroutes Close to CloseWrite. +type sessionStdin struct { + io.Writer + ch Channel +} + +func (s *sessionStdin) Close() error { + return s.ch.CloseWrite() +} + +// StdinPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard input when the command starts. +func (s *Session) StdinPipe() (io.WriteCloser, error) { + if s.Stdin != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdin already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdinPipe after process started") + } + s.stdinpipe = true + return &sessionStdin{s.ch, s.ch}, nil +} + +// StdoutPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard output when the command starts. +// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between +// stdout and stderr streams. If the StdoutPipe reader is +// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the +// remote command to block. +func (s *Session) StdoutPipe() (io.Reader, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdoutPipe after process started") + } + s.stdoutpipe = true + return s.ch, nil +} + +// StderrPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard error when the command starts. +// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between +// stdout and stderr streams. If the StderrPipe reader is +// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the +// remote command to block. +func (s *Session) StderrPipe() (io.Reader, error) { + if s.Stderr != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StderrPipe after process started") + } + s.stderrpipe = true + return s.ch.Stderr(), nil +} + +// newSession returns a new interactive session on the remote host. +func newSession(ch Channel, reqs <-chan *Request) (*Session, error) { + s := &Session{ + ch: ch, + } + s.exitStatus = make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + s.exitStatus <- s.wait(reqs) + }() + + return s, nil +} + +// An ExitError reports unsuccessful completion of a remote command. +type ExitError struct { + Waitmsg +} + +func (e *ExitError) Error() string { + return e.Waitmsg.String() +} + +// Waitmsg stores the information about an exited remote command +// as reported by Wait. +type Waitmsg struct { + status int + signal string + msg string + lang string +} + +// ExitStatus returns the exit status of the remote command. +func (w Waitmsg) ExitStatus() int { + return w.status +} + +// Signal returns the exit signal of the remote command if +// it was terminated violently. +func (w Waitmsg) Signal() string { + return w.signal +} + +// Msg returns the exit message given by the remote command +func (w Waitmsg) Msg() string { + return w.msg +} + +// Lang returns the language tag. See RFC 3066 +func (w Waitmsg) Lang() string { + return w.lang +} + +func (w Waitmsg) String() string { + str := fmt.Sprintf("Process exited with status %v", w.status) + if w.signal != "" { + str += fmt.Sprintf(" from signal %v", w.signal) + } + if w.msg != "" { + str += fmt.Sprintf(". Reason was: %v", w.msg) + } + return str +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24bd7c8e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" +) + +var krb5OID []byte + +func init() { + krb5OID, _ = asn1.Marshal(krb5Mesh) +} + +// GSSAPIClient provides the API to plug-in GSSAPI authentication for client logins. +type GSSAPIClient interface { + // InitSecContext initiates the establishment of a security context for GSS-API between the + // ssh client and ssh server. Initially the token parameter should be specified as nil. + // The routine may return a outputToken which should be transferred to + // the ssh server, where the ssh server will present it to + // AcceptSecContext. If no token need be sent, InitSecContext will indicate this by setting + // needContinue to false. To complete the context + // establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the ssh + // server;if so, InitSecContext will return a needContinue which is true. + // In this case, InitSecContext should be called again when the + // reply token is received from the ssh server, passing the reply + // token to InitSecContext via the token parameters. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.1 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. + InitSecContext(target string, token []byte, isGSSDelegCreds bool) (outputToken []byte, needContinue bool, err error) + // GetMIC generates a cryptographic MIC for the SSH2 message, and places + // the MIC in a token for transfer to the ssh server. + // The contents of the MIC field are obtained by calling GSS_GetMIC() + // over the following, using the GSS-API context that was just + // established: + // string session identifier + // byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST + // string user name + // string service + // string "gssapi-with-mic" + // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.1 and RFC 4462 3.5. + GetMIC(micFiled []byte) ([]byte, error) + // Whenever possible, it should be possible for + // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even + // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + // resources to be released. + // In addition to deleting established security contexts, + // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" + // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. + DeleteSecContext() error +} + +// GSSAPIServer provides the API to plug in GSSAPI authentication for server logins. +type GSSAPIServer interface { + // AcceptSecContext allows a remotely initiated security context between the application + // and a remote peer to be established by the ssh client. The routine may return a + // outputToken which should be transferred to the ssh client, + // where the ssh client will present it to InitSecContext. + // If no token need be sent, AcceptSecContext will indicate this + // by setting the needContinue to false. To + // complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + // required from the ssh client. if so, AcceptSecContext + // will return a needContinue which is true, in which case it + // should be called again when the reply token is received from the ssh + // client, passing the token to AcceptSecContext via the + // token parameters. + // The srcName return value is the authenticated username. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.2 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. + AcceptSecContext(token []byte) (outputToken []byte, srcName string, needContinue bool, err error) + // VerifyMIC verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, + // fits the supplied message is received from the ssh client. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.2. + VerifyMIC(micField []byte, micToken []byte) error + // Whenever possible, it should be possible for + // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even + // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + // resources to be released. + // In addition to deleting established security contexts, + // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" + // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. + DeleteSecContext() error +} + +var ( + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication, + // so we also support the krb5 mechanism only. + // See RFC 1964 section 1. + krb5Mesh = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2} +) + +// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST +// See RFC 4462 section 3.2. +type userAuthRequestGSSAPI struct { + N uint32 + OIDS []asn1.ObjectIdentifier +} + +func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) { + n, rest, ok := parseUint32(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed") + } + s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{ + N: n, + OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n), + } + for i := 0; i < int(n); i++ { + var ( + desiredMech []byte + err error + ) + desiredMech, rest, ok = parseString(rest) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("parse string failed") + } + if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + } + return s, nil +} + +// See RFC 4462 section 3.6. +func buildMIC(sessionID string, username string, service string, authMethod string) []byte { + out := make([]byte, 0, 0) + out = appendString(out, sessionID) + out = append(out, msgUserAuthRequest) + out = appendString(out, username) + out = appendString(out, service) + out = appendString(out, authMethod) + return out +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b171b330 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +package ssh + +import ( + "errors" + "io" + "net" +) + +// streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message +// with "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. +// +// See openssh-portable/PROTOCOL, section 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding +// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL#L235 +type streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg struct { + socketPath string + reserved0 string + reserved1 uint32 +} + +// forwardedStreamLocalPayload is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message +// with "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. +type forwardedStreamLocalPayload struct { + SocketPath string + Reserved0 string +} + +// streamLocalChannelForwardMsg is a struct used for SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message +// with "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"/"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" string. +type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct { + socketPath string +} + +// ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket. +func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) + m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ + socketPath, + } + // send message + ok, _, err := c.SendRequest("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: streamlocal-forward@openssh.com request denied by peer") + } + ch := c.forwards.add(&net.UnixAddr{Name: socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + + return &unixListener{socketPath, c, ch}, nil +} + +func (c *Client) dialStreamLocal(socketPath string) (Channel, error) { + msg := streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg{ + socketPath: socketPath, + } + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", Marshal(&msg)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(in) + return ch, err +} + +type unixListener struct { + socketPath string + + conn *Client + in <-chan forward +} + +// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. +func (l *unixListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { + s, ok := <-l.in + if !ok { + return nil, io.EOF + } + ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(incoming) + + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: l.socketPath, + Net: "unix", + }, + raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + }, + }, nil +} + +// Close closes the listener. +func (l *unixListener) Close() error { + // this also closes the listener. + l.conn.forwards.remove(&net.UnixAddr{Name: l.socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ + l.socketPath, + } + ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com failed") + } + return err +} + +// Addr returns the listener's network address. +func (l *unixListener) Addr() net.Addr { + return &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: l.socketPath, + Net: "unix", + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93d844f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/rand" + "net" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Listen requests the remote peer open a listening socket on +// addr. Incoming connections will be available by calling Accept on +// the returned net.Listener. The listener must be serviced, or the +// SSH connection may hang. +// N must be "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6", or "unix". +func (c *Client) Listen(n, addr string) (net.Listener, error) { + switch n { + case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": + laddr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr(n, addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return c.ListenTCP(laddr) + case "unix": + return c.ListenUnix(addr) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) + } +} + +// Automatic port allocation is broken with OpenSSH before 6.0. See +// also https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2017. In +// particular, OpenSSH 5.9 sends a channelOpenMsg with port number 0, +// rather than the actual port number. This means you can never open +// two different listeners with auto allocated ports. We work around +// this by trying explicit ports until we succeed. + +const openSSHPrefix = "OpenSSH_" + +var portRandomizer = rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())) + +// isBrokenOpenSSHVersion returns true if the given version string +// specifies a version of OpenSSH that is known to have a bug in port +// forwarding. +func isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(versionStr string) bool { + i := strings.Index(versionStr, openSSHPrefix) + if i < 0 { + return false + } + i += len(openSSHPrefix) + j := i + for ; j < len(versionStr); j++ { + if versionStr[j] < '0' || versionStr[j] > '9' { + break + } + } + version, _ := strconv.Atoi(versionStr[i:j]) + return version < 6 +} + +// autoPortListenWorkaround simulates automatic port allocation by +// trying random ports repeatedly. +func (c *Client) autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { + var sshListener net.Listener + var err error + const tries = 10 + for i := 0; i < tries; i++ { + addr := *laddr + addr.Port = 1024 + portRandomizer.Intn(60000) + sshListener, err = c.ListenTCP(&addr) + if err == nil { + laddr.Port = addr.Port + return sshListener, err + } + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: listen on random port failed after %d tries: %v", tries, err) +} + +// RFC 4254 7.1 +type channelForwardMsg struct { + addr string + rport uint32 +} + +// handleForwards starts goroutines handling forwarded connections. +// It's called on first use by (*Client).ListenTCP to not launch +// goroutines until needed. +func (c *Client) handleForwards() { + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip")) + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com")) +} + +// ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket +// on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling +// Accept on the returned net.Listener. +func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) + if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) { + return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr) + } + + m := channelForwardMsg{ + laddr.IP.String(), + uint32(laddr.Port), + } + // send message + ok, resp, err := c.SendRequest("tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: tcpip-forward request denied by peer") + } + + // If the original port was 0, then the remote side will + // supply a real port number in the response. + if laddr.Port == 0 { + var p struct { + Port uint32 + } + if err := Unmarshal(resp, &p); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + laddr.Port = int(p.Port) + } + + // Register this forward, using the port number we obtained. + ch := c.forwards.add(laddr) + + return &tcpListener{laddr, c, ch}, nil +} + +// forwardList stores a mapping between remote +// forward requests and the tcpListeners. +type forwardList struct { + sync.Mutex + entries []forwardEntry +} + +// forwardEntry represents an established mapping of a laddr on a +// remote ssh server to a channel connected to a tcpListener. +type forwardEntry struct { + laddr net.Addr + c chan forward +} + +// forward represents an incoming forwarded tcpip connection. The +// arguments to add/remove/lookup should be address as specified in +// the original forward-request. +type forward struct { + newCh NewChannel // the ssh client channel underlying this forward + raddr net.Addr // the raddr of the incoming connection +} + +func (l *forwardList) add(addr net.Addr) chan forward { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + f := forwardEntry{ + laddr: addr, + c: make(chan forward, 1), + } + l.entries = append(l.entries, f) + return f.c +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 7.2 +type forwardedTCPPayload struct { + Addr string + Port uint32 + OriginAddr string + OriginPort uint32 +} + +// parseTCPAddr parses the originating address from the remote into a *net.TCPAddr. +func parseTCPAddr(addr string, port uint32) (*net.TCPAddr, error) { + if port == 0 || port > 65535 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: port number out of range: %d", port) + } + ip := net.ParseIP(string(addr)) + if ip == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot parse IP address %q", addr) + } + return &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: int(port)}, nil +} + +func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) { + for ch := range in { + var ( + laddr net.Addr + raddr net.Addr + err error + ) + switch channelType := ch.ChannelType(); channelType { + case "forwarded-tcpip": + var payload forwardedTCPPayload + if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-tcpip payload: "+err.Error()) + continue + } + + // RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming + // addresses should list the address, in string + // format. It is implied that this should be an IP + // address, as it would be impossible to connect to it + // otherwise. + laddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.Addr, payload.Port) + if err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) + continue + } + raddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.OriginAddr, payload.OriginPort) + if err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) + continue + } + + case "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com": + var payload forwardedStreamLocalPayload + if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com payload: "+err.Error()) + continue + } + laddr = &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: payload.SocketPath, + Net: "unix", + } + raddr = &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + } + default: + panic(fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown channel type %s", channelType)) + } + if ok := l.forward(laddr, raddr, ch); !ok { + // Section 7.2, implementations MUST reject spurious incoming + // connections. + ch.Reject(Prohibited, "no forward for address") + continue + } + + } +} + +// remove removes the forward entry, and the channel feeding its +// listener. +func (l *forwardList) remove(addr net.Addr) { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for i, f := range l.entries { + if addr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && addr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + l.entries = append(l.entries[:i], l.entries[i+1:]...) + close(f.c) + return + } + } +} + +// closeAll closes and clears all forwards. +func (l *forwardList) closeAll() { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for _, f := range l.entries { + close(f.c) + } + l.entries = nil +} + +func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for _, f := range l.entries { + if laddr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && laddr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + f.c <- forward{newCh: ch, raddr: raddr} + return true + } + } + return false +} + +type tcpListener struct { + laddr *net.TCPAddr + + conn *Client + in <-chan forward +} + +// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. +func (l *tcpListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { + s, ok := <-l.in + if !ok { + return nil, io.EOF + } + ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(incoming) + + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: l.laddr, + raddr: s.raddr, + }, nil +} + +// Close closes the listener. +func (l *tcpListener) Close() error { + m := channelForwardMsg{ + l.laddr.IP.String(), + uint32(l.laddr.Port), + } + + // this also closes the listener. + l.conn.forwards.remove(l.laddr) + ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-tcpip-forward failed") + } + return err +} + +// Addr returns the listener's network address. +func (l *tcpListener) Addr() net.Addr { + return l.laddr +} + +// DialContext initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host. +// +// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before the +// connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully connected, +// any expiration of the context will not affect the connection. +// +// See func Dial for additional information. +func (c *Client) DialContext(ctx context.Context, n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + type connErr struct { + conn net.Conn + err error + } + ch := make(chan connErr) + go func() { + conn, err := c.Dial(n, addr) + select { + case ch <- connErr{conn, err}: + case <-ctx.Done(): + if conn != nil { + conn.Close() + } + } + }() + select { + case res := <-ch: + return res.conn, res.err + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil, ctx.Err() + } +} + +// Dial initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host. +// The resulting connection has a zero LocalAddr() and RemoteAddr(). +func (c *Client) Dial(n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + var ch Channel + switch n { + case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": + // Parse the address into host and numeric port. + host, portString, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + port, err := strconv.ParseUint(portString, 10, 16) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ch, err = c.dial(net.IPv4zero.String(), 0, host, int(port)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Use a zero address for local and remote address. + zeroAddr := &net.TCPAddr{ + IP: net.IPv4zero, + Port: 0, + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: zeroAddr, + raddr: zeroAddr, + }, nil + case "unix": + var err error + ch, err = c.dialStreamLocal(addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + }, + raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: addr, + Net: "unix", + }, + }, nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) + } +} + +// DialTCP connects to the remote address raddr on the network net, +// which must be "tcp", "tcp4", or "tcp6". If laddr is not nil, it is used +// as the local address for the connection. +func (c *Client) DialTCP(n string, laddr, raddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Conn, error) { + if laddr == nil { + laddr = &net.TCPAddr{ + IP: net.IPv4zero, + Port: 0, + } + } + ch, err := c.dial(laddr.IP.String(), laddr.Port, raddr.IP.String(), raddr.Port) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: laddr, + raddr: raddr, + }, nil +} + +// RFC 4254 7.2 +type channelOpenDirectMsg struct { + raddr string + rport uint32 + laddr string + lport uint32 +} + +func (c *Client) dial(laddr string, lport int, raddr string, rport int) (Channel, error) { + msg := channelOpenDirectMsg{ + raddr: raddr, + rport: uint32(rport), + laddr: laddr, + lport: uint32(lport), + } + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-tcpip", Marshal(&msg)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(in) + return ch, nil +} + +type tcpChan struct { + Channel // the backing channel +} + +// chanConn fulfills the net.Conn interface without +// the tcpChan having to hold laddr or raddr directly. +type chanConn struct { + Channel + laddr, raddr net.Addr +} + +// LocalAddr returns the local network address. +func (t *chanConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return t.laddr +} + +// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. +func (t *chanConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return t.raddr +} + +// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated +// with the connection. +func (t *chanConn) SetDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + if err := t.SetReadDeadline(deadline); err != nil { + return err + } + return t.SetWriteDeadline(deadline) +} + +// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline. +// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. +// After the deadline, the error from Read will implement net.Error +// with Timeout() == true. +func (t *chanConn) SetReadDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + // for compatibility with previous version, + // the error message contains "tcpChan" + return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") +} + +// SetWriteDeadline exists to satisfy the net.Conn interface +// but is not implemented by this type. It always returns an error. +func (t *chanConn) SetWriteDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fa3dd6a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go @@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bufio" + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" +) + +// debugTransport if set, will print packet types as they go over the +// wire. No message decoding is done, to minimize the impact on timing. +const debugTransport = false + +// packetConn represents a transport that implements packet based +// operations. +type packetConn interface { + // Encrypt and send a packet of data to the remote peer. + writePacket(packet []byte) error + + // Read a packet from the connection. The read is blocking, + // i.e. if error is nil, then the returned byte slice is + // always non-empty. + readPacket() ([]byte, error) + + // Close closes the write-side of the connection. + Close() error +} + +// transport is the keyingTransport that implements the SSH packet +// protocol. +type transport struct { + reader connectionState + writer connectionState + + bufReader *bufio.Reader + bufWriter *bufio.Writer + rand io.Reader + isClient bool + io.Closer + + strictMode bool + initialKEXDone bool +} + +// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC +// protocol. A single instance should be used for one direction only. +type packetCipher interface { + // writeCipherPacket encrypts the packet and writes it to w. The + // contents of the packet are generally scrambled. + writeCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error + + // readCipherPacket reads and decrypts a packet of data. The + // returned packet may be overwritten by future calls of + // readPacket. + readCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) +} + +// connectionState represents one side (read or write) of the +// connection. This is necessary because each direction has its own +// keys, and can even have its own algorithms +type connectionState struct { + packetCipher + seqNum uint32 + dir direction + pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher +} + +func (t *transport) setStrictMode() error { + if t.reader.seqNum != 1 { + return errors.New("ssh: sequence number != 1 when strict KEX mode requested") + } + t.strictMode = true + return nil +} + +func (t *transport) setInitialKEXDone() { + t.initialKEXDone = true +} + +// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in +// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet +// respectively. +func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *NegotiatedAlgorithms, kexResult *kexResult) error { + ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.Read, kexResult) + if err != nil { + return err + } + t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph + + ciph, err = newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.Write, kexResult) + if err != nil { + return err + } + t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph + + return nil +} + +func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { + if len(p) == 0 { + return + } + who := "server" + if t.isClient { + who = "client" + } + what := "read" + if write { + what = "write" + } + + log.Println(what, who, p[0]) +} + +// Read and decrypt next packet. +func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) { + for { + p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader, t.strictMode) + if err != nil { + break + } + // in strict mode we pass through DEBUG and IGNORE packets only during the initial KEX + if len(p) == 0 || (t.strictMode && !t.initialKEXDone) || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) { + break + } + } + if debugTransport { + t.printPacket(p, false) + } + + return p, err +} + +func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader, strictMode bool) ([]byte, error) { + packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r) + s.seqNum++ + if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 { + err = errors.New("ssh: zero length packet") + } + + if len(packet) > 0 { + switch packet[0] { + case msgNewKeys: + select { + case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: + s.packetCipher = cipher + if strictMode { + s.seqNum = 0 + } + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message") + } + + case msgDisconnect: + // Transform a disconnect message into an + // error. Since this is lowest level at which + // we interpret message types, doing it here + // ensures that we don't have to handle it + // elsewhere. + var msg disconnectMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return nil, &msg + } + } + + // The packet may point to an internal buffer, so copy the + // packet out here. + fresh := make([]byte, len(packet)) + copy(fresh, packet) + + return fresh, err +} + +func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error { + if debugTransport { + t.printPacket(packet, true) + } + return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet, t.strictMode) +} + +func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte, strictMode bool) error { + changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys + + err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err = w.Flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + s.seqNum++ + if changeKeys { + select { + case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: + s.packetCipher = cipher + if strictMode { + s.seqNum = 0 + } + default: + panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys") + } + } + return err +} + +func newTransport(rwc io.ReadWriteCloser, rand io.Reader, isClient bool) *transport { + t := &transport{ + bufReader: bufio.NewReader(rwc), + bufWriter: bufio.NewWriter(rwc), + rand: rand, + reader: connectionState{ + packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, + pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), + }, + writer: connectionState{ + packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, + pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), + }, + Closer: rwc, + } + t.isClient = isClient + + if isClient { + t.reader.dir = serverKeys + t.writer.dir = clientKeys + } else { + t.reader.dir = clientKeys + t.writer.dir = serverKeys + } + + return t +} + +type direction struct { + ivTag []byte + keyTag []byte + macKeyTag []byte +} + +var ( + serverKeys = direction{[]byte{'B'}, []byte{'D'}, []byte{'F'}} + clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}} +) + +// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as +// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys +// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys). +func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs DirectionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) { + cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher] + if cipherMode == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported cipher %v", algs.Cipher) + } + + iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize) + key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize) + + generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex) + generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex) + + var macKey []byte + if !aeadCiphers[algs.Cipher] { + macMode := macModes[algs.MAC] + macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize) + generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex) + } + + return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs) +} + +// generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H +// and sessionId, as specified in RFC 4253, section 7.2. +func generateKeyMaterial(out, tag []byte, r *kexResult) { + var digestsSoFar []byte + + h := r.Hash.New() + for len(out) > 0 { + h.Reset() + h.Write(r.K) + h.Write(r.H) + + if len(digestsSoFar) == 0 { + h.Write(tag) + h.Write(r.SessionID) + } else { + h.Write(digestsSoFar) + } + + digest := h.Sum(nil) + n := copy(out, digest) + out = out[n:] + if len(out) > 0 { + digestsSoFar = append(digestsSoFar, digest...) + } + } +} + +const packageVersion = "SSH-2.0-Go" + +// Sends and receives a version line. The versionLine string should +// be US ASCII, start with "SSH-2.0-", and should not include a +// newline. exchangeVersions returns the other side's version line. +func exchangeVersions(rw io.ReadWriter, versionLine []byte) (them []byte, err error) { + // Contrary to the RFC, we do not ignore lines that don't + // start with "SSH-2.0-" to make the library usable with + // nonconforming servers. + for _, c := range versionLine { + // The spec disallows non US-ASCII chars, and + // specifically forbids null chars. + if c < 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk character in version line") + } + } + if _, err = rw.Write(append(versionLine, '\r', '\n')); err != nil { + return + } + + them, err = readVersion(rw) + return them, err +} + +// maxVersionStringBytes is the maximum number of bytes that we'll +// accept as a version string. RFC 4253 section 4.2 limits this at 255 +// chars +const maxVersionStringBytes = 255 + +// Read version string as specified by RFC 4253, section 4.2. +func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + versionString := make([]byte, 0, 64) + var ok bool + var buf [1]byte + + for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ { + _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n + // but several SSH servers actually only send a \n. + if buf[0] == '\n' { + if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) { + // RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines + // except the one containing the SSH version (provided that + // all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total). + versionString = versionString[:0] + continue + } + ok = true + break + } + + // non ASCII chars are disallowed, but we are lenient, + // since Go doesn't use null-terminated strings. + + // The RFC allows a comment after a space, however, + // all of it (version and comments) goes into the + // session hash. + versionString = append(versionString, buf[0]) + } + + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: overflow reading version string") + } + + // There might be a '\r' on the end which we should remove. + if len(versionString) > 0 && versionString[len(versionString)-1] == '\r' { + versionString = versionString[:len(versionString)-1] + } + return versionString, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..269e173c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +// +// System calls for ppc64, AIX are implemented in runtime/syscall_aix.go +// + +TEXT ·syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88 + JMP syscall·syscall6(SB) + +TEXT ·rawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88 + JMP syscall·rawSyscall6(SB) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_darwin_x86_gc.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_darwin_x86_gc.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec2acfe5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_darwin_x86_gc.s @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build darwin && amd64 && gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +TEXT libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0 + JMP libc_sysctl(SB) +GLOBL ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8 +DATA ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB) + +TEXT libc_sysctlbyname_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0 + JMP libc_sysctlbyname(SB) +GLOBL ·libc_sysctlbyname_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8 +DATA ·libc_sysctlbyname_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_sysctlbyname_trampoline<>(SB) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..271055be --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "runtime" +) + +// byteOrder is a subset of encoding/binary.ByteOrder. +type byteOrder interface { + Uint32([]byte) uint32 + Uint64([]byte) uint64 +} + +type littleEndian struct{} +type bigEndian struct{} + +func (littleEndian) Uint32(b []byte) uint32 { + _ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint32(b[0]) | uint32(b[1])<<8 | uint32(b[2])<<16 | uint32(b[3])<<24 +} + +func (littleEndian) Uint64(b []byte) uint64 { + _ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint64(b[0]) | uint64(b[1])<<8 | uint64(b[2])<<16 | uint64(b[3])<<24 | + uint64(b[4])<<32 | uint64(b[5])<<40 | uint64(b[6])<<48 | uint64(b[7])<<56 +} + +func (bigEndian) Uint32(b []byte) uint32 { + _ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint32(b[3]) | uint32(b[2])<<8 | uint32(b[1])<<16 | uint32(b[0])<<24 +} + +func (bigEndian) Uint64(b []byte) uint64 { + _ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint64(b[7]) | uint64(b[6])<<8 | uint64(b[5])<<16 | uint64(b[4])<<24 | + uint64(b[3])<<32 | uint64(b[2])<<40 | uint64(b[1])<<48 | uint64(b[0])<<56 +} + +// hostByteOrder returns littleEndian on little-endian machines and +// bigEndian on big-endian machines. +func hostByteOrder() byteOrder { + switch runtime.GOARCH { + case "386", "amd64", "amd64p32", + "alpha", + "arm", "arm64", + "loong64", + "mipsle", "mips64le", "mips64p32le", + "nios2", + "ppc64le", + "riscv", "riscv64", + "sh": + return littleEndian{} + case "armbe", "arm64be", + "m68k", + "mips", "mips64", "mips64p32", + "ppc", "ppc64", + "s390", "s390x", + "shbe", + "sparc", "sparc64": + return bigEndian{} + } + panic("unknown architecture") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..63541994 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package cpu implements processor feature detection for +// various CPU architectures. +package cpu + +import ( + "os" + "strings" +) + +// Initialized reports whether the CPU features were initialized. +// +// For some GOOS/GOARCH combinations initialization of the CPU features depends +// on reading an operating specific file, e.g. /proc/self/auxv on linux/arm +// Initialized will report false if reading the file fails. +var Initialized bool + +// CacheLinePad is used to pad structs to avoid false sharing. +type CacheLinePad struct{ _ [cacheLineSize]byte } + +// X86 contains the supported CPU features of the +// current X86/AMD64 platform. If the current platform +// is not X86/AMD64 then all feature flags are false. +// +// X86 is padded to avoid false sharing. Further the HasAVX +// and HasAVX2 are only set if the OS supports XMM and YMM +// registers in addition to the CPUID feature bit being set. +var X86 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation (AES NI) + HasADX bool // Multi-precision add-carry instruction extensions + HasAVX bool // Advanced vector extension + HasAVX2 bool // Advanced vector extension 2 + HasAVX512 bool // Advanced vector extension 512 + HasAVX512F bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Foundation Instructions + HasAVX512CD bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Conflict Detection Instructions + HasAVX512ER bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Exponential and Reciprocal Instructions + HasAVX512PF bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Prefetch Instructions + HasAVX512VL bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Length Extensions + HasAVX512BW bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Byte and Word Instructions + HasAVX512DQ bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Doubleword and Quadword Instructions + HasAVX512IFMA bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Integer Fused Multiply Add + HasAVX512VBMI bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Byte Manipulation Instructions + HasAVX5124VNNIW bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Neural Network Instructions Word variable precision + HasAVX5124FMAPS bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Fused Multiply Accumulation Packed Single precision + HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Double and quad word population count instructions + HasAVX512VPCLMULQDQ bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector carry-less multiply operations + HasAVX512VNNI bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Neural Network Instructions + HasAVX512GFNI bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Galois field New Instructions + HasAVX512VAES bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector AES instructions + HasAVX512VBMI2 bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Byte Manipulation Instructions 2 + HasAVX512BITALG bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Bit Algorithms + HasAVX512BF16 bool // Advanced vector extension 512 BFloat16 Instructions + HasAMXTile bool // Advanced Matrix Extension Tile instructions + HasAMXInt8 bool // Advanced Matrix Extension Int8 instructions + HasAMXBF16 bool // Advanced Matrix Extension BFloat16 instructions + HasBMI1 bool // Bit manipulation instruction set 1 + HasBMI2 bool // Bit manipulation instruction set 2 + HasCX16 bool // Compare and exchange 16 Bytes + HasERMS bool // Enhanced REP for MOVSB and STOSB + HasFMA bool // Fused-multiply-add instructions + HasOSXSAVE bool // OS supports XSAVE/XRESTOR for saving/restoring XMM registers. + HasPCLMULQDQ bool // PCLMULQDQ instruction - most often used for AES-GCM + HasPOPCNT bool // Hamming weight instruction POPCNT. + HasRDRAND bool // RDRAND instruction (on-chip random number generator) + HasRDSEED bool // RDSEED instruction (on-chip random number generator) + HasSSE2 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 2 (always available on amd64) + HasSSE3 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 3 + HasSSSE3 bool // Supplemental streaming SIMD extension 3 + HasSSE41 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 4 and 4.1 + HasSSE42 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 4 and 4.2 + HasAVXIFMA bool // Advanced vector extension Integer Fused Multiply Add + HasAVXVNNI bool // Advanced vector extension Vector Neural Network Instructions + HasAVXVNNIInt8 bool // Advanced vector extension Vector Neural Network Int8 instructions + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// ARM64 contains the supported CPU features of the +// current ARMv8(aarch64) platform. If the current platform +// is not arm64 then all feature flags are false. +var ARM64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasFP bool // Floating-point instruction set (always available) + HasASIMD bool // Advanced SIMD (always available) + HasEVTSTRM bool // Event stream support + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation + HasPMULL bool // Polynomial multiplication instruction set + HasSHA1 bool // SHA1 hardware implementation + HasSHA2 bool // SHA2 hardware implementation + HasCRC32 bool // CRC32 hardware implementation + HasATOMICS bool // Atomic memory operation instruction set + HasFPHP bool // Half precision floating-point instruction set + HasASIMDHP bool // Advanced SIMD half precision instruction set + HasCPUID bool // CPUID identification scheme registers + HasASIMDRDM bool // Rounding double multiply add/subtract instruction set + HasJSCVT bool // Javascript conversion from floating-point to integer + HasFCMA bool // Floating-point multiplication and addition of complex numbers + HasLRCPC bool // Release Consistent processor consistent support + HasDCPOP bool // Persistent memory support + HasSHA3 bool // SHA3 hardware implementation + HasSM3 bool // SM3 hardware implementation + HasSM4 bool // SM4 hardware implementation + HasASIMDDP bool // Advanced SIMD double precision instruction set + HasSHA512 bool // SHA512 hardware implementation + HasSVE bool // Scalable Vector Extensions + HasSVE2 bool // Scalable Vector Extensions 2 + HasASIMDFHM bool // Advanced SIMD multiplication FP16 to FP32 + HasDIT bool // Data Independent Timing support + HasI8MM bool // Advanced SIMD Int8 matrix multiplication instructions + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// ARM contains the supported CPU features of the current ARM (32-bit) platform. +// All feature flags are false if: +// 1. the current platform is not arm, or +// 2. the current operating system is not Linux. +var ARM struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasSWP bool // SWP instruction support + HasHALF bool // Half-word load and store support + HasTHUMB bool // ARM Thumb instruction set + Has26BIT bool // Address space limited to 26-bits + HasFASTMUL bool // 32-bit operand, 64-bit result multiplication support + HasFPA bool // Floating point arithmetic support + HasVFP bool // Vector floating point support + HasEDSP bool // DSP Extensions support + HasJAVA bool // Java instruction set + HasIWMMXT bool // Intel Wireless MMX technology support + HasCRUNCH bool // MaverickCrunch context switching and handling + HasTHUMBEE bool // Thumb EE instruction set + HasNEON bool // NEON instruction set + HasVFPv3 bool // Vector floating point version 3 support + HasVFPv3D16 bool // Vector floating point version 3 D8-D15 + HasTLS bool // Thread local storage support + HasVFPv4 bool // Vector floating point version 4 support + HasIDIVA bool // Integer divide instruction support in ARM mode + HasIDIVT bool // Integer divide instruction support in Thumb mode + HasVFPD32 bool // Vector floating point version 3 D15-D31 + HasLPAE bool // Large Physical Address Extensions + HasEVTSTRM bool // Event stream support + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation + HasPMULL bool // Polynomial multiplication instruction set + HasSHA1 bool // SHA1 hardware implementation + HasSHA2 bool // SHA2 hardware implementation + HasCRC32 bool // CRC32 hardware implementation + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// The booleans in Loong64 contain the correspondingly named cpu feature bit. +// The struct is padded to avoid false sharing. +var Loong64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasLSX bool // support 128-bit vector extension + HasLASX bool // support 256-bit vector extension + HasCRC32 bool // support CRC instruction + HasLAM_BH bool // support AM{SWAP/ADD}[_DB].{B/H} instruction + HasLAMCAS bool // support AMCAS[_DB].{B/H/W/D} instruction + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// MIPS64X contains the supported CPU features of the current mips64/mips64le +// platforms. If the current platform is not mips64/mips64le or the current +// operating system is not Linux then all feature flags are false. +var MIPS64X struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasMSA bool // MIPS SIMD architecture + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// PPC64 contains the supported CPU features of the current ppc64/ppc64le platforms. +// If the current platform is not ppc64/ppc64le then all feature flags are false. +// +// For ppc64/ppc64le, it is safe to check only for ISA level starting on ISA v3.00, +// since there are no optional categories. There are some exceptions that also +// require kernel support to work (DARN, SCV), so there are feature bits for +// those as well. The struct is padded to avoid false sharing. +var PPC64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasDARN bool // Hardware random number generator (requires kernel enablement) + HasSCV bool // Syscall vectored (requires kernel enablement) + IsPOWER8 bool // ISA v2.07 (POWER8) + IsPOWER9 bool // ISA v3.00 (POWER9), implies IsPOWER8 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// S390X contains the supported CPU features of the current IBM Z +// (s390x) platform. If the current platform is not IBM Z then all +// feature flags are false. +// +// S390X is padded to avoid false sharing. Further HasVX is only set +// if the OS supports vector registers in addition to the STFLE +// feature bit being set. +var S390X struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasZARCH bool // z/Architecture mode is active [mandatory] + HasSTFLE bool // store facility list extended + HasLDISP bool // long (20-bit) displacements + HasEIMM bool // 32-bit immediates + HasDFP bool // decimal floating point + HasETF3EH bool // ETF-3 enhanced + HasMSA bool // message security assist (CPACF) + HasAES bool // KM-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESCBC bool // KMC-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESCTR bool // KMCTR-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESGCM bool // KMA-GCM-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasGHASH bool // KIMD-GHASH function + HasSHA1 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-1 functions + HasSHA256 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-256 functions + HasSHA512 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-512 functions + HasSHA3 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA3-{224,256,384,512} and K{I,L}MD-SHAKE-{128,256} functions + HasVX bool // vector facility + HasVXE bool // vector-enhancements facility 1 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// RISCV64 contains the supported CPU features and performance characteristics for riscv64 +// platforms. The booleans in RISCV64, with the exception of HasFastMisaligned, indicate +// the presence of RISC-V extensions. +// +// It is safe to assume that all the RV64G extensions are supported and so they are omitted from +// this structure. As riscv64 Go programs require at least RV64G, the code that populates +// this structure cannot run successfully if some of the RV64G extensions are missing. +// The struct is padded to avoid false sharing. +var RISCV64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasFastMisaligned bool // Fast misaligned accesses + HasC bool // Compressed instruction-set extension + HasV bool // Vector extension compatible with RVV 1.0 + HasZba bool // Address generation instructions extension + HasZbb bool // Basic bit-manipulation extension + HasZbs bool // Single-bit instructions extension + HasZvbb bool // Vector Basic Bit-manipulation + HasZvbc bool // Vector Carryless Multiplication + HasZvkb bool // Vector Cryptography Bit-manipulation + HasZvkt bool // Vector Data-Independent Execution Latency + HasZvkg bool // Vector GCM/GMAC + HasZvkn bool // NIST Algorithm Suite (AES/SHA256/SHA512) + HasZvknc bool // NIST Algorithm Suite with carryless multiply + HasZvkng bool // NIST Algorithm Suite with GCM + HasZvks bool // ShangMi Algorithm Suite + HasZvksc bool // ShangMi Algorithm Suite with carryless multiplication + HasZvksg bool // ShangMi Algorithm Suite with GCM + _ CacheLinePad +} + +func init() { + archInit() + initOptions() + processOptions() +} + +// options contains the cpu debug options that can be used in GODEBUG. +// Options are arch dependent and are added by the arch specific initOptions functions. +// Features that are mandatory for the specific GOARCH should have the Required field set +// (e.g. SSE2 on amd64). +var options []option + +// Option names should be lower case. e.g. avx instead of AVX. +type option struct { + Name string + Feature *bool + Specified bool // whether feature value was specified in GODEBUG + Enable bool // whether feature should be enabled + Required bool // whether feature is mandatory and can not be disabled +} + +func processOptions() { + env := os.Getenv("GODEBUG") +field: + for env != "" { + field := "" + i := strings.IndexByte(env, ',') + if i < 0 { + field, env = env, "" + } else { + field, env = env[:i], env[i+1:] + } + if len(field) < 4 || field[:4] != "cpu." { + continue + } + i = strings.IndexByte(field, '=') + if i < 0 { + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: no value specified for \"", field, "\"\n") + continue + } + key, value := field[4:i], field[i+1:] // e.g. "SSE2", "on" + + var enable bool + switch value { + case "on": + enable = true + case "off": + enable = false + default: + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: value \"", value, "\" not supported for cpu option \"", key, "\"\n") + continue field + } + + if key == "all" { + for i := range options { + options[i].Specified = true + options[i].Enable = enable || options[i].Required + } + continue field + } + + for i := range options { + if options[i].Name == key { + options[i].Specified = true + options[i].Enable = enable + continue field + } + } + + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: unknown cpu feature \"", key, "\"\n") + } + + for _, o := range options { + if !o.Specified { + continue + } + + if o.Enable && !*o.Feature { + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: can not enable \"", o.Name, "\", missing CPU support\n") + continue + } + + if !o.Enable && o.Required { + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: can not disable \"", o.Name, "\", required CPU feature\n") + continue + } + + *o.Feature = o.Enable + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9bf0c32e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build aix + +package cpu + +const ( + // getsystemcfg constants + _SC_IMPL = 2 + _IMPL_POWER8 = 0x10000 + _IMPL_POWER9 = 0x20000 +) + +func archInit() { + impl := getsystemcfg(_SC_IMPL) + if impl&_IMPL_POWER8 != 0 { + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = true + } + if impl&_IMPL_POWER9 != 0 { + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = true + PPC64.IsPOWER9 = true + } + + Initialized = true +} + +func getsystemcfg(label int) (n uint64) { + r0, _ := callgetsystemcfg(label) + n = uint64(r0) + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..301b752e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. +// These are specific to Linux. +const ( + hwcap_SWP = 1 << 0 + hwcap_HALF = 1 << 1 + hwcap_THUMB = 1 << 2 + hwcap_26BIT = 1 << 3 + hwcap_FAST_MULT = 1 << 4 + hwcap_FPA = 1 << 5 + hwcap_VFP = 1 << 6 + hwcap_EDSP = 1 << 7 + hwcap_JAVA = 1 << 8 + hwcap_IWMMXT = 1 << 9 + hwcap_CRUNCH = 1 << 10 + hwcap_THUMBEE = 1 << 11 + hwcap_NEON = 1 << 12 + hwcap_VFPv3 = 1 << 13 + hwcap_VFPv3D16 = 1 << 14 + hwcap_TLS = 1 << 15 + hwcap_VFPv4 = 1 << 16 + hwcap_IDIVA = 1 << 17 + hwcap_IDIVT = 1 << 18 + hwcap_VFPD32 = 1 << 19 + hwcap_LPAE = 1 << 20 + hwcap_EVTSTRM = 1 << 21 + + hwcap2_AES = 1 << 0 + hwcap2_PMULL = 1 << 1 + hwcap2_SHA1 = 1 << 2 + hwcap2_SHA2 = 1 << 3 + hwcap2_CRC32 = 1 << 4 +) + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "pmull", Feature: &ARM.HasPMULL}, + {Name: "sha1", Feature: &ARM.HasSHA1}, + {Name: "sha2", Feature: &ARM.HasSHA2}, + {Name: "swp", Feature: &ARM.HasSWP}, + {Name: "thumb", Feature: &ARM.HasTHUMB}, + {Name: "thumbee", Feature: &ARM.HasTHUMBEE}, + {Name: "tls", Feature: &ARM.HasTLS}, + {Name: "vfp", Feature: &ARM.HasVFP}, + {Name: "vfpd32", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPD32}, + {Name: "vfpv3", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPv3}, + {Name: "vfpv3d16", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPv3D16}, + {Name: "vfpv4", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPv4}, + {Name: "half", Feature: &ARM.HasHALF}, + {Name: "26bit", Feature: &ARM.Has26BIT}, + {Name: "fastmul", Feature: &ARM.HasFASTMUL}, + {Name: "fpa", Feature: &ARM.HasFPA}, + {Name: "edsp", Feature: &ARM.HasEDSP}, + {Name: "java", Feature: &ARM.HasJAVA}, + {Name: "iwmmxt", Feature: &ARM.HasIWMMXT}, + {Name: "crunch", Feature: &ARM.HasCRUNCH}, + {Name: "neon", Feature: &ARM.HasNEON}, + {Name: "idivt", Feature: &ARM.HasIDIVT}, + {Name: "idiva", Feature: &ARM.HasIDIVA}, + {Name: "lpae", Feature: &ARM.HasLPAE}, + {Name: "evtstrm", Feature: &ARM.HasEVTSTRM}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &ARM.HasAES}, + {Name: "crc32", Feature: &ARM.HasCRC32}, + } + +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af2aa99f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import "runtime" + +// cacheLineSize is used to prevent false sharing of cache lines. +// We choose 128 because Apple Silicon, a.k.a. M1, has 128-byte cache line size. +// It doesn't cost much and is much more future-proof. +const cacheLineSize = 128 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "fp", Feature: &ARM64.HasFP}, + {Name: "asimd", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMD}, + {Name: "evstrm", Feature: &ARM64.HasEVTSTRM}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &ARM64.HasAES}, + {Name: "fphp", Feature: &ARM64.HasFPHP}, + {Name: "jscvt", Feature: &ARM64.HasJSCVT}, + {Name: "lrcpc", Feature: &ARM64.HasLRCPC}, + {Name: "pmull", Feature: &ARM64.HasPMULL}, + {Name: "sha1", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA1}, + {Name: "sha2", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA2}, + {Name: "sha3", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA3}, + {Name: "sha512", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA512}, + {Name: "sm3", Feature: &ARM64.HasSM3}, + {Name: "sm4", Feature: &ARM64.HasSM4}, + {Name: "sve", Feature: &ARM64.HasSVE}, + {Name: "sve2", Feature: &ARM64.HasSVE2}, + {Name: "crc32", Feature: &ARM64.HasCRC32}, + {Name: "atomics", Feature: &ARM64.HasATOMICS}, + {Name: "asimdhp", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDHP}, + {Name: "cpuid", Feature: &ARM64.HasCPUID}, + {Name: "asimrdm", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDRDM}, + {Name: "fcma", Feature: &ARM64.HasFCMA}, + {Name: "dcpop", Feature: &ARM64.HasDCPOP}, + {Name: "asimddp", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDDP}, + {Name: "asimdfhm", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDFHM}, + {Name: "dit", Feature: &ARM64.HasDIT}, + {Name: "i8mm", Feature: &ARM64.HasI8MM}, + } +} + +func archInit() { + switch runtime.GOOS { + case "freebsd": + readARM64Registers() + case "linux", "netbsd", "openbsd": + doinit() + default: + // Many platforms don't seem to allow reading these registers. + setMinimalFeatures() + } +} + +// setMinimalFeatures fakes the minimal ARM64 features expected by +// TestARM64minimalFeatures. +func setMinimalFeatures() { + ARM64.HasASIMD = true + ARM64.HasFP = true +} + +func readARM64Registers() { + Initialized = true + + parseARM64SystemRegisters(getisar0(), getisar1(), getpfr0()) +} + +func parseARM64SystemRegisters(isar0, isar1, pfr0 uint64) { + // ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1 + switch extractBits(isar0, 4, 7) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasAES = true + case 2: + ARM64.HasAES = true + ARM64.HasPMULL = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 8, 11) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSHA1 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 12, 15) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSHA2 = true + case 2: + ARM64.HasSHA2 = true + ARM64.HasSHA512 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 16, 19) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasCRC32 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 20, 23) { + case 2: + ARM64.HasATOMICS = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 28, 31) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasASIMDRDM = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 32, 35) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSHA3 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 36, 39) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSM3 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 40, 43) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSM4 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 44, 47) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasASIMDDP = true + } + + // ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 + switch extractBits(isar1, 0, 3) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasDCPOP = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar1, 12, 15) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasJSCVT = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar1, 16, 19) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasFCMA = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar1, 20, 23) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasLRCPC = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar1, 52, 55) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasI8MM = true + } + + // ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 + switch extractBits(pfr0, 16, 19) { + case 0: + ARM64.HasFP = true + case 1: + ARM64.HasFP = true + ARM64.HasFPHP = true + } + + switch extractBits(pfr0, 20, 23) { + case 0: + ARM64.HasASIMD = true + case 1: + ARM64.HasASIMD = true + ARM64.HasASIMDHP = true + } + + switch extractBits(pfr0, 32, 35) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSVE = true + + parseARM64SVERegister(getzfr0()) + } + + switch extractBits(pfr0, 48, 51) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasDIT = true + } +} + +func parseARM64SVERegister(zfr0 uint64) { + switch extractBits(zfr0, 0, 3) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSVE2 = true + } +} + +func extractBits(data uint64, start, end uint) uint { + return (uint)(data>>start) & ((1 << (end - start + 1)) - 1) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..22cc9984 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func getisar0() uint64 +TEXT ·getisar0(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + // get Instruction Set Attributes 0 into x0 + // mrs x0, ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1 = d5380600 + WORD $0xd5380600 + MOVD R0, ret+0(FP) + RET + +// func getisar1() uint64 +TEXT ·getisar1(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + // get Instruction Set Attributes 1 into x0 + // mrs x0, ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 = d5380620 + WORD $0xd5380620 + MOVD R0, ret+0(FP) + RET + +// func getpfr0() uint64 +TEXT ·getpfr0(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + // get Processor Feature Register 0 into x0 + // mrs x0, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 = d5380400 + WORD $0xd5380400 + MOVD R0, ret+0(FP) + RET + +// func getzfr0() uint64 +TEXT ·getzfr0(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + // get SVE Feature Register 0 into x0 + // mrs x0, ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 = d5380480 + WORD $0xd5380480 + MOVD R0, ret+0(FP) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_darwin_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_darwin_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b838cb9e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_darwin_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build darwin && amd64 && gc + +package cpu + +// darwinSupportsAVX512 checks Darwin kernel for AVX512 support via sysctl +// call (see issue 43089). It also restricts AVX512 support for Darwin to +// kernel version 21.3.0 (MacOS 12.2.0) or later (see issue 49233). +// +// Background: +// Darwin implements a special mechanism to economize on thread state when +// AVX512 specific registers are not in use. This scheme minimizes state when +// preempting threads that haven't yet used any AVX512 instructions, but adds +// special requirements to check for AVX512 hardware support at runtime (e.g. +// via sysctl call or commpage inspection). See issue 43089 and link below for +// full background: +// https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/xnu-11215.1.10/osfmk/i386/fpu.c#L214-L240 +// +// Additionally, all versions of the Darwin kernel from 19.6.0 through 21.2.0 +// (corresponding to MacOS 10.15.6 - 12.1) have a bug that can cause corruption +// of the AVX512 mask registers (K0-K7) upon signal return. For this reason +// AVX512 is considered unsafe to use on Darwin for kernel versions prior to +// 21.3.0, where a fix has been confirmed. See issue 49233 for full background. +func darwinSupportsAVX512() bool { + return darwinSysctlEnabled([]byte("hw.optional.avx512f\x00")) && darwinKernelVersionCheck(21, 3, 0) +} + +// Ensure Darwin kernel version is at least major.minor.patch, avoiding dependencies +func darwinKernelVersionCheck(major, minor, patch int) bool { + var release [256]byte + err := darwinOSRelease(&release) + if err != nil { + return false + } + + var mmp [3]int + c := 0 +Loop: + for _, b := range release[:] { + switch { + case b >= '0' && b <= '9': + mmp[c] = 10*mmp[c] + int(b-'0') + case b == '.': + c++ + if c > 2 { + return false + } + case b == 0: + break Loop + default: + return false + } + } + if c != 2 { + return false + } + return mmp[0] > major || mmp[0] == major && (mmp[1] > minor || mmp[1] == minor && mmp[2] >= patch) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6ac6e1ef --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +package cpu + +func getisar0() uint64 +func getisar1() uint64 +func getpfr0() uint64 +func getzfr0() uint64 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8ae6ddc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +package cpu + +// haveAsmFunctions reports whether the other functions in this file can +// be safely called. +func haveAsmFunctions() bool { return true } + +// The following feature detection functions are defined in cpu_s390x.s. +// They are likely to be expensive to call so the results should be cached. +func stfle() facilityList +func kmQuery() queryResult +func kmcQuery() queryResult +func kmctrQuery() queryResult +func kmaQuery() queryResult +func kimdQuery() queryResult +func klmdQuery() queryResult diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32a44514 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (386 || amd64 || amd64p32) && gc + +package cpu + +// cpuid is implemented in cpu_gc_x86.s for gc compiler +// and in cpu_gccgo.c for gccgo. +func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) + +// xgetbv with ecx = 0 is implemented in cpu_gc_x86.s for gc compiler +// and in cpu_gccgo.c for gccgo. +func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ce208ce6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.s @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (386 || amd64 || amd64p32) && gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) +TEXT ·cpuid(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-24 + MOVL eaxArg+0(FP), AX + MOVL ecxArg+4(FP), CX + CPUID + MOVL AX, eax+8(FP) + MOVL BX, ebx+12(FP) + MOVL CX, ecx+16(FP) + MOVL DX, edx+20(FP) + RET + +// func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) +TEXT ·xgetbv(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-8 + MOVL $0, CX + XGETBV + MOVL AX, eax+0(FP) + MOVL DX, edx+4(FP) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f194678 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gccgo + +package cpu + +func getisar0() uint64 { return 0 } +func getisar1() uint64 { return 0 } +func getpfr0() uint64 { return 0 } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9526d2ce --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gccgo + +package cpu + +// haveAsmFunctions reports whether the other functions in this file can +// be safely called. +func haveAsmFunctions() bool { return false } + +// TODO(mundaym): the following feature detection functions are currently +// stubs. See https://golang.org/cl/162887 for how to fix this. +// They are likely to be expensive to call so the results should be cached. +func stfle() facilityList { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmcQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmctrQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmaQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kimdQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func klmdQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f73a05d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (386 || amd64 || amd64p32) && gccgo + +#include +#include +#include + +// Need to wrap __get_cpuid_count because it's declared as static. +int +gccgoGetCpuidCount(uint32_t leaf, uint32_t subleaf, + uint32_t *eax, uint32_t *ebx, + uint32_t *ecx, uint32_t *edx) +{ + return __get_cpuid_count(leaf, subleaf, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); +} + +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunknown-pragmas" +#pragma GCC push_options +#pragma GCC target("xsave") +#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("xsave"))), apply_to=function) + +// xgetbv reads the contents of an XCR (Extended Control Register) +// specified in the ECX register into registers EDX:EAX. +// Currently, the only supported value for XCR is 0. +void +gccgoXgetbv(uint32_t *eax, uint32_t *edx) +{ + uint64_t v = _xgetbv(0); + *eax = v & 0xffffffff; + *edx = v >> 32; +} + +#pragma clang attribute pop +#pragma GCC pop_options diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..170d21dd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (386 || amd64 || amd64p32) && gccgo + +package cpu + +//extern gccgoGetCpuidCount +func gccgoGetCpuidCount(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32, eax, ebx, ecx, edx *uint32) + +func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) { + var a, b, c, d uint32 + gccgoGetCpuidCount(eaxArg, ecxArg, &a, &b, &c, &d) + return a, b, c, d +} + +//extern gccgoXgetbv +func gccgoXgetbv(eax, edx *uint32) + +func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) { + var a, d uint32 + gccgoXgetbv(&a, &d) + return a, d +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..743eb543 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !386 && !amd64 && !amd64p32 && !arm64 + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + if err := readHWCAP(); err != nil { + return + } + doinit() + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2057006d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +func doinit() { + ARM.HasSWP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SWP) + ARM.HasHALF = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_HALF) + ARM.HasTHUMB = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_THUMB) + ARM.Has26BIT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_26BIT) + ARM.HasFASTMUL = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FAST_MULT) + ARM.HasFPA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FPA) + ARM.HasVFP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFP) + ARM.HasEDSP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EDSP) + ARM.HasJAVA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_JAVA) + ARM.HasIWMMXT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IWMMXT) + ARM.HasCRUNCH = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CRUNCH) + ARM.HasTHUMBEE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_THUMBEE) + ARM.HasNEON = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_NEON) + ARM.HasVFPv3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv3) + ARM.HasVFPv3D16 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv3D16) + ARM.HasTLS = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_TLS) + ARM.HasVFPv4 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv4) + ARM.HasIDIVA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IDIVA) + ARM.HasIDIVT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IDIVT) + ARM.HasVFPD32 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPD32) + ARM.HasLPAE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_LPAE) + ARM.HasEVTSTRM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EVTSTRM) + ARM.HasAES = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_AES) + ARM.HasPMULL = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_PMULL) + ARM.HasSHA1 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_SHA1) + ARM.HasSHA2 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_SHA2) + ARM.HasCRC32 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_CRC32) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f1caf0f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "strings" + "syscall" +) + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. These are exposed by Linux. +const ( + hwcap_FP = 1 << 0 + hwcap_ASIMD = 1 << 1 + hwcap_EVTSTRM = 1 << 2 + hwcap_AES = 1 << 3 + hwcap_PMULL = 1 << 4 + hwcap_SHA1 = 1 << 5 + hwcap_SHA2 = 1 << 6 + hwcap_CRC32 = 1 << 7 + hwcap_ATOMICS = 1 << 8 + hwcap_FPHP = 1 << 9 + hwcap_ASIMDHP = 1 << 10 + hwcap_CPUID = 1 << 11 + hwcap_ASIMDRDM = 1 << 12 + hwcap_JSCVT = 1 << 13 + hwcap_FCMA = 1 << 14 + hwcap_LRCPC = 1 << 15 + hwcap_DCPOP = 1 << 16 + hwcap_SHA3 = 1 << 17 + hwcap_SM3 = 1 << 18 + hwcap_SM4 = 1 << 19 + hwcap_ASIMDDP = 1 << 20 + hwcap_SHA512 = 1 << 21 + hwcap_SVE = 1 << 22 + hwcap_ASIMDFHM = 1 << 23 + hwcap_DIT = 1 << 24 + + hwcap2_SVE2 = 1 << 1 + hwcap2_I8MM = 1 << 13 +) + +// linuxKernelCanEmulateCPUID reports whether we're running +// on Linux 4.11+. Ideally we'd like to ask the question about +// whether the current kernel contains +// https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=77c97b4ee21290f5f083173d957843b615abbff2 +// but the version number will have to do. +func linuxKernelCanEmulateCPUID() bool { + var un syscall.Utsname + syscall.Uname(&un) + var sb strings.Builder + for _, b := range un.Release[:] { + if b == 0 { + break + } + sb.WriteByte(byte(b)) + } + major, minor, _, ok := parseRelease(sb.String()) + return ok && (major > 4 || major == 4 && minor >= 11) +} + +func doinit() { + if err := readHWCAP(); err != nil { + // We failed to read /proc/self/auxv. This can happen if the binary has + // been given extra capabilities(7) with /bin/setcap. + // + // When this happens, we have two options. If the Linux kernel is new + // enough (4.11+), we can read the arm64 registers directly which'll + // trap into the kernel and then return back to userspace. + // + // But on older kernels, such as Linux 4.4.180 as used on many Synology + // devices, calling readARM64Registers (specifically getisar0) will + // cause a SIGILL and we'll die. So for older kernels, parse /proc/cpuinfo + // instead. + // + // See golang/go#57336. + if linuxKernelCanEmulateCPUID() { + readARM64Registers() + } else { + readLinuxProcCPUInfo() + } + return + } + + // HWCAP feature bits + ARM64.HasFP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FP) + ARM64.HasASIMD = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMD) + ARM64.HasEVTSTRM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EVTSTRM) + ARM64.HasAES = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_AES) + ARM64.HasPMULL = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_PMULL) + ARM64.HasSHA1 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA1) + ARM64.HasSHA2 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA2) + ARM64.HasCRC32 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CRC32) + ARM64.HasATOMICS = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ATOMICS) + ARM64.HasFPHP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FPHP) + ARM64.HasASIMDHP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDHP) + ARM64.HasCPUID = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CPUID) + ARM64.HasASIMDRDM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDRDM) + ARM64.HasJSCVT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_JSCVT) + ARM64.HasFCMA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FCMA) + ARM64.HasLRCPC = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_LRCPC) + ARM64.HasDCPOP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_DCPOP) + ARM64.HasSHA3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA3) + ARM64.HasSM3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SM3) + ARM64.HasSM4 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SM4) + ARM64.HasASIMDDP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDDP) + ARM64.HasSHA512 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA512) + ARM64.HasSVE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SVE) + ARM64.HasASIMDFHM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDFHM) + ARM64.HasDIT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_DIT) + + // HWCAP2 feature bits + ARM64.HasSVE2 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_SVE2) + ARM64.HasI8MM = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_I8MM) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_loong64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_loong64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f341143 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_loong64.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +// HWCAP bits. These are exposed by the Linux kernel. +const ( + hwcap_LOONGARCH_LSX = 1 << 4 + hwcap_LOONGARCH_LASX = 1 << 5 +) + +func doinit() { + // TODO: Features that require kernel support like LSX and LASX can + // be detected here once needed in std library or by the compiler. + Loong64.HasLSX = hwcIsSet(hwCap, hwcap_LOONGARCH_LSX) + Loong64.HasLASX = hwcIsSet(hwCap, hwcap_LOONGARCH_LASX) +} + +func hwcIsSet(hwc uint, val uint) bool { + return hwc&val != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4686c1d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && (mips64 || mips64le) + +package cpu + +// HWCAP bits. These are exposed by the Linux kernel 5.4. +const ( + // CPU features + hwcap_MIPS_MSA = 1 << 1 +) + +func doinit() { + // HWCAP feature bits + MIPS64X.HasMSA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_MIPS_MSA) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a428dec9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && !arm && !arm64 && !loong64 && !mips64 && !mips64le && !ppc64 && !ppc64le && !s390x && !riscv64 + +package cpu + +func doinit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..197188e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && (ppc64 || ppc64le) + +package cpu + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. These are exposed by the kernel. +const ( + // ISA Level + _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_2_07 = 0x80000000 + _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00 = 0x00800000 + + // CPU features + _PPC_FEATURE2_DARN = 0x00200000 + _PPC_FEATURE2_SCV = 0x00100000 +) + +func doinit() { + // HWCAP2 feature bits + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_2_07) + PPC64.IsPOWER9 = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00) + PPC64.HasDARN = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_DARN) + PPC64.HasSCV = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_SCV) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_riscv64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_riscv64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ad741536 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_riscv64.go @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +// RISC-V extension discovery code for Linux. The approach here is to first try the riscv_hwprobe +// syscall falling back to HWCAP to check for the C extension if riscv_hwprobe is not available. +// +// A note on detection of the Vector extension using HWCAP. +// +// Support for the Vector extension version 1.0 was added to the Linux kernel in release 6.5. +// Support for the riscv_hwprobe syscall was added in 6.4. It follows that if the riscv_hwprobe +// syscall is not available then neither is the Vector extension (which needs kernel support). +// The riscv_hwprobe syscall should then be all we need to detect the Vector extension. +// However, some RISC-V board manufacturers ship boards with an older kernel on top of which +// they have back-ported various versions of the Vector extension patches but not the riscv_hwprobe +// patches. These kernels advertise support for the Vector extension using HWCAP. Falling +// back to HWCAP to detect the Vector extension, if riscv_hwprobe is not available, or simply not +// bothering with riscv_hwprobe at all and just using HWCAP may then seem like an attractive option. +// +// Unfortunately, simply checking the 'V' bit in AT_HWCAP will not work as this bit is used by +// RISC-V board and cloud instance providers to mean different things. The Lichee Pi 4A board +// and the Scaleway RV1 cloud instances use the 'V' bit to advertise their support for the unratified +// 0.7.1 version of the Vector Specification. The Banana Pi BPI-F3 and the CanMV-K230 board use +// it to advertise support for 1.0 of the Vector extension. Versions 0.7.1 and 1.0 of the Vector +// extension are binary incompatible. HWCAP can then not be used in isolation to populate the +// HasV field as this field indicates that the underlying CPU is compatible with RVV 1.0. +// +// There is a way at runtime to distinguish between versions 0.7.1 and 1.0 of the Vector +// specification by issuing a RVV 1.0 vsetvli instruction and checking the vill bit of the vtype +// register. This check would allow us to safely detect version 1.0 of the Vector extension +// with HWCAP, if riscv_hwprobe were not available. However, the check cannot +// be added until the assembler supports the Vector instructions. +// +// Note the riscv_hwprobe syscall does not suffer from these ambiguities by design as all of the +// extensions it advertises support for are explicitly versioned. It's also worth noting that +// the riscv_hwprobe syscall is the only way to detect multi-letter RISC-V extensions, e.g., Zba. +// These cannot be detected using HWCAP and so riscv_hwprobe must be used to detect the majority +// of RISC-V extensions. +// +// Please see https://docs.kernel.org/arch/riscv/hwprobe.html for more information. + +// golang.org/x/sys/cpu is not allowed to depend on golang.org/x/sys/unix so we must +// reproduce the constants, types and functions needed to make the riscv_hwprobe syscall +// here. + +const ( + // Copied from golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_riscv64.go. + riscv_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_0 = 0x4 + riscv_HWPROBE_IMA_C = 0x2 + riscv_HWPROBE_IMA_V = 0x4 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBA = 0x8 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBB = 0x10 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBS = 0x20 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVBB = 0x20000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVBC = 0x40000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKB = 0x80000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKG = 0x100000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKNED = 0x200000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKNHB = 0x800000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKSED = 0x1000000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKSH = 0x2000000 + riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKT = 0x4000000 + riscv_HWPROBE_KEY_CPUPERF_0 = 0x5 + riscv_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_FAST = 0x3 + riscv_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_MASK = 0x7 +) + +const ( + // sys_RISCV_HWPROBE is copied from golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_riscv64.go. + sys_RISCV_HWPROBE = 258 +) + +// riscvHWProbePairs is copied from golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_riscv64.go. +type riscvHWProbePairs struct { + key int64 + value uint64 +} + +const ( + // CPU features + hwcap_RISCV_ISA_C = 1 << ('C' - 'A') +) + +func doinit() { + // A slice of key/value pair structures is passed to the RISCVHWProbe syscall. The key + // field should be initialised with one of the key constants defined above, e.g., + // RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_0. The syscall will set the value field to the appropriate value. + // If the kernel does not recognise a key it will set the key field to -1 and the value field to 0. + + pairs := []riscvHWProbePairs{ + {riscv_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_0, 0}, + {riscv_HWPROBE_KEY_CPUPERF_0, 0}, + } + + // This call only indicates that extensions are supported if they are implemented on all cores. + if riscvHWProbe(pairs, 0) { + if pairs[0].key != -1 { + v := uint(pairs[0].value) + RISCV64.HasC = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_IMA_C) + RISCV64.HasV = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_IMA_V) + RISCV64.HasZba = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBA) + RISCV64.HasZbb = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBB) + RISCV64.HasZbs = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBS) + RISCV64.HasZvbb = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVBB) + RISCV64.HasZvbc = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVBC) + RISCV64.HasZvkb = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKB) + RISCV64.HasZvkg = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKG) + RISCV64.HasZvkt = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKT) + // Cryptography shorthand extensions + RISCV64.HasZvkn = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKNED) && + isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKNHB) && RISCV64.HasZvkb && RISCV64.HasZvkt + RISCV64.HasZvknc = RISCV64.HasZvkn && RISCV64.HasZvbc + RISCV64.HasZvkng = RISCV64.HasZvkn && RISCV64.HasZvkg + RISCV64.HasZvks = isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKSED) && + isSet(v, riscv_HWPROBE_EXT_ZVKSH) && RISCV64.HasZvkb && RISCV64.HasZvkt + RISCV64.HasZvksc = RISCV64.HasZvks && RISCV64.HasZvbc + RISCV64.HasZvksg = RISCV64.HasZvks && RISCV64.HasZvkg + } + if pairs[1].key != -1 { + v := pairs[1].value & riscv_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_MASK + RISCV64.HasFastMisaligned = v == riscv_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_FAST + } + } + + // Let's double check with HWCAP if the C extension does not appear to be supported. + // This may happen if we're running on a kernel older than 6.4. + + if !RISCV64.HasC { + RISCV64.HasC = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_RISCV_ISA_C) + } +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} + +// riscvHWProbe is a simplified version of the generated wrapper function found in +// golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsyscall_linux_riscv64.go. We simplify it by removing the +// cpuCount and cpus parameters which we do not need. We always want to pass 0 for +// these parameters here so the kernel only reports the extensions that are present +// on all cores. +func riscvHWProbe(pairs []riscvHWProbePairs, flags uint) bool { + var _zero uintptr + var p0 unsafe.Pointer + if len(pairs) > 0 { + p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&pairs[0]) + } else { + p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&_zero) + } + + _, _, e1 := syscall.Syscall6(sys_RISCV_HWPROBE, uintptr(p0), uintptr(len(pairs)), uintptr(0), uintptr(0), uintptr(flags), 0) + return e1 == 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1517ac61 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const ( + // bit mask values from /usr/include/bits/hwcap.h + hwcap_ZARCH = 2 + hwcap_STFLE = 4 + hwcap_MSA = 8 + hwcap_LDISP = 16 + hwcap_EIMM = 32 + hwcap_DFP = 64 + hwcap_ETF3EH = 256 + hwcap_VX = 2048 + hwcap_VXE = 8192 +) + +func initS390Xbase() { + // test HWCAP bit vector + has := func(featureMask uint) bool { + return hwCap&featureMask == featureMask + } + + // mandatory + S390X.HasZARCH = has(hwcap_ZARCH) + + // optional + S390X.HasSTFLE = has(hwcap_STFLE) + S390X.HasLDISP = has(hwcap_LDISP) + S390X.HasEIMM = has(hwcap_EIMM) + S390X.HasETF3EH = has(hwcap_ETF3EH) + S390X.HasDFP = has(hwcap_DFP) + S390X.HasMSA = has(hwcap_MSA) + S390X.HasVX = has(hwcap_VX) + if S390X.HasVX { + S390X.HasVXE = has(hwcap_VXE) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45ecb29a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build loong64 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +// Bit fields for CPUCFG registers, Related reference documents: +// https://loongson.github.io/LoongArch-Documentation/LoongArch-Vol1-EN.html#_cpucfg +const ( + // CPUCFG1 bits + cpucfg1_CRC32 = 1 << 25 + + // CPUCFG2 bits + cpucfg2_LAM_BH = 1 << 27 + cpucfg2_LAMCAS = 1 << 28 +) + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "lsx", Feature: &Loong64.HasLSX}, + {Name: "lasx", Feature: &Loong64.HasLASX}, + {Name: "crc32", Feature: &Loong64.HasCRC32}, + {Name: "lam_bh", Feature: &Loong64.HasLAM_BH}, + {Name: "lamcas", Feature: &Loong64.HasLAMCAS}, + } + + // The CPUCFG data on Loong64 only reflects the hardware capabilities, + // not the kernel support status, so features such as LSX and LASX that + // require kernel support cannot be obtained from the CPUCFG data. + // + // These features only require hardware capability support and do not + // require kernel specific support, so they can be obtained directly + // through CPUCFG + cfg1 := get_cpucfg(1) + cfg2 := get_cpucfg(2) + + Loong64.HasCRC32 = cfgIsSet(cfg1, cpucfg1_CRC32) + Loong64.HasLAMCAS = cfgIsSet(cfg2, cpucfg2_LAMCAS) + Loong64.HasLAM_BH = cfgIsSet(cfg2, cpucfg2_LAM_BH) +} + +func get_cpucfg(reg uint32) uint32 + +func cfgIsSet(cfg uint32, val uint32) bool { + return cfg&val != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..71cbaf1c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.s @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func get_cpucfg(reg uint32) uint32 +TEXT ·get_cpucfg(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0 + MOVW reg+0(FP), R5 + // CPUCFG R5, R4 = 0x00006ca4 + WORD $0x00006ca4 + MOVW R4, ret+8(FP) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fedb00cc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build mips64 || mips64le + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "msa", Feature: &MIPS64X.HasMSA}, + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ffb4ec7e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build mips || mipsle + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 + +func initOptions() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ebfb3fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +// Minimal copy of functionality from x/sys/unix so the cpu package can call +// sysctl without depending on x/sys/unix. + +const ( + _CTL_QUERY = -2 + + _SYSCTL_VERS_1 = 0x1000000 +) + +var _zero uintptr + +func sysctl(mib []int32, old *byte, oldlen *uintptr, new *byte, newlen uintptr) (err error) { + var _p0 unsafe.Pointer + if len(mib) > 0 { + _p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&mib[0]) + } else { + _p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&_zero) + } + _, _, errno := syscall.Syscall6( + syscall.SYS___SYSCTL, + uintptr(_p0), + uintptr(len(mib)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(old)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(oldlen)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(new)), + uintptr(newlen)) + if errno != 0 { + return errno + } + return nil +} + +type sysctlNode struct { + Flags uint32 + Num int32 + Name [32]int8 + Ver uint32 + __rsvd uint32 + Un [16]byte + _sysctl_size [8]byte + _sysctl_func [8]byte + _sysctl_parent [8]byte + _sysctl_desc [8]byte +} + +func sysctlNodes(mib []int32) ([]sysctlNode, error) { + var olen uintptr + + // Get a list of all sysctl nodes below the given MIB by performing + // a sysctl for the given MIB with CTL_QUERY appended. + mib = append(mib, _CTL_QUERY) + qnode := sysctlNode{Flags: _SYSCTL_VERS_1} + qp := (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&qnode)) + sz := unsafe.Sizeof(qnode) + if err := sysctl(mib, nil, &olen, qp, sz); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Now that we know the size, get the actual nodes. + nodes := make([]sysctlNode, olen/sz) + np := (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&nodes[0])) + if err := sysctl(mib, np, &olen, qp, sz); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return nodes, nil +} + +func nametomib(name string) ([]int32, error) { + // Split name into components. + var parts []string + last := 0 + for i := 0; i < len(name); i++ { + if name[i] == '.' { + parts = append(parts, name[last:i]) + last = i + 1 + } + } + parts = append(parts, name[last:]) + + mib := []int32{} + // Discover the nodes and construct the MIB OID. + for partno, part := range parts { + nodes, err := sysctlNodes(mib) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + for _, node := range nodes { + n := make([]byte, 0) + for i := range node.Name { + if node.Name[i] != 0 { + n = append(n, byte(node.Name[i])) + } + } + if string(n) == part { + mib = append(mib, int32(node.Num)) + break + } + } + if len(mib) != partno+1 { + return nil, err + } + } + + return mib, nil +} + +// aarch64SysctlCPUID is struct aarch64_sysctl_cpu_id from NetBSD's +type aarch64SysctlCPUID struct { + midr uint64 /* Main ID Register */ + revidr uint64 /* Revision ID Register */ + mpidr uint64 /* Multiprocessor Affinity Register */ + aa64dfr0 uint64 /* A64 Debug Feature Register 0 */ + aa64dfr1 uint64 /* A64 Debug Feature Register 1 */ + aa64isar0 uint64 /* A64 Instruction Set Attribute Register 0 */ + aa64isar1 uint64 /* A64 Instruction Set Attribute Register 1 */ + aa64mmfr0 uint64 /* A64 Memory Model Feature Register 0 */ + aa64mmfr1 uint64 /* A64 Memory Model Feature Register 1 */ + aa64mmfr2 uint64 /* A64 Memory Model Feature Register 2 */ + aa64pfr0 uint64 /* A64 Processor Feature Register 0 */ + aa64pfr1 uint64 /* A64 Processor Feature Register 1 */ + aa64zfr0 uint64 /* A64 SVE Feature ID Register 0 */ + mvfr0 uint32 /* Media and VFP Feature Register 0 */ + mvfr1 uint32 /* Media and VFP Feature Register 1 */ + mvfr2 uint32 /* Media and VFP Feature Register 2 */ + pad uint32 + clidr uint64 /* Cache Level ID Register */ + ctr uint64 /* Cache Type Register */ +} + +func sysctlCPUID(name string) (*aarch64SysctlCPUID, error) { + mib, err := nametomib(name) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + out := aarch64SysctlCPUID{} + n := unsafe.Sizeof(out) + _, _, errno := syscall.Syscall6( + syscall.SYS___SYSCTL, + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&mib[0])), + uintptr(len(mib)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&out)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&n)), + uintptr(0), + uintptr(0)) + if errno != 0 { + return nil, errno + } + return &out, nil +} + +func doinit() { + cpuid, err := sysctlCPUID("machdep.cpu0.cpu_id") + if err != nil { + setMinimalFeatures() + return + } + parseARM64SystemRegisters(cpuid.aa64isar0, cpuid.aa64isar1, cpuid.aa64pfr0) + + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85b64d5c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +// Minimal copy of functionality from x/sys/unix so the cpu package can call +// sysctl without depending on x/sys/unix. + +const ( + // From OpenBSD's sys/sysctl.h. + _CTL_MACHDEP = 7 + + // From OpenBSD's machine/cpu.h. + _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0 = 2 + _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR1 = 3 +) + +// Implemented in the runtime package (runtime/sys_openbsd3.go) +func syscall_syscall6(fn, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err syscall.Errno) + +//go:linkname syscall_syscall6 syscall.syscall6 + +func sysctl(mib []uint32, old *byte, oldlen *uintptr, new *byte, newlen uintptr) (err error) { + _, _, errno := syscall_syscall6(libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&mib[0])), uintptr(len(mib)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(old)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(oldlen)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(new)), uintptr(newlen)) + if errno != 0 { + return errno + } + return nil +} + +var libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr uintptr + +//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_sysctl sysctl "libc.so" + +func sysctlUint64(mib []uint32) (uint64, bool) { + var out uint64 + nout := unsafe.Sizeof(out) + if err := sysctl(mib, (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&out)), &nout, nil, 0); err != nil { + return 0, false + } + return out, true +} + +func doinit() { + setMinimalFeatures() + + // Get ID_AA64ISAR0 and ID_AA64ISAR1 from sysctl. + isar0, ok := sysctlUint64([]uint32{_CTL_MACHDEP, _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0}) + if !ok { + return + } + isar1, ok := sysctlUint64([]uint32{_CTL_MACHDEP, _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR1}) + if !ok { + return + } + parseARM64SystemRegisters(isar0, isar1, 0) + + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..054ba05d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "textflag.h" + +TEXT libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0 + JMP libc_sysctl(SB) + +GLOBL ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8 +DATA ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9ecf2a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && arm + +package cpu + +func archInit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5341e7f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && !netbsd && !openbsd && arm64 + +package cpu + +func doinit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f8f2419 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && (mips64 || mips64le) + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89608fba --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !aix && !linux && (ppc64 || ppc64le) + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = true + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ab87808 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && riscv64 + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0fd7e2f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build 386 || amd64p32 || (amd64 && (!darwin || !gc)) + +package cpu + +func darwinSupportsAVX512() bool { + panic("only implemented for gc && amd64 && darwin") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c14f12b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build ppc64 || ppc64le + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 128 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "darn", Feature: &PPC64.HasDARN}, + {Name: "scv", Feature: &PPC64.HasSCV}, + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f617aef --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build riscv64 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "fastmisaligned", Feature: &RISCV64.HasFastMisaligned}, + {Name: "c", Feature: &RISCV64.HasC}, + {Name: "v", Feature: &RISCV64.HasV}, + {Name: "zba", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZba}, + {Name: "zbb", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZbb}, + {Name: "zbs", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZbs}, + // RISC-V Cryptography Extensions + {Name: "zvbb", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvbb}, + {Name: "zvbc", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvbc}, + {Name: "zvkb", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvkb}, + {Name: "zvkg", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvkg}, + {Name: "zvkt", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvkt}, + {Name: "zvkn", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvkn}, + {Name: "zvknc", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvknc}, + {Name: "zvkng", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvkng}, + {Name: "zvks", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvks}, + {Name: "zvksc", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvksc}, + {Name: "zvksg", Feature: &RISCV64.HasZvksg}, + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5881b883 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 256 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "zarch", Feature: &S390X.HasZARCH, Required: true}, + {Name: "stfle", Feature: &S390X.HasSTFLE, Required: true}, + {Name: "ldisp", Feature: &S390X.HasLDISP, Required: true}, + {Name: "eimm", Feature: &S390X.HasEIMM, Required: true}, + {Name: "dfp", Feature: &S390X.HasDFP}, + {Name: "etf3eh", Feature: &S390X.HasETF3EH}, + {Name: "msa", Feature: &S390X.HasMSA}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &S390X.HasAES}, + {Name: "aescbc", Feature: &S390X.HasAESCBC}, + {Name: "aesctr", Feature: &S390X.HasAESCTR}, + {Name: "aesgcm", Feature: &S390X.HasAESGCM}, + {Name: "ghash", Feature: &S390X.HasGHASH}, + {Name: "sha1", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA1}, + {Name: "sha256", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA256}, + {Name: "sha3", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA3}, + {Name: "sha512", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA512}, + {Name: "vx", Feature: &S390X.HasVX}, + {Name: "vxe", Feature: &S390X.HasVXE}, + } +} + +// bitIsSet reports whether the bit at index is set. The bit index +// is in big endian order, so bit index 0 is the leftmost bit. +func bitIsSet(bits []uint64, index uint) bool { + return bits[index/64]&((1<<63)>>(index%64)) != 0 +} + +// facility is a bit index for the named facility. +type facility uint8 + +const ( + // mandatory facilities + zarch facility = 1 // z architecture mode is active + stflef facility = 7 // store-facility-list-extended + ldisp facility = 18 // long-displacement + eimm facility = 21 // extended-immediate + + // miscellaneous facilities + dfp facility = 42 // decimal-floating-point + etf3eh facility = 30 // extended-translation 3 enhancement + + // cryptography facilities + msa facility = 17 // message-security-assist + msa3 facility = 76 // message-security-assist extension 3 + msa4 facility = 77 // message-security-assist extension 4 + msa5 facility = 57 // message-security-assist extension 5 + msa8 facility = 146 // message-security-assist extension 8 + msa9 facility = 155 // message-security-assist extension 9 + + // vector facilities + vx facility = 129 // vector facility + vxe facility = 135 // vector-enhancements 1 + vxe2 facility = 148 // vector-enhancements 2 +) + +// facilityList contains the result of an STFLE call. +// Bits are numbered in big endian order so the +// leftmost bit (the MSB) is at index 0. +type facilityList struct { + bits [4]uint64 +} + +// Has reports whether the given facilities are present. +func (s *facilityList) Has(fs ...facility) bool { + if len(fs) == 0 { + panic("no facility bits provided") + } + for _, f := range fs { + if !bitIsSet(s.bits[:], uint(f)) { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +// function is the code for the named cryptographic function. +type function uint8 + +const ( + // KM{,A,C,CTR} function codes + aes128 function = 18 // AES-128 + aes192 function = 19 // AES-192 + aes256 function = 20 // AES-256 + + // K{I,L}MD function codes + sha1 function = 1 // SHA-1 + sha256 function = 2 // SHA-256 + sha512 function = 3 // SHA-512 + sha3_224 function = 32 // SHA3-224 + sha3_256 function = 33 // SHA3-256 + sha3_384 function = 34 // SHA3-384 + sha3_512 function = 35 // SHA3-512 + shake128 function = 36 // SHAKE-128 + shake256 function = 37 // SHAKE-256 + + // KLMD function codes + ghash function = 65 // GHASH +) + +// queryResult contains the result of a Query function +// call. Bits are numbered in big endian order so the +// leftmost bit (the MSB) is at index 0. +type queryResult struct { + bits [2]uint64 +} + +// Has reports whether the given functions are present. +func (q *queryResult) Has(fns ...function) bool { + if len(fns) == 0 { + panic("no function codes provided") + } + for _, f := range fns { + if !bitIsSet(q.bits[:], uint(f)) { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +func doinit() { + initS390Xbase() + + // We need implementations of stfle, km and so on + // to detect cryptographic features. + if !haveAsmFunctions() { + return + } + + // optional cryptographic functions + if S390X.HasMSA { + aes := []function{aes128, aes192, aes256} + + // cipher message + km, kmc := kmQuery(), kmcQuery() + S390X.HasAES = km.Has(aes...) + S390X.HasAESCBC = kmc.Has(aes...) + if S390X.HasSTFLE { + facilities := stfle() + if facilities.Has(msa4) { + kmctr := kmctrQuery() + S390X.HasAESCTR = kmctr.Has(aes...) + } + if facilities.Has(msa8) { + kma := kmaQuery() + S390X.HasAESGCM = kma.Has(aes...) + } + } + + // compute message digest + kimd := kimdQuery() // intermediate (no padding) + klmd := klmdQuery() // last (padding) + S390X.HasSHA1 = kimd.Has(sha1) && klmd.Has(sha1) + S390X.HasSHA256 = kimd.Has(sha256) && klmd.Has(sha256) + S390X.HasSHA512 = kimd.Has(sha512) && klmd.Has(sha512) + S390X.HasGHASH = kimd.Has(ghash) // KLMD-GHASH does not exist + sha3 := []function{ + sha3_224, sha3_256, sha3_384, sha3_512, + shake128, shake256, + } + S390X.HasSHA3 = kimd.Has(sha3...) && klmd.Has(sha3...) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1fb4b701 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func stfle() facilityList +TEXT ·stfle(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-32 + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 + MOVD $3, R0 // last doubleword index to store + XC $32, (R1), (R1) // clear 4 doublewords (32 bytes) + WORD $0xb2b01000 // store facility list extended (STFLE) + RET + +// func kmQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KM-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92E0024 // cipher message (KM) + RET + +// func kmcQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmcQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMC-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92F0024 // cipher message with chaining (KMC) + RET + +// func kmctrQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmctrQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMCTR-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92D4024 // cipher message with counter (KMCTR) + RET + +// func kmaQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmaQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMA-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xb9296024 // cipher message with authentication (KMA) + RET + +// func kimdQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kimdQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KIMD-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB93E0024 // compute intermediate message digest (KIMD) + RET + +// func klmdQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·klmdQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KLMD-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB93F0024 // compute last message digest (KLMD) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..384787ea --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build wasm + +package cpu + +// We're compiling the cpu package for an unknown (software-abstracted) CPU. +// Make CacheLinePad an empty struct and hope that the usual struct alignment +// rules are good enough. + +const cacheLineSize = 0 + +func initOptions() {} + +func archInit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e642f33 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build 386 || amd64 || amd64p32 + +package cpu + +import "runtime" + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "adx", Feature: &X86.HasADX}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &X86.HasAES}, + {Name: "avx", Feature: &X86.HasAVX}, + {Name: "avx2", Feature: &X86.HasAVX2}, + {Name: "avx512", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512}, + {Name: "avx512f", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512F}, + {Name: "avx512cd", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512CD}, + {Name: "avx512er", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512ER}, + {Name: "avx512pf", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512PF}, + {Name: "avx512vl", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VL}, + {Name: "avx512bw", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512BW}, + {Name: "avx512dq", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512DQ}, + {Name: "avx512ifma", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512IFMA}, + {Name: "avx512vbmi", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VBMI}, + {Name: "avx512vnniw", Feature: &X86.HasAVX5124VNNIW}, + {Name: "avx5124fmaps", Feature: &X86.HasAVX5124FMAPS}, + {Name: "avx512vpopcntdq", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ}, + {Name: "avx512vpclmulqdq", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VPCLMULQDQ}, + {Name: "avx512vnni", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VNNI}, + {Name: "avx512gfni", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512GFNI}, + {Name: "avx512vaes", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VAES}, + {Name: "avx512vbmi2", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VBMI2}, + {Name: "avx512bitalg", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512BITALG}, + {Name: "avx512bf16", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512BF16}, + {Name: "amxtile", Feature: &X86.HasAMXTile}, + {Name: "amxint8", Feature: &X86.HasAMXInt8}, + {Name: "amxbf16", Feature: &X86.HasAMXBF16}, + {Name: "bmi1", Feature: &X86.HasBMI1}, + {Name: "bmi2", Feature: &X86.HasBMI2}, + {Name: "cx16", Feature: &X86.HasCX16}, + {Name: "erms", Feature: &X86.HasERMS}, + {Name: "fma", Feature: &X86.HasFMA}, + {Name: "osxsave", Feature: &X86.HasOSXSAVE}, + {Name: "pclmulqdq", Feature: &X86.HasPCLMULQDQ}, + {Name: "popcnt", Feature: &X86.HasPOPCNT}, + {Name: "rdrand", Feature: &X86.HasRDRAND}, + {Name: "rdseed", Feature: &X86.HasRDSEED}, + {Name: "sse3", Feature: &X86.HasSSE3}, + {Name: "sse41", Feature: &X86.HasSSE41}, + {Name: "sse42", Feature: &X86.HasSSE42}, + {Name: "ssse3", Feature: &X86.HasSSSE3}, + {Name: "avxifma", Feature: &X86.HasAVXIFMA}, + {Name: "avxvnni", Feature: &X86.HasAVXVNNI}, + {Name: "avxvnniint8", Feature: &X86.HasAVXVNNIInt8}, + + // These capabilities should always be enabled on amd64: + {Name: "sse2", Feature: &X86.HasSSE2, Required: runtime.GOARCH == "amd64"}, + } +} + +func archInit() { + + Initialized = true + + maxID, _, _, _ := cpuid(0, 0) + + if maxID < 1 { + return + } + + _, _, ecx1, edx1 := cpuid(1, 0) + X86.HasSSE2 = isSet(26, edx1) + + X86.HasSSE3 = isSet(0, ecx1) + X86.HasPCLMULQDQ = isSet(1, ecx1) + X86.HasSSSE3 = isSet(9, ecx1) + X86.HasFMA = isSet(12, ecx1) + X86.HasCX16 = isSet(13, ecx1) + X86.HasSSE41 = isSet(19, ecx1) + X86.HasSSE42 = isSet(20, ecx1) + X86.HasPOPCNT = isSet(23, ecx1) + X86.HasAES = isSet(25, ecx1) + X86.HasOSXSAVE = isSet(27, ecx1) + X86.HasRDRAND = isSet(30, ecx1) + + var osSupportsAVX, osSupportsAVX512 bool + // For XGETBV, OSXSAVE bit is required and sufficient. + if X86.HasOSXSAVE { + eax, _ := xgetbv() + // Check if XMM and YMM registers have OS support. + osSupportsAVX = isSet(1, eax) && isSet(2, eax) + + if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" { + // Darwin requires special AVX512 checks, see cpu_darwin_x86.go + osSupportsAVX512 = osSupportsAVX && darwinSupportsAVX512() + } else { + // Check if OPMASK and ZMM registers have OS support. + osSupportsAVX512 = osSupportsAVX && isSet(5, eax) && isSet(6, eax) && isSet(7, eax) + } + } + + X86.HasAVX = isSet(28, ecx1) && osSupportsAVX + + if maxID < 7 { + return + } + + eax7, ebx7, ecx7, edx7 := cpuid(7, 0) + X86.HasBMI1 = isSet(3, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX2 = isSet(5, ebx7) && osSupportsAVX + X86.HasBMI2 = isSet(8, ebx7) + X86.HasERMS = isSet(9, ebx7) + X86.HasRDSEED = isSet(18, ebx7) + X86.HasADX = isSet(19, ebx7) + + X86.HasAVX512 = isSet(16, ebx7) && osSupportsAVX512 // Because avx-512 foundation is the core required extension + if X86.HasAVX512 { + X86.HasAVX512F = true + X86.HasAVX512CD = isSet(28, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512ER = isSet(27, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512PF = isSet(26, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512VL = isSet(31, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512BW = isSet(30, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512DQ = isSet(17, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512IFMA = isSet(21, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512VBMI = isSet(1, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX5124VNNIW = isSet(2, edx7) + X86.HasAVX5124FMAPS = isSet(3, edx7) + X86.HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ = isSet(14, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VPCLMULQDQ = isSet(10, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VNNI = isSet(11, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512GFNI = isSet(8, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VAES = isSet(9, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VBMI2 = isSet(6, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512BITALG = isSet(12, ecx7) + } + + X86.HasAMXTile = isSet(24, edx7) + X86.HasAMXInt8 = isSet(25, edx7) + X86.HasAMXBF16 = isSet(22, edx7) + + // These features depend on the second level of extended features. + if eax7 >= 1 { + eax71, _, _, edx71 := cpuid(7, 1) + if X86.HasAVX512 { + X86.HasAVX512BF16 = isSet(5, eax71) + } + if X86.HasAVX { + X86.HasAVXIFMA = isSet(23, eax71) + X86.HasAVXVNNI = isSet(4, eax71) + X86.HasAVXVNNIInt8 = isSet(4, edx71) + } + } +} + +func isSet(bitpos uint, value uint32) bool { + return value&(1<> 63)) +) + +// For those platforms don't have a 'cpuid' equivalent we use HWCAP/HWCAP2 +// These are initialized in cpu_$GOARCH.go +// and should not be changed after they are initialized. +var hwCap uint +var hwCap2 uint + +func readHWCAP() error { + // For Go 1.21+, get auxv from the Go runtime. + if a := getAuxv(); len(a) > 0 { + for len(a) >= 2 { + tag, val := a[0], uint(a[1]) + a = a[2:] + switch tag { + case _AT_HWCAP: + hwCap = val + case _AT_HWCAP2: + hwCap2 = val + } + } + return nil + } + + buf, err := os.ReadFile(procAuxv) + if err != nil { + // e.g. on android /proc/self/auxv is not accessible, so silently + // ignore the error and leave Initialized = false. On some + // architectures (e.g. arm64) doinit() implements a fallback + // readout and will set Initialized = true again. + return err + } + bo := hostByteOrder() + for len(buf) >= 2*(uintSize/8) { + var tag, val uint + switch uintSize { + case 32: + tag = uint(bo.Uint32(buf[0:])) + val = uint(bo.Uint32(buf[4:])) + buf = buf[8:] + case 64: + tag = uint(bo.Uint64(buf[0:])) + val = uint(bo.Uint64(buf[8:])) + buf = buf[16:] + } + switch tag { + case _AT_HWCAP: + hwCap = val + case _AT_HWCAP2: + hwCap2 = val + } + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..56a7e1a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import "strconv" + +// parseRelease parses a dot-separated version number. It follows the semver +// syntax, but allows the minor and patch versions to be elided. +// +// This is a copy of the Go runtime's parseRelease from +// https://golang.org/cl/209597. +func parseRelease(rel string) (major, minor, patch int, ok bool) { + // Strip anything after a dash or plus. + for i := range len(rel) { + if rel[i] == '-' || rel[i] == '+' { + rel = rel[:i] + break + } + } + + next := func() (int, bool) { + for i := range len(rel) { + if rel[i] == '.' { + ver, err := strconv.Atoi(rel[:i]) + rel = rel[i+1:] + return ver, err == nil + } + } + ver, err := strconv.Atoi(rel) + rel = "" + return ver, err == nil + } + if major, ok = next(); !ok || rel == "" { + return + } + if minor, ok = next(); !ok || rel == "" { + return + } + patch, ok = next() + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4cd64c70 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && arm64 + +package cpu + +import ( + "errors" + "io" + "os" + "strings" +) + +func readLinuxProcCPUInfo() error { + f, err := os.Open("/proc/cpuinfo") + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer f.Close() + + var buf [1 << 10]byte // enough for first CPU + n, err := io.ReadFull(f, buf[:]) + if err != nil && err != io.ErrUnexpectedEOF { + return err + } + in := string(buf[:n]) + const features = "\nFeatures : " + i := strings.Index(in, features) + if i == -1 { + return errors.New("no CPU features found") + } + in = in[i+len(features):] + if i := strings.Index(in, "\n"); i != -1 { + in = in[:i] + } + m := map[string]*bool{} + + initOptions() // need it early here; it's harmless to call twice + for _, o := range options { + m[o.Name] = o.Feature + } + // The EVTSTRM field has alias "evstrm" in Go, but Linux calls it "evtstrm". + m["evtstrm"] = &ARM64.HasEVTSTRM + + for _, f := range strings.Fields(in) { + if p, ok := m[f]; ok { + *p = true + } + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f92ac9a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +// getAuxvFn is non-nil on Go 1.21+ (via runtime_auxv_go121.go init) +// on platforms that use auxv. +var getAuxvFn func() []uintptr + +func getAuxv() []uintptr { + if getAuxvFn == nil { + return nil + } + return getAuxvFn() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c9788ea --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.21 + +package cpu + +import ( + _ "unsafe" // for linkname +) + +//go:linkname runtime_getAuxv runtime.getAuxv +func runtime_getAuxv() []uintptr + +func init() { + getAuxvFn = runtime_getAuxv +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b9ccb09 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Recreate a getsystemcfg syscall handler instead of +// using the one provided by x/sys/unix to avoid having +// the dependency between them. (See golang.org/issue/32102) +// Moreover, this file will be used during the building of +// gccgo's libgo and thus must not used a CGo method. + +//go:build aix && gccgo + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" +) + +//extern getsystemcfg +func gccgoGetsystemcfg(label uint32) (r uint64) + +func callgetsystemcfg(label int) (r1 uintptr, e1 syscall.Errno) { + r1 = uintptr(gccgoGetsystemcfg(uint32(label))) + e1 = syscall.GetErrno() + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8b6cdbe --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Minimal copy of x/sys/unix so the cpu package can make a +// system call on AIX without depending on x/sys/unix. +// (See golang.org/issue/32102) + +//go:build aix && ppc64 && gc + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_getsystemcfg getsystemcfg "libc.a/shr_64.o" + +//go:linkname libc_getsystemcfg libc_getsystemcfg + +type syscallFunc uintptr + +var libc_getsystemcfg syscallFunc + +type errno = syscall.Errno + +// Implemented in runtime/syscall_aix.go. +func rawSyscall6(trap, nargs, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err errno) +func syscall6(trap, nargs, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err errno) + +func callgetsystemcfg(label int) (r1 uintptr, e1 errno) { + r1, _, e1 = syscall6(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&libc_getsystemcfg)), 1, uintptr(label), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_darwin_x86_gc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_darwin_x86_gc.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d0888b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_darwin_x86_gc.go @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Minimal copy of x/sys/unix so the cpu package can make a +// system call on Darwin without depending on x/sys/unix. + +//go:build darwin && amd64 && gc + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +type _C_int int32 + +// adapted from unix.Uname() at x/sys/unix/syscall_darwin.go L419 +func darwinOSRelease(release *[256]byte) error { + // from x/sys/unix/zerrors_openbsd_amd64.go + const ( + CTL_KERN = 0x1 + KERN_OSRELEASE = 0x2 + ) + + mib := []_C_int{CTL_KERN, KERN_OSRELEASE} + n := unsafe.Sizeof(*release) + + return sysctl(mib, &release[0], &n, nil, 0) +} + +type Errno = syscall.Errno + +var _zero uintptr // Single-word zero for use when we need a valid pointer to 0 bytes. + +// from x/sys/unix/zsyscall_darwin_amd64.go L791-807 +func sysctl(mib []_C_int, old *byte, oldlen *uintptr, new *byte, newlen uintptr) error { + var _p0 unsafe.Pointer + if len(mib) > 0 { + _p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&mib[0]) + } else { + _p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&_zero) + } + if _, _, err := syscall_syscall6( + libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr, + uintptr(_p0), + uintptr(len(mib)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(old)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(oldlen)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(new)), + uintptr(newlen), + ); err != 0 { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +var libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr uintptr + +// adapted from internal/cpu/cpu_arm64_darwin.go +func darwinSysctlEnabled(name []byte) bool { + out := int32(0) + nout := unsafe.Sizeof(out) + if ret := sysctlbyname(&name[0], (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&out)), &nout, nil, 0); ret != nil { + return false + } + return out > 0 +} + +//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_sysctl sysctl "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib" + +var libc_sysctlbyname_trampoline_addr uintptr + +// adapted from runtime/sys_darwin.go in the pattern of sysctl() above, as defined in x/sys/unix +func sysctlbyname(name *byte, old *byte, oldlen *uintptr, new *byte, newlen uintptr) error { + if _, _, err := syscall_syscall6( + libc_sysctlbyname_trampoline_addr, + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(name)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(old)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(oldlen)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(new)), + uintptr(newlen), + 0, + ); err != 0 { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_sysctlbyname sysctlbyname "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib" + +// Implemented in the runtime package (runtime/sys_darwin.go) +func syscall_syscall6(fn, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err Errno) + +//go:linkname syscall_syscall6 syscall.syscall6 diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index 4816a16e..c7382b41 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -120,6 +120,15 @@ go.uber.org/zap/internal/pool go.uber.org/zap/internal/stacktrace go.uber.org/zap/zapcore go.uber.org/zap/zapgrpc +# golang.org/x/crypto v0.43.0 +## explicit; go 1.24.0 +golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish +golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20 +golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519 +golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias +golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305 +golang.org/x/crypto/ssh +golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf # golang.org/x/net v0.46.0 ## explicit; go 1.24.0 golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts @@ -131,6 +140,7 @@ golang.org/x/net/internal/timeseries golang.org/x/net/trace # golang.org/x/sys v0.37.0 ## explicit; go 1.24.0 +golang.org/x/sys/cpu golang.org/x/sys/unix golang.org/x/sys/windows # golang.org/x/text v0.30.0